Dunne v. Cook County
Decision Date | 26 July 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 60178,60178 |
Citation | 483 N.E.2d 13,108 Ill.2d 161,90 Ill.Dec. 866 |
Parties | , 90 Ill.Dec. 866 George W. DUNNE, County Board President et al., Appellees, v. The COUNTY OF COOK et al., Appellants. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Jerome H. Torshen, James T. Ryan, Sp. State's Attys., Chicago, for appellants; Abigail K. Spreyer, Jerome H. Torshen, Ltd., Timothy R. Conway, Greenberger, Krauss & Jacobs, Chtd., Chicago, of counsel.
Jerold S. Solovy, Sp. State's Atty., Chicago, for appellees; Barry Sullivan, Joel T. Pelz, Jenner & Block, Chicago, of counsel.
Plaintiff, George W. Dunne, president of the board of commissioners of Cook County, filed this action in the circuit court of Cook County against the other 16 members of the board, seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinance approved on January 17, 1983, reducing from four-fifths to three-fifths the majority necessary to override a veto, was invalid. Mathew W. Bieszcat and John H. Stroger, Jr., members of the board who had not voted for the ordinance, were granted leave to be realigned as parties plaintiff. Upon allowance of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment the circuit court entered judgment holding the ordinance invalid. The appellate court affirmed (123 Ill.App.3d 468, 78 Ill.Dec. 851, 462 N.E.2d 970), and we allowed defendants' petition for leave to appeal (94 Ill.2d R. 315). The facts are adequately stated in the opinion of the appellate court and will be restated here only to the extent necessary to discuss the issues.
The record shows that on January 17, 1983, the board of commissioners of Cook County enacted an ordinance in which it is stated that pursuant to the home rule authority granted by the 1970 Constitution the ordinance supersedes "that portion of Chap. 34, Sec. 908 Ill.Rev. Statutes [section 61.4 of 'An Act to revise the law in relation to the election of county commissioners in Cook County and to fix their term of office'], regarding the veto power of the President of the Board of Commissioners of Cook County * * * " (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 34, par. 908). Section 61.4 provides that the president of the board of commissioners has the authority to veto ordinances enacted by the county board, and that four- fifths of the members elected to the board may pass an ordinance over his veto. The ordinance reduced the majority required to override a veto from four-fifths to three-fifths. On January 20, 1983, the president of the board vetoed the ordinance, and on January 25, 14 of the 17 members of the board, a four-fifths majority, overrode his veto.
The circuit court held that the ordinance purported to alter the county's form of government without a referendum and was violative of article VII, section 6(f), of the Constitution of 1970. A divided appellate court affirmed.
The issue presented is whether enactment of the ordinance under the county's home rule authority (Ill. Const.1970, art. VII, sec. 6(a)) effected an alteration in the "form of government," as contemplated in article VII, section 6(f) (Ill. Const.1970, art. VII, sec. 6(f)), without approval by referendum. Section 6(a) of article VII, in pertinent part, provides:
"Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt." (Ill. Const.1970, art. VII, sec. 6(a).)
Section 6(f) of article VII, in pertinent part, provides:
"A home rule unit shall have the power subject to approval by referendum to adopt, alter or repeal a form of government provided by law * * *." Ill. Const.1970, art. VII, sec. 6(f).
Defendants cite the statement in Justice Linn's dissenting opinion in the appellate court explaining that the reason for enacting the statute requiring a four-fifths veto override was to insure that the commissioners representing the area outside of Chicago were not dominated by the commissioners within Chicago. Justice Linn said:
(123 Ill.App.3d 468, 483-84, 78 Ill.Dec. 851, 462 N.E.2d 970.)
Defendants contend that this historical rationale is not undermined by lowering the required vote from four-fifths to three-fifths, because under the three-fifths provision, 11 votes are required to override a presidential veto; and with 10 city members and 7 suburban members, neither group has a sufficient number of members to override a veto without at least one vote from the other contingent. Therefore, they assert that the veto-override ordinance does not change the historic balance of powers in Cook County's two multimember district form of government. They submit that because the form of government was not changed, the power sought to be exercised was not required to be subjected to approval by referendum.
Citing Pechous v. Slawko (1976), 64 Ill.2d 576, 2 Ill.Dec. 701, 357 N.E.2d 1144, plaintiffs argue that the ordinance effects a change in the "form of government" because the veto power is a central element...
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