Dunkley v. Hueler
| Decision Date | 14 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | A19-2047 |
| Parties | William M. Dunkley, et al., Appellants, v. Greg W. Hueler, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
Reversed and remanded
Hennepin County District Court
Eric A.O. Ruzicka, Andrew Brantingham, Christopher DeLong, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)
Tamara O'Neill Moreland, Inga K. (Schuchard) Kingland, Larkin Hoffman Daly & Lindgren, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bryan, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In this lakeshore property dispute, appellant property owners challenge summary judgment determining that two easement agreements prohibit them from using a driveway and private road to access their home. Because the easement agreements do not restrict appellants' proposed modification and use of the driveway and road, we reverse and remand.
This case involves property located on Lake Minnetonka in Orono. It is undisputed that appellants William and Susan Dunkley own and reside at 2709 Walters Port Lane (the Walters Port Property). Respondents Greg and Kelli Hueler own and reside at 2715 Pence Lane. In between these two properties is 2710 Pence Lane, which the Dunkleys purchased in 2017. The Walters Port Property is accessible by Walters Port Lane, a private road that the Dunkleys own. The other two properties are accessible by a driveway that connects to Pence Lane, a private road. The driveway is located on 2710 Pence. The following map shows the properties as they existed in 2017:1
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At issue in this case are two easement agreements dating back to the 1980s. In 1982, the Huelers' predecessors in interest owned 2715 Pence and the portion of 2710 Pence that contained the driveway connecting the two properties to Pence Lane. The Huelers' predecessors in interest sold this portion of 2710 Pence to the Dunkleys' predecessors in interest. In connection with the sale, the parties executed a Driveway Easement Agreement (the driveway agreement), which provides:
[The Huelers' predecessors in interest], their successors and assigns, shall have a perpetual, nonexclusive easement for driveway purposes over the driveway herein described for ingress to and egress from [2715 Pence], subject to the right of [the Dunkleys' predecessors in interest], [their] successors and assigns, to use part or all of said driveway for ingress and egress.
The driveway agreement also stated that the Dunkleys' predecessors in interest had "the right to relocate the driveway, except for its point of commencement and its point of termination."
At the time the driveway agreement was executed, Pence Lane was a public road. But in May 1984, the City of Orono vacated Pence Lane. The Dunkleys' and Huelers' predecessors in interest, and a third neighbor, succeeded to ownership of Pence Lane as tenants in common. In June 1984, the three parties executed a Road and Utility Easement Agreement (the road agreement).2 The road agreement provides:
The owners of the Walters Port Property were not parties to either the driveway agreement or the road agreement. As part of the 2017 purchase of 2710 Pence, the Dunkleys acquired an undivided one-third interest in Pence Lane as tenants in common.
After the purchase, the Dunkleys reconfigured the boundary line between the Walters Port Property and 2710 Pence. They first combined the two parcels, demolished the house located on 2710 Pence, and expanded the Walters Port Property house. They then subdivided the combined parcel to increase the size of the Walters Port Property and decrease the size of 2710 Pence, which they intended to sell. The Dunkleys planned to retain the Walters Port Property and a small portion of 2710 Pence where the driveway connects to Pence Lane. And they intended to modify the driveway so it could be used to access the Walters Port Property. The Huelers objected to the Dunkleys' proposed use of Pence Lane and the driveway to access the Walters Port Property.
In March 2018, the Dunkleys commenced this action, seeking to quiet title and to obtain a declaration that (1) the driveway agreement and the road agreement do not prohibit them from accessing the Walters Port Property using Pence Lane; and (2) as owners of 2710 Pence and tenants in common of Pence Lane, they have the right to use Pence Lane and modify and use 2710 Pence to access the Walters Port Property. The Huelers asserted a counterclaim, seeking, among other relief, a declaration that the Dunkleys may not use Pence Lane or the driveway to access the Walters Port Property. After discovery was complete, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
The district court granted the Huelers' motion, concluding that the driveway agreement and the road agreement prohibit the Dunkleys from using Pence Lane and thedriveway to access the Walters Port Property. The court reasoned that because the driveway agreement refers only to 2710 Pence and 2715 Pence, it only permits the parties to use the driveway for "ingress to and egress from" those two properties. And the court concluded that the road agreement's reference to only three properties—2710 Pence, 2715 Pence, and the neighbor's property—means that Pence Lane may not be used to access any other property.3 The Dunkleys appeal.
As a preliminary matter, the Huelers contend that the Dunkleys lack standing because their ownership status has changed since this case began. "Standing is the requirement that a party has a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court." State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 493 (Minn. 1996). A party has standing on appeal if her personal rights are "injuriously affected by the underlying adjudication." Glaze v. State, 909 N.W.2d 322, 325-26 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted).
The Huelers assert that the Dunkleys sold most of 2710 Pence, retaining only "a small portion of the Driveway" at its point of commencement at Pence Lane. The Dunkleysacknowledged in the district court and on appeal that they sold most of 2710 Pence. But they contend that they retained an interest in Pence Lane as tenants in common and retained a portion of the land under the driveway with "an exclusive option to replat" 2710 Pence in order to use the driveway to access the Walters Port Property.4 The Dunkleys argue that the summary judgment injuriously affects their remaining property rights.
We are persuaded that the Dunkleys have a sufficient stake in the controversy to pursue this appeal. Their ownership interests in Pence Lane and a portion of the driveway and their option to extend the driveway to access the Walters Port Property are adversely affected by the judgment. Accordingly, they have standing to bring this appeal.
Summary judgment is proper if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. A party opposing summary judgment must produce competent, admissible evidence that creates a genuine issue for trial. Twin Cities Metro-Certified Dev. Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 868 N.W.2d 713, 720 (Minn. App. 2015). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo to determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the district court properly applied the law. Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017).
An easement is "an interest in land in the possession of another which entitles the owner of such interest to a limited use or enjoyment of the land in which the interest exists." Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler, 177 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Minn. 1970). The express grant of an easement is a contract. Lindberg v. Fasching, 667 N.W.2d 481, 487 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 2003). The scope of an express easement "depends entirely upon the construction of the terms of the grant." Bergh & Mission Farms, Inc. v. Great Lakes Transmission, Inc., 565 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted). "[T]he extent of an easement should not be enlarged by legal construction beyond the objects originally contemplated or expressly agreed upon by the parties." Minneapolis Athletic Club, 177 N.W.2d at 789-90.
The grant of an easement limits the parties' right to use the property, so that both the grantor (i.e., the owner of the land on which the easement is located) and the easement holder can reasonably enjoy the property. Giles v. Luker, 9 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Minn. 1943). "Generally, the grant of an easement over land does not preclude the grantor from using the land in a manner not unreasonably interfering with the special use for which the easement was acquired." Minneapolis Athletic Club, 177 N.W.2d at 789; see also Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.9 cmt. c (2000) ("The person who holds the land burdened by a[n] [easement] is entitled to make all uses of the land that are not prohibited by the [easement] and that do not...
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