Dunn v. Mo. Dep't of Corrs.
| Decision Date | 22 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | WD84515 |
| Parties | JAMES DUNN, Appellant v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County The Honorable Daniel R Green, Judge
Before Alok Ahuja, P.J., and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., and Janet Sutton, JJ.
James Dunn is currently incarcerated based on sentences he received in 1997 for second-degree murder and armed criminal action. Dunn filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the Department of Corrections in the Circuit Court of Cole County. Dunn claimed that the Board of Probation and Parole had incorrectly recalculated his parole eligibility date. Dunn contended that the Board's recalculation was based on new Board regulations which were not in effect at the time he was sentenced, which changed the minimum prison term on Dunn's armed criminal action conviction. Dunn claimed that the Board's new parole eligibility calculation conflicted with the governing statutes, and violated multiple constitutional provisions. The circuit court granted the Department of Corrections' motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Dunn appeals. We affirm.
In June 1997, Dunn was convicted in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County of second-degree murder, in violation of § 565.021, [1] and armed criminal action, in violation of § 571.015. The charges arose from Dunn's fatal shooting of Larry Pearson in Maplewood on March 31, 1996. Dunn was convicted following a jury trial. The circuit court sentenced him to life imprisonment for both the murder and armed criminal action convictions, with the sentences ordered to run consecutively.
Beginning in 1979, § 571.015.1 has provided that, in connection with a first conviction of armed criminal action, "[n]o person convicted under this subsection shall be eligible for parole . . . for a period of three calendar years."
On August 1, 2019, Dunn received a notice from the Board of Probation and Parole that he was scheduled for a parole hearing on October 10, 2019. Dunn alleged that the Board scheduled the October 2019 parole hearing based on its view that §§ 558.019.3 and .4(1) required him to serve 85% of his sentence for second-degree murder (with his life sentence calculated at thirty years), and that he was required to serve an additional three years on his armed criminal action conviction by operation of § 571.015.1.
On October 15, 2019, Dunn received another notice from the Board, informing him that his parole hearing had been rescheduled to June 2036. Dunn requested an explanation for the seventeen-year delay of his initial parole hearing.
The Board explained that Dunn's parole eligibility on his armed criminal action conviction was governed by the "15 year rule" in the Board's "Procedures Governing the Granting of Parole and Conditional Release" (the "Blue Book").[2] Section 19(E) of the Blue Book specifies that "[o]ffenders serving life . . . sentences . . . may not be eligible for parole until a minimum of 15 years has been served, except where statute requires more time to be served." The Board also informed Dunn that although it previously scheduled offenders for an initial parole hearing two years prior to the conclusion of their minimum prison terms, the Board had adopted a new rule effective September 1, 2019, under which it was now scheduling offenders for an initial parole hearing four months prior to their earliest parole eligibility date.
Dunn filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the Department of Corrections in the Circuit Court of Cole County on September 1, 2020. Dunn argued that the Board's recalculation of his minimum parole eligibility date was in conflict with various Missouri statutes and regulations. Dunn also alleged that the Board's determination that he was required to serve a minimum of fifteen years on his life sentence for armed criminal action conflicted not only with the governing statutes, but also with one of the Board's own pre-2008 regulations. Dunn contended that the Board's retroactive application of its newer regulations constituted an unconstitutional ex post facto law. He also alleged that the redetermination of his parole eligibility date violated separation of powers principles, as well as Dunn's constitutional rights to due process of law and to the equal protection of the laws.
Both Dunn and the Department filed motions for judgment on the pleadings. The circuit court granted the Department's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and denied Dunn declaratory relief. Following the denial of his motion to set aside the judgment, Dunn filed the current appeal.
This Court reviews a circuit court's ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo. Woods v. Mo Dep't of Corr., 595 S.W.3d 504, 505 (Mo. 2020) (citing Mo. Mun. League v. State, 489 S.W.3d 765 767 (Mo. 2016)). "'[A] motion for judgment on the pleadings should be sustained if, from the face of the pleadings, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Id. (quoting Madison Block Pharmacy, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 620 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Mo. 1981)).
On appeal, Dunn does not challenge the Board's determination that he must serve 85% of his life sentence for second-degree murder, with the life sentence treated as a thirty-year term of imprisonment. Dunn also does not challenge the Board's conclusion that, because his sentences were ordered to run consecutively, he must serve any minimum prison term on his armed criminal action conviction in addition to the minimum prison term for his second-degree murder conviction before he will become parole-eligible. Instead, Dunn challenges only the Board's conclusion that, before Dunn is eligible for parole, he must serve fifteen years on his life sentence for armed criminal action. Dunn contends that - at least under the law as it existed at the time of his underlying offense, conviction, and sentencing - he is only required to serve three years before being eligible for parole on his armed criminal action conviction.
Although Dunn contends that the Board's recalculation of his parole eligibility date violates multiple constitutional provisions, statutes, and regulations, all of his claims rely on his interpretation of three legal authorities: § 217.690.4; § 571.015.1; and the Board regulation which appeared at 14 C.S.R. 80-2.010(4)(A)(1) prior to 2008. None of these authorities ever provided, however, that Dunn would be eligible for parole on his armed criminal action conviction after serving only three years of his life sentence.
At the time of Dunn's offense and conviction, § 217.690.4 specified the manner in which parole eligibility was determined for offenders serving consecutive sentences. Section 217.690.4 provided:
When considering parole for an offender with consecutive sentences, the minimum term for eligibility for parole shall be calculated by adding the minimum terms for parole eligibility for each of the consecutive sentences, except the minimum term for parole eligibility shall not exceed the minimum term for parole eligibility for an ordinary life sentence.
§ 217.690.4. This provision currently appears in § 217.690.5, RSMo Cum. Supp. 2021.
Dunn contends that the final phrase of § 217.690.4, which specified that "the minimum term for parole eligibility shall not exceed the minimum term for parole eligibility for an ordinary life sentence," meant that the minimum prison term for his entire sentencing sequence could not exceed the minimum term applicable to a single life sentence. This Court squarely rejected that argument in Langston v. Missouri Board of Probation & Parole, 391 S.W.3d 473 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012), in which an inmate similarly argued that "no inmate with consecutive sentences can have a minimum prison term prior to parole eligibility that is longer than the minimum prison term he would have on a single life sentence." Id. at 476. We explained:
Under Langston, § 217.690.4 permitted an offender's total minimum prison term to be longer than the minimum term of a single life sentence, so long as none of the minimum prison terms on the offender's individual sentences exceeded the minimum term for a life sentence. The statute did not prevent the Board from imposing a 15-year minimum term for Dunn's armed criminal action sentence, in addition to the minimum term he is required to serve on his consecutive life sentence for second-degree murder.
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