Dos Santos v. F.D. Rich Const., Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 15082,15082
• Citation: 658 A.2d 83,233 Conn. 14
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Luis DOS SANTOS v. F.D. RICH CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al.

Page 83

658 A.2d 83

233 Conn. 14

Luis DOS SANTOS v. F.D. RICH CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al.

No. 15082.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 10, 1995.

Decided May 9, 1995.

Richard G. Kascak, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Serge G. Mihaly, for appellants (named defendant et al.).

Ernie R. Walker, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., and William J. McCullough, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee (defendant Second Injury Fund).

Before CALLAHAN, BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal from the compensation review board (board) is the meaning of the term "agreement" within the notice requirement for the transfer of liability to the second injury fund (fund) pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 31-349 of the Workers' Compensation Act (act). ¹ The defendants ² F.D. Rich Construction Company, Inc. (Rich), and its workers' compensation insurer, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (Fidelity), appeal from the decision of the board affirming the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner (commissioner) that their agreement for compensation with the plaintiff, Luis Dos Santos, was defective notice under § 31-349 because it previously had neither been signed by Dos Santos nor been approved by the commissioner. We reverse the board's decision. ³

The following facts are undisputed. On September 17, 1986, Dos Santos suffered injury to his chest, ribs and legs during the course of his employment with Rich. As a result of this injury, he has been totally disabled since September 18, 1986, and has received temporary total disability benefits from Rich pursuant to General Statutes § 31-307. ⁴ He also has received payment from Rich for his medical and hospital bills pursuant to General Statutes § 31-294. ⁵

On May 25, 1988, Rich sent to Dos Santos a voluntary agreement that had been signed by Fidelity, but that did not bear Dos Santos' signature or a notation of the approval of the commissioner. See General Statutes § 31-296. ⁶ Dos Santos signed the voluntary agreement and returned it to Rich on June 28, 1988.

On that same day, May 25, 1988, the defendants mailed a certified letter with return receipt requested to the treasurer of the state of Connecticut to provide the fund with notice of their intent to transfer to the fund, pursuant to § 31-349, liability for Dos Santos' claim for workers' compensation benefits. ⁷ Along with this letter, the defendants included all records and documentation concerning Dos Santos' claim, including a copy of the voluntary agreement that had been signed by Fidelity, but that had neither been signed by Dos Santos nor been approved by the commissioner. The fund acknowledged receipt of this letter by correspondence dated May 27, 1988. The fund then mailed to the defendants a letter dated May 31, 1988, that again acknowledged the fund's receipt of the letter of May 25, 1988, and, further, advised the defendants that the information they had furnished was "complete and up to date." On July 11, 1988, the defendants mailed the fully executed voluntary agreement to the commissioner, and the commissioner approved it on July 14, 1988.

On August 24, 1988, the defendants sent to the fund a copy of the fully signed and approved voluntary agreement related to Dos Santos' claim. The defendants subsequently filed with the fund additional medical reports pertaining to Dos Santos' claim. On May 13, 1991, after contacts between the defendants and the fund pertaining to the transfer of Dos Santos' claim, the fund formally advised the defendants that it would not accept transfer of Dos Santos' case because of late notice to the fund. Following a formal hearing before a workers' compensation commissioner on September 10, 1991, the commissioner agreed with the fund that the notice was defective because the defendants' "failure to file with the Fund within the prescribed period both the notice and [an] executed and approved Voluntary Agreement or [a] Finding and Award constituted a failure to comply with the requirements of Section 31-349." Further, the commissioner rejected the defendants' estoppel claim on the ground that they had failed to establish "that the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury."

The defendants then appealed that decision to the board pursuant to General Statutes § 31-301. Noting that § 31-349 is subject to strict interpretation and that § 31-296 requires voluntary agreements to be signed by the parties and approved by a commissioner, the board agreed with the commissioner's interpretation of § 31-349. The board also concluded that the commissioner had properly rejected the defendants' estoppel argument and, accordingly, affirmed the commissioner's finding. The defendants appealed the board's decision to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c).

The defendants claim that the board incorrectly concluded that the notice provisions of § 31-349 are only satisfied by the filing of an agreement if such agreement previously had been signed by the parties, including the claimant, and approved by the commissioner. The defendants contend that the plain meaning of the phrase "copy of the agreement " in § 31-349 requires only a copy of the agreement that, in fact, existed between the parties, not a fully signed and approved "voluntary agreement " pursuant to § 31-296 (Emphasis added). They also argue that their proffered interpretation is the most logical reading of that phrase in light of the purposes of § 31-349 and the remainder of the act's provisions. We agree with the defendants on all points.

"In construing any statute, we seek to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, 220 Conn. 749, 755, 601 A.2d 1005 (1992)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vaillancourt v. New Britain Machine/Litton, 224 Conn. 382, 390, 618 A.2d 1340 (1993). "It is an axiom of statutory construction that legislative intent is to be determined by an analysis of the language actually used in the legislation. Caltabiano v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 662, 666, 560 A.2d 975 (1989)." Vaillancourt v. New Britain Machine/Litton, supra, at 391, 618 A.2d 1340. "[W]hen the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we need look no further than the words themselves because we assume that the language expresses the legislature's intent. American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, 205 Conn. 178, 193, 530 A.2d 171 (1987). We have acknowledged, however, in the context of workers' compensation legislation, that [s]uch guidance is often of little help ... since words seldom have precise and unvarying meanings. Jacques v. H.O. Penn Machinery Co., 166 Conn. 352, 359 n. 3, 349 A.2d 847 (1974). Weinberg v. ARA Vending Co., 223 Conn. 336, 340-41, 612 A.2d 1203 (1992).

"When the language of a statute is unclear, we may ascertain the intent of the legislature by looking beyond the language to the statute's legislative history and the purpose that the statute was intended to serve. [Weinberg v. ARA Vending Co., 223 Conn.] 341, 612 A.2d 1203. We have previously recognized that our construction of the Workers' Compensation Act should make every part operative and harmonious with every other part insofar as is possible.... Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 104, 491 A.2d 368 (1985). In applying these principles, we are mindful that the legislature is presumed to have intended a just and rational result. Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179, 187, 592 A.2d 912 (1991)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vaillancourt v. New Britain Machine/Litton, supra, 224 Conn. at 390-91, 618 A.2d 1340. Finally, although we ordinarily accord deference to the construction of the act by the commissioner and the board; see Crochiere v. Board of Education, 227 Conn. 333, 354, 630 A.2d 1027 (1993); we do not do so in this case because the meaning of "agreement" under § 31-349 is a question of law that previously has not been subject to judicial scrutiny. Davis v. Norwich, 232 Conn. 311, 317, 654 A.2d 1221 (1995).

Our primary focus, therefore, is on the express language of § 31-349. This section provides, inter alia, as follows: "As a condition precedent to the liability of the second injury fund, the employer or his insurance carrier must, ninety days prior to the expiration of the one-hundred-four-week period, notify the custodian of the second injury fund of the pending case and shall furnish to said custodian a copy of the agreement or award together with all information purporting to support his claim as to the liability of the second injury fund, and shall make available to the custodian all medical reports as the custodian shall desire." General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 31-349. The language is clear that, in addition to providing the fund with notice "of the pending case," the employer or insurer must provide the fund with a copy of either the agreement or the award.

In this case, it is undisputed that the defendants did not provide the fund with a copy of an award within the prescribed period. It is also uncontested, however, that Dos Santos has been receiving workers' compensation benefits since his injury in 1986 and that the defendants, within the statutory period, did provide the fund with a copy of an agreement that was subsequently signed by Dos Santos and approved by the commissioner. Thus, the resolution of this case depends upon whether the agreement of May 25, 1988, was an "agreement" within the meaning of § 31-349.

The defendants, quoting Sage v. Wilcox, 6 Conn. 81, 85 (1826),...