Dunkel v. Hamilton, 3:15-cv-949-J-34PDB
| Decision Date | 08 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:15-cv-949-J-34PDB,3:15-cv-949-J-34PDB |
| Parties | PAMELA DUNKEL, Plaintiff, v. DAWN HAMILTON, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
In 2013, in separate federal criminal cases in the Eastern District of Virginia, Michael Dunkel and Dawn Hamilton pleaded guilty to major fraud against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1031.1 His wife, Pamela Dunkel, without a lawyer, now sues Hamilton for torts based on her contention Hamilton's fraud caused her husband's conviction.2 Doc. 24. Before the Court is Hamilton's motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), (b)(3), and (b)(6) for lack of personaljurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Doc. 27, and Dunkel's response in opposition, Doc. 38. The motion does not request dismissal with prejudice. See generally Doc. 27.
Dunkel filed the original complaint in July 2015. Doc. 1. Hamilton moved to dismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Doc. 12. Dunkel responded by filing an amended complaint. Doc. 24. The Court therefore denied the motion to dismiss as moot. Doc. 25. Hamilton then filed the current motion to dismiss. Doc. 27. The parties later met and filed a case management report, and the Court entered a case management and scheduling order. Doc. 39; Doc. 45. Hamilton moved to stay discovery pending a decision on the motion to dismiss. Doc. 46. The Court granted the motion and stayed all deadlines in the case management and scheduling order. Doc. 47. There are no other pending motions.
The amended complaint alleges the following facts. Dunkel is a citizen of Florida. Doc. 24 ¶ 2. She is married to Michael Dunkel. Doc. 24 ¶ 32. Hamilton is a citizen of Maryland. Doc. 24 ¶ 3. Security Assistance Corporation ("SAC") is a Virginia corporation with its principal place of business in Virginia. Doc. 24 ¶¶ 7, 8. SAC participated in the 8(a) Business Development Program administered by the United States Small Business Administration.3 Doc. 24 ¶ 9. To gain that participation,Hamilton falsely represented she was SAC's owner and chief executive officer. Doc. 24 ¶¶ 7, 20, 21.
From 2005 to 2012, Michael Dunkel had a business relationship with Hamilton and SAC. Doc. 24 ¶ 22. She misled him "into believing she had appropriate certifications to deal with" the National Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA") and other government agencies. Doc. 24 ¶¶ 23, 36. She knew she did not because she knew SAC had no minority owner and therefore did not qualify for participation in the 8(a) program. Doc. 24 ¶ 24. She concealed from the Dunkels that SAC should not have participated in the 8(a) program. Doc. 24 ¶ 41. As a result, he "entered into a [fraudulent] contractual relationship" with her, was associated with the fraud, was convicted of a federal crime, was sentenced to 60 months' imprisonment, and was ordered to forfeit $2.9 million. Doc. 24 ¶¶ 37-39, 43, 47.
Michael Dunkel's imprisonment has caused Dunkel depression, emotional distress, and financial loss. Doc. 24 ¶¶ 28, 29, 30, 34. She lost her home, had to move to rental property, and had to find work more than an hour away. Doc. 24 ¶ 29. She lost his "society, affection[,] and companionship" after "29 years of partnership." Doc. 24 ¶ 32. She has to do things he used to do and work "endless hours" to meet "daily living obligations" and care for her elderly mother-in-law. Doc. 24 ¶¶ 33, 34.
Dunkel asserts common law tort claims for fraudulent misrepresentation (count I), intentional infliction of emotional distress (count II), loss of consortium(count III), fraud in the inducement (count IV), and concealment (count V). Doc. 24. She seeks compensatory and punitive damages, including damages for losing her home, losing her husband's current and future income, pain and suffering, and the $2.9 million forfeiture amount. Doc. 24 ¶¶ 45-47.
Hamilton argues the Court should dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction and under Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue, observing the amended complaint does not allege contact between her and Florida. Doc. 27 at 4-8. She also argues the Court should dismiss the claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state claims upon which relief may be granted, contending Dunkel has alleged insufficient facts to support any of them. Doc. 27 at 10-18. Within that argument, she contends Dunkel lacks standing to bring the fraud-based claims.
Hamilton attaches to the motion: (1) a plea agreement in which Michael Dunkel pleaded guilty to major fraud against the United States, Doc. 27-1; (2) a stipulated statement of facts in which Michael Dunkel stipulated to the truth and accuracy of facts supporting his plea, Doc. 27-2; (3) a consent order of forfeiture in which Michael Dunkel agreed to the entry of an order of forfeiture in the form of a money judgment for $2,960,697.37, Doc. 27-3; and (4) the judgment in which Michael Dunkel was sentenced to 60 months' imprisonment, to be followed by 24 months' supervised release, and ordered to pay $12,500 in fines, Doc. 27-4.
Dunkel responds the Court has personal jurisdiction over Hamilton and venue is proper in this district because Michael Dunkel performed work for SAC at NASAfacilities here and Hamilton caused her harm here. Doc. 38 at 2-10. She contends the Court should not consider Michael Dunkel's guilty plea because his decision to plead was a "business decision" based on age and health and he has moved for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the ground the plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.4 Doc. 38 at 1, 11. She details facts she contends establish Hamilton's fraud. Doc. 38 at 2-10.
Dunkel attaches to the response: (1) an agreement between Michael Dunkel and SAC executed in October 2007 in which he agrees to provide "consulting services" to SAC until September 2011, Doc. 38-1; (2) June 2011 testimony by Hamilton before a subcommittee of the United States House of Representative's Committee on Small Business in which she states she is SAC's president and chief executive officer,5 Doc. 38-2 at 2-19; (3) an article from the Washington Business Journal in which a reporter states she, like the congressional subcommittee, had been "duped" by Hamilton, Doc. 38-2 at 20; (4) proposed debarments from the 8(a) program from an unspecified source,6 Doc. 38-3; (5) emails between Michael Dunkel and SAC employees,7 Doc. 38-4; (6) a 2015 article from the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia explaining Hamilton agreed to pay $300,000 to settle civil claims "arising from a fraudulent scheme to establish SAC as a front company,"8 Doc. 38-5; (7) Hamilton's prepared statement for her congressional subcommittee testimony, Doc. 38-6; and (8) a stipulated statement of facts from the criminal case against Hamilton in which she stipulated to the truth and accuracy of facts supporting her guilty plea,9Doc. 38-7. Dunkel argues the documents prove Hamilton's fraud and her husband's innocence. See generally Doc. 38.
The stipulated facts supporting Michael Dunkel's and Hamilton's respective guilty pleas are detailed and lengthy. See generally Doc. 27-2; Doc. 38-7. Both Michael Dunkel and Hamilton admitted to having knowingly defrauded the United States through falsities bearing on SAC's ability to participate in the 8(a) program and obtain preferences for bids on government projects. See Doc. 27-2; Doc. 38-7.
A court must hold a pleading drafted by a pro se litigant to a less stringent standard than one drafted by a lawyer. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). Although a court must treat a pro se pleading leniently, the court cannot rewrite a deficient pleading for a party or otherwise serve as her de facto counsel. GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Here, because Dunkel is unrepresented, that less-stringent standard applies.
"No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our systemof government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies." Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (quoted authority omitted). "Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy." Id. "The doctrine limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong." Id. At a "constitutional minimum," a plaintiff must allege she "(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Id.
"In addition to these three constitutional requirements, ... prudential requirements pose additional limitations on standing." Hawes v. Gleicher, 745 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoted authority omitted). "For example, a party 'generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.'" Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). Unlike constitutional standing requirements, "the prudential requirements are essentially a matter of self-governance." CAMP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1270 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The question of prudential standing often is resolved by the nature and source of the claim. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500; see also Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Admins. of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 77 (1991) (). Whether...
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