Dupage v. Butler

• Decision Date: 23 February 2023
• Docket Number: 19-cv-1021- JES-JEH
• Parties: JOSHUA M. DUPAGE, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER BRETT BUTLER, and the CITY OF PEKIN, ILLINOIS, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois

JOSHUA M. DUPAGE, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER BRETT BUTLER, and the CITY OF PEKIN, ILLINOIS, Defendants.

No. 19-cv-1021- JES-JEH

United States District Court, C.D. Illinois

February 23, 2023

ORDER AND OPINION

JAMES E. SHADID UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is now before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts I and III, but not Count II, of Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 68) and Plaintiff's Response (Doc. 7). For the reasons set forth below Defendants' Motion (Doc. 68) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a 3-Count complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, asserting violations of the Fourth Amendment and Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Plaintiff names Pekin Police Officer Brett Butler (“Butler”), claiming that Defendant Butler unlawfully detained and searched him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff also names the City of Pekin (“City”), under Monell, asserting that the City is liable for the unconstitutional policies and practices of the Pekin Police Department. The following facts are taken from the complaint which the court accepts as true for the purposes of this Order and Opinion. Bible v United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 799 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 2015).

Plaintiff has provided little detail in his complaint and, in Count I alleges without preamble, that on February 9, 2018, Defendant Butler ordered Plaintiff to stop walking and detained and searched him without probable cause. In Count II, which is not a subject of the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff pleads that Defendant Butler used excessive force while arresting him, overly tightening the handcuffs. In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that the City is liable for the Pekin Police Department initiating a February 1, 2018 policy of harassment as to Plaintiff. He claims that Defendant Butler acted pursuant to this policy when he stopped Plaintiff on February 9, 2018 and, among other actions, called him a “scum bag” and a “low life drug dealer.” Plaintiff alleges a failure to train, supervise, and monitor Defendant Butler and other unknown officers. Plaintiff claims to have suffered permanent damage to his right hand and wrist; requesting compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Defendants move to dismiss Counts I and III.

Defendants have provided documentation of Plaintiff's related federal and state criminal proceedings, records of which the Court may take judicial notice. Parungao v. Cmty. Health Sys., 858 F.3d 452, 457 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Courts may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record when the accuracy of those documents reasonably cannot be questioned.”). These records reveal that on March 1, 2018, Plaintiff was charged in Tazewell County with unlawful possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, armed violence, and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, arising from the February 9, 2018 arrest by Defendant Butler. The state court charges were dismissed (Doc. 68-2), when Plaintiff was federally indicted on March 20, 2018, for possession of methamphetamine, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm in for furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. (Doc. 68-3). On May 23, 2022, Plaintiff pled guilty and was adjudicated guilty on two counts of the indictment; possession of methamphetamine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The remaining counrt was dismissed.

Plaintiff later attempted to withdraw his guilty plea, a request which was denied on December 15, 2022. (Doc. 68-5). On December 20, 2022, Plaintiff was sentenced to 156 months of imprisonment on Counts I and III. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal which was docketed on January 4, 2023 and remains pending.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges whether a complaint sufficiently states a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Court is to accept all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint as true, and to draw all permissible inferences in plaintiff's favor. See Bible, 799 F.3d at 639. To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must describe the claim in sufficient detail to put defendants on notice as to the nature of the claim and its bases, and it must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief. Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint need not allege specific facts, but it may not rest entirely on conclusory statements or empty recitations of the elements of the cause of action. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

ANALYSIS

Count I Fourth Amendment Claim

Defendants assert that in Count I, Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim, and that the claim is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck bars a §1983 claim for money damages if a judgment in plaintiff's favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. Under Heck, a plaintiff may not challenge a conviction unless it has been reversed, expunged, or called into question. Id. At 486-87. This is so, as “civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486. However, Heck will generally not bar a Fourth Amendment claim, as the issue of probable cause to arrest often “has no bearing on the validity of [a] subsequent guilty plea and criminal conviction.” Reynolds v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 767 (7th Cir. 2007); Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 136 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[b]ecause an illegal search or arrest may be followed by a valid conviction, a conviction generally need not be set aside in order for a plaintiff to pursue a § 1983 claim under the Fourth Amendment.”) See also Dominguez v. Hendley, 545 F.3d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007)).

While Plaintiff alleges there was no probable cause for his arrest, Defendants cite Heck, claiming that a finding in Plaintiff's favor would necessarily call into question the validity of his conviction. In his response, however, Plaintiff draws a distinction between the allegedly false arrest undertaken without probable cause, and the conviction. Plaintiff does not dispute that the evidence obtained was a sufficient basis for his plea of guilt, stating “Defendant Butler still violated constitutional protections and civil rights; and my conviction has no bearing on Butler's actions.” (Doc. 77 at 5). In other words, Plaintiff asserts a civil rights action seeking damages for the allegedly unlawful stop without asserting that his conviction should be overturned. See Mordi v. Zeigler, 870 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2017) (dismissing Heck challenge to arrest). “Mordi makes a similar point: even if he were to prevail on his racial-profiling and prolonged-detention arguments, the discovery of the cocaine found within the car would be just as secure, his guilty plea would stand, and his conviction would, too. All he can hope for in his Fourth Amendment case would be some form of damages for the loss of his time and the dignitary insult inflicted by racial discrimination.”

Similar to Mordi, the Plaintiff here does not seek to have the conviction overturned, but requests monetary and other relief “regardless of any conviction, I have.” (Doc. 77, at 6). See also Blunt v. Becker No. 08-157, 2010 WL 570489 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2010) (citing Reynolds, 488 F.3d at 767 (recognizing the “bright-line rule” allowing false arrest claims to survive Heck because “[w]hether Officer Darr had probable cause to arrest [defendant] has no bearing on the validity of his subsequent guilty plea and criminal conviction.”)

There is an exception to the Heck-bar, as a plaintiff may not plead or otherwise assert a position inconsistent with his conviction. Rice v. Murphy, No. 17-6887, 2018 WL 4616354, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2018) (finding a plaintiff “may plead himself into a Heck bar by insisting on facts inconsistent with his guilt.”) (citing Easterling v. Moeller, 334 Fed.Appx. 22, 24 (7th Cir. 2009). In Rice, the plaintiff brought a claim of false arrest, after having pled guilty to possession of drugs. In his amended complaint, however, Plaintiff asserted “that he was unlawfully arrested because he ‘wasn't doing anything unusual', ‘was at no time ... in possession of any drugs . . .'”. Id at 2. There, the court applied Heck and dismissed the amended complaint, citing Gordon v. Miller, 528 F. App'x. 673, 674 (7th Cir. 2013) (“a § 1983 claim is Heck-barred where a plaintiff ‘insists that the arrest and prosecutions were wrongful because he never' committed the offense.”).

The Seventh Circuit illustrated this point in Rollins v. Willett, 770 F.3d 575, 576-77 (7th Cir. 2014), with the following example: “[s]o suppose a defendant convicted of possessing illegal drugs found on his person sued the officer who had found the drugs, alleging that the officer planted them. If he won the suit, it would imply the invalidity of his drug conviction.”

This is not the case before this Court, however, as Plaintiff does not deny possessing the drugs and weapon. He merely asserts that the manner of the stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights, not that it played a part in his plea and conviction. Accordingly, if he were to prevail on his Fourth Amendment claim, it would not undermine the validity of the conviction. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Heck-bar does not apply and will not dismiss on these grounds.

Defendants further assert that the complaint is...