Dunn v. Wolf

• Decision Date: 26 January 1891
• Citation: 81 Iowa 688,47 N.W. 887
• Parties: DUNN v. WOLF ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

81 Iowa 688

47 N.W. 887

DUNN

v.WOLF ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 26, 1891.

Appeal from district court, Audubon county; H. E. DEEMER, Judge.

Action to enjoin the sale of real estate on execution. Decree for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.Benj. I. Salinger, for appellant.

Nash, Phelps & Green, for appellee.

GRANGER, J.

1. Arthur M. Ryan, Moses Crawford, William M. Dunn, and A. M. Dunn were joint judgment debtors to the defendant Wolf. A. M. Dunn is the husband of the plaintiff, and has been since 1883. William M. Dunn is the son of A. M. Dunn, by a former wife. The judgment referred to was obtained November 18, 1885, and an execution issued thereon was by the defendant Herbert, as sheriff, levied on the lands in question on the 17th day of November, 1885, as the property of William M. Dunn. On the 5th day of November, 1885, William M. Dunn, by warranty deed, conveyed the land to the plaintiff, who brings this action to enjoin the sale. The defendants admit the execution of the deed to plaintiff, but aver that it was accepted by plaintiff to aid William M. Dunn and A. M. Dunn to defraud their creditors, and especially the defendant Wolf. From March, 1881, to some time in 1884, or later, there was litigation between William M. Dunn and defendant Wolf in regard to the ownership of real estate and improvements thereon, in the course of which proceedings an injunction issued at the instance of William M. Dunn. Ryan, Crawford, and A. M. Dunn, were, with William M. Dunn, obligors on the bond to obtain the injunction; and the judgment now sought to be enforced against the land was obtained on the injunction bond. The cause in which Wolf's judgment was obtained was on trial on the 5th of November, 1885, and near the time when the taking of testimony was concluded and the arguments to the jury commenced. A. M. Dunn left the court-room and went to the office of one Armstrong, and procured the making of the deed in question; and, shortly thereafter, William M. Dunn went in and signed the deed, and also had prepared and signed a bill of sale of practically all his personal property to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was afterwards there, and accepted the instruments. A. M. and William M. Dunn were, before the trial was concluded, again in court; and, in answer to a question by counsel for William M. Dunn, “If it was fixed?” or words to that effect, one of them answered, “Yes; it's all right.” It is not and could not well be contended by appellant but that, as to William M. Dunn, the transfer was fraudulent; but it is contended that, as to the plaintiff, there is no sufficient showing to implicate her in the fraud, either because of knowledge of or participation in it. The district court found otherwise, and our examination of the record leads us to the same conclusion. The relationship of the parties, the notoriety of the pending litigation, and the particular time of the transfer, the manner of its accomplishment, the difference between the price paid and its actual value being upwards of $2,000, the purchase of the property without an examination of it, and the failure of the plaintiff in her own behalf to explain the many badges of fraud against her apparent on the trial, leave little room to doubt the correctness of our conclusion. These general conclusions are aided materially by the evidence in detail, which we do not present.

2. It is urged that the decree cannot be sustained, because William M. Dunn is not made a party to this proceeding. The effect...