Dunphy v. City Council of City of Creston

Decision Date29 July 1977
Docket NumberNo. 58986,58986
Citation256 N.W.2d 913
PartiesEugene DUNPHY, Naomi Dunphy, Mary Stoner, Willis Stoner, T. M. Thompson, Wesley W. Fisher, Maxine Recknor, Earl Recknor, Joseph Hanrahan, Mary K. Fisher, Margaret Hanrahan and Larry E. Crosser, Appellants, v. CITY COUNCIL OF the CITY OF CRESTON, Iowa, Appellees.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Mullin, Mullin, McLaughlin & Harvey, Creston, for appellants.

Paul J. Boysen, Jr., Creston, for appellees.

Heard before MOORE, C. J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, LeGRAND and UHLENHOPP, JJ.

MASON, Justice.

Plaintiffs, residents, property owners, taxpayers and electors of the city of Creston, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Union District Court seeking review of the actions of the Creston City Council in approving and authorizing a municipal improvement project. This project involved remodeling and restoration of the Burlington Railroad Depot Building for use as a new City Hall complex. Said writ was issued but, following hearing, was quashed and defendant's actions were sustained. Plaintiffs appeal from the district court's order quashing the writ and dismissing their claim for relief.

On April 5, 1973, Burlington Northern, Inc., conveyed to the city of Creston "for exclusively public purposes" a parcel of real estate located within the city's central business district. Upon said realty is an abandoned railroad depot which is the center of this controversy.

In June of 1973 a resolution was passed by the then sitting city council authorizing the demolition of the depot. However, that resolution precipitated court battles, injunctions and, ultimately, a change in council membership.

March 5, 1974, the new council, defendant herein, voted to conduct a special election June 4 to determine whether the citizens of Creston favored the issuance of general obligation bonds in the amount of $491,000 with a total authorized indebtedness of $525,000 for the purpose of converting the depot into a city hall complex. That election resulted in approval of the bond issue with 1,828 "yes" votes and 590 "no" votes cast.

The first set of bids on the depot project was opened at a public hearing and council meeting May 8, 1975, but all exceeded the funds authorized by the special election. The plans were subsequently revised and a second set of bids was opened July 15. At that hearing, written and oral objections to the plans and specifications were asserted by various members of the citizenry and overruled by defendant council. A resolution was passed approving the project and a low bid of $496,000 was accepted. However, defendant, on advice of bond counsel, subsequently voided its actions at the July 15 hearing and meeting recognizing the validity of the objections raised therein based upon defendant's failure to file the plans and specifications with the city clerk.

A third set of bids was opened at a September 30 public hearing and council meeting. Again, objections to the plans, specifications and form of contract were voiced and overruled by defendant. A resolution approving all aspects of the project carried and bids were opened. A low bid of $502,933, submitted by A. V. Boyd & Sons of Creston, was accepted.

Plaintiffs filed their previously mentioned petition for writ of certiorari October 7, 1975, alleging defendant's motion overruling the objections to the project exceeded defendant's proper jurisdiction and constituted an illegal act within the meaning of rule 306, Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court ordered the issuance of the writ and sua sponte stayed all proceedings pertaining to the project.

On October 13 defendant filed a motion requesting the court to order plaintiffs to post a bond. Said motion was based upon the fact the stay order prevented defendant from proceeding with the depot project and would cause the loss of the low bid since said bid would expire if not contracted for by October 20. An application for an immediate hearing on defendant's request was filed the same day.

On October 15, the hearing on defendant's bond request was continued until November 7 and the parties entered into the following stipulation:

" * * * that so much of the order of 7 October 1975 as stays proceedings of the defendants as to the execution of a contract between the city council and one Boyd be expunged and that any legal disability now existing so far as the mayor and city clerk of Creston as to the execution of that contract be removed. * * *."

Plaintiffs filed a resistance to defendant's bond request on October 20 arguing that they did not request the stay order and, consequently, should not be required to post bond therefor. However, on November 7 the district court ordered plaintiffs to post bond in the amount of $200,000 within ten days.

Defendant's answer, filed November 19, specifically denied each material allegation set forth in plaintiffs' petition.

At the beginning of the trial on the merits of plaintiffs' claim for relief, defendant filed a motion to dismiss based upon plaintiffs' failure to post bond as required by the court's order of November 7. After some discussion between the court and counsel defendant's motion was taken under advisement.

In the hope that it would be explanatory of matters contained in the return of the writ, the trial court permitted plaintiffs to introduce additional exhibits and testimony. However, the court determined its hope was not justified and found that defendant had not exceeded its proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.

In our opinion the contentions of the parties raise the following issues for review in this court:

1. Did defendant exceed its proper jurisdiction and otherwise act illegally in overruling the objection asserted at the September 30, 1975, public hearing that no form of contract for the project was on file prior to said hearing and in adopting a resolution approving the form of contract?

2. Did defendant exceed its proper jurisdiction and otherwise act illegally in exceeding the authorized indebtedness for the depot project?

3. Did defendant exceed its proper jurisdiction and otherwise act illegally in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law with reference to the two sets of written objections to the depot project asserted at the September 30, 1975, public hearing?

4. Did the trial court err in sustaining defendant's motion requesting plaintiffs be required to post bond and in not complying with rule 118, R.C.P., in ruling on said motion?

5. Did defendant act illegally in overruling objections to the depot project which pointed out specific violations of chapter 384, The Code, 1975?

6. Did defendant exceed its proper jurisdiction and otherwise act illegally in overruling objections to the depot project based upon the fact that the site had already been set aside for public parking and that the realty was mortgaged and was subject to defects in title?

7. Did defendant exceed its proper jurisdiction and otherwise act illegally in overruling objections to the project by motion rather than by resolution?

8. Did the trial court err in (1) failing to make any "meaningful" findings of fact and conclusions of law, (2) going outside of the record for the basis of a statement contained in its ruling, and (3) failing to rule separately on the issues presented by the written objections made at the September 30, 1975, public hearing which were incorporated into plaintiffs' petition?

9. In overruling the objections to the depot project, was defendant exercising a judicial function within the meaning of rule 306, R.C.P.?

I. Pertinent to a determination of the appropriate scope of review herein is the following language from Smith v. Iowa Liquor Control Commission, 169 N.W.2d 803, 810 (Iowa 1969):

"The action of certiorari is by ordinary proceedings. Rule 317 Rules of Civil Procedure; Staads v. Board of Trustees of F. R. P. Fund, Iowa, 159 N.W.2d 485, 489. Appeal to us from the trial court's judgment is governed by the rules applicable to appeals in ordinary actions. R.C.P. 318. See also Rule 344(f), par. 1. * * *."

One of the many well-established principles applicable to appeals in ordinary actions was set forth as follows in City of Spencer v. Hawkeye Security Insurance Co., 216 N.W.2d 406, 408 (Iowa 1974):

"Where the facts are not in material dispute, interpretation placed thereon by trial court becomes a question of law which is not conclusive on appeal. * * * (citing authority)."

The facts herein are not in dispute and no conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom. Consequently, this court must independently determine the questions of law presented herein.

II. It would appear to be advantageous to first confront the last issue enumerated above. If defendant was not exercising a "judicial function" within the meaning of rule 306, R.C.P., plaintiffs' claim for relief would be without foundation. Therefore, that preliminary issue will be dealt with in this division.

Under different circumstances the identical issue was raised in Buechele v. Ray, 219 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Iowa 1974), wherein this court analyzed the problem as follows:

"The term 'judicial functions' is not here construed in a strict or technical sense. In other words, certiorari will lie if the act in question is quasi-judicial in nature. * * * (citing authorities).

"In the same vein, it is the nature of an act, not identity of the board or tribunal charged with its performance, which determines whether or not a function is judicial or quasi-judicial. * * * (citing authorities).

"It is at best difficult to determine whether acts are judicial or quasi-judicial. * * * (citing authority). The focal point of the solution may lie in use of the term 'quasi.' That word ordinarily means superficially resembling but intrinsically different. Therefore, when an activity appears to be judicial in nature, but in reality is not, it is termed quasi-judicial. * * * (citing authority).

"In keeping therewith it...

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