Duni v. United Technologies Corporation/Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Div.

• Decision Date: 20 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 15373,15373
• Citation: 682 A.2d 99,239 Conn. 19
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Beatrice DUNI v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION/PRATT AND WHITNEY AIRCRAFT DIVISION et al.

Page 99

682 A.2d 99

239 Conn. 19

Beatrice DUNI v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION/PRATT AND WHITNEY AIRCRAFT

DIVISION et al.

No. 15373.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 30, 1996.

Decided Aug. 20, 1996.

Sydney T. Schulman, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Nancy S. Rosenbaum, Glastonbury, for appellees (named defendant et al.).

Kenneth H. Kennedy, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, and William J. McCullough and Michael J. Belzer, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee (defendant second injury fund).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

PALMER, Justice.

The dispositive issue raised by this appeal is whether a stipulation entered into by an employee and his employer in full and final settlement of the employee's workers' compensation claim can bar a claim for survivor's benefits by the employee's widow after the death of the employee. The employee, William Duni (decedent), filed a workers' compensation claim against his former employer, United Technologies Corporation/Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Division (Pratt & Whitney), the named defendant. The decedent, Pratt & Whitney, the defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty) ¹ and the defendant Second Injury and Compensation Assurance Fund (fund) ² entered into a stipulated settlement agreement that purported to bind the decedent and anyone else who might ever have a claim against the defendants on account of the decedent's work-related injuries. After the decedent's death, his widow, the plaintiff, Beatrice Duni, filed a claim for survivor's benefits under General Statutes § 31-306. ³ Pratt & Whitney and Liberty sought dismissal of the claim on the ground that it was barred by the settlement agreement. The workers' compensation commissioner (commissioner) denied the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the workers' compensation review board (review board) reversed the decision of the commissioner, concluding that the settlement agreement was binding on the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed from the decision of the review board to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We affirm the decision of the review board.

The facts relevant to this appeal are undisputed. The decedent was employed by Pratt & Whitney from 1941 to December, 1982. On December 3, 1984, the decedent filed a workers' compensation claim asserting that during the course of his employment with Pratt & Whitney he had been exposed to various substances that had caused injury to his lungs, heart, eyes, nose and other body parts, leaving him disabled.

The decedent and the defendants subsequently agreed to settle the claim and entered into an agreement entitled "Stipulation for Full and Final Settlement" (stipulation). Under the terms of the stipulation, the defendants agreed to make a lump sum payment to the decedent in return for his agreement to release them from any further liability in connection with his claim. The stipulation purported to "constitute a complete satisfaction of all claims due or to become due at any time in favor of anybody on account of the claimed injuries or on account of any condition in any way resulting out of the said injuries." ⁴ The parties' stipulation was approved by the commissioner on September 15, 1986.

On December 14, 1991, the decedent died. Approximately two months later, the plaintiff submitted to Pratt & Whitney a claim for survivor's benefits pursuant to § 31-306. The plaintiff alleged that the decedent's death was the result of the injuries that he had sustained during the course of his employment with Pratt & Whitney and, consequently, that she was entitled to survivor's benefits.

Pratt & Whitney and Liberty contested the claim and, thereafter, sought its dismissal on the ground that the stipulation barred the plaintiff's recovery. ⁵ The commissioner denied the motion, concluding that the plaintiff's right to survivor's benefits was independent of the decedent's claim and that the plaintiff was not bound by the stipulation because she was not a signatory to it. The defendants appealed to the review board, which reversed the commissioner's decision on the ground that the plaintiff's application for survivor's benefits was precluded by the stipulation. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the review board improperly concluded that she was not entitled to seek survivor's benefits under § 31-306. Specifically, the plaintiff maintains that her right to compensation under § 31-306 is completely independent of the decedent's rights to compensation for work-related injuries under the Workers' Compensation Act (act), ⁶ and, accordingly, that the decedent lacked the authority to settle any claim for survivor's benefits that she might later have arising from his work-related injuries. Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that the stipulation cannot reasonably be construed to bar her right to make a claim under § 31-306. We disagree with both of these claims.

I

The plaintiff first contends that the stipulation entered into by the decedent does not bar her claim for workers' compensation benefits because her rights under § 31-306 are entirely independent of the decedent's compensation rights and, consequently, that the decedent had no authority to compromise her right to seek benefits under § 31-306 after his death. We disagree.

Our resolution of this issue is guided by well established principles of statutory construction. "Our fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 409, 645 A.2d 965 (1994); Fleming v. Garnett, 231 Conn. 77, 92, 646 A.2d 1308 (1994). "We have previously recognized that our construction of the Workers' Compensation Act should make every part operative and harmonious with every other part insofar as is possible.... In applying these principles, we are mindful that the legislature is presumed to have intended a just and rational result...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dos Santos v. F.D. Rich Construction Inc., 233 Conn. 14, 20-21, 658 A.2d 83 (1995).

"It is well established that [a]lthough not dispositive, we accord great weight to the construction given to the workers' compensation statutes by the commissioner and review board.... A state agency is not entitled, however, to special deference when its determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Davis v. Norwich, 232 Conn. 311, 317, 654 A.2d 1221 (1995).

As is often the case in the context of workers' compensation legislation; see Dos Santos v. F.D. Rich Construction Inc., supra, 233 Conn. at 20, 658 A.2d 83; the statutory language provides little guidance for our determination of whether the decedent, in settling his own workers' compensation claim, also had the authority to compromise whatever right the plaintiff might have to survivor's benefits. Furthermore, the pertinent legislative history is silent on the question. Several considerations persuade us, however, that, under our statutory scheme, a surviving dependent's right to compensation is subordinate to an employee's right to settle his or her workers' compensation claim.

First, the availability of survivorship benefits under § 31-306 is inextricably linked to, and wholly dependent upon, the existence of a compensable injury or illness suffered by the employee. Thus, in the absence of a work-related injury or illness, a surviving dependent of the employee has no claim whatsoever under § 31-306. Moreover, a dependent has no compensation rights unless and until the employee dies as a result of the occupational injury or disease. Further, the calculation of the amount of survivor's benefits to which a dependent may be entitled is determined as of the date of the employee's injury and not as of the date on which the dependent becomes eligible to receive such benefits. General Statutes § 31-306(a)(2). Similarly, a person who has not attained dependent status until after the date of the employee's injury is not entitled to bring a claim under § 31-306. See General Statutes § 31-275(6). ⁷ Thus, a surviving dependent's compensation rights under § 31-306 flow directly from the work-related injury or disease suffered by the employee. ⁸

Second, our conclusion advances the public policy favoring the pretrial resolution of disputes. As we have long recognized in the context of civil actions, "the pretrial settlement of claims is to be encouraged because, in the vast number of cases, an amicable resolution of the dispute is in the best interests of all concerned. 'The efficient administration of the courts is subserved by the ending of disputes without the delay and expense of a trial, and the philosophy or ideal of justice is served in the amicable solution of controversies.' Krattenstein v. G. Fox & Co., 155 Conn. 609, 614, 236 A.2d 466 (1967).... At a time when our courts confront an unprecedented volume of litigation, we reaffirm our strong support for the implementation of policies and procedures that encourage fair and amicable pretrial settlements." Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky, 231 Conn. 168, 174, 646 A.2d 195 (1994). We see no reason to eschew this sound public policy in connection with claims arising under our workers' compensation statutes.

To conclude, as the plaintiff urges, that an employee may...