Dupont Engineering Co. v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co.
Decision Date | 09 March 1925 |
Docket Number | No. 1492.,1492. |
Parties | DUPONT ENGINEERING CO. v. NASHVILLE BANNER PUB. CO. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Thos. J. Tyne, Sr., Thos. J. Tyne, Jr., and J. M. Peebles, all of Nashville, Tenn., and W. S. Gregg, of Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff.
E. A. Price and Thomas W. Schlater, Jr., both of Nashville, Tenn., for defendant.
This case for libel is before me on demurrer. The declaration contains one count, and it is averred that plaintiff is a nonresident corporation, "organized and existing," etc., and that the defendant, a resident corporation, is the publisher of a newspaper known as the Nashville Banner; that defendant "falsely and maliciously" published of and concerning plaintiff certain "false and defamatory matter, with intent to defame the plaintiff," etc.
The publication complained of appeared upon two pages of said paper on the 16th day of December, 1923, and because of its great length a verbatim copy will be pretermitted. The original publication is filed as a portion of the declaration. The demurrer is composed of eight grounds. For convenience the grounds will be grouped — grounds 1 and 2 in one group, grounds 6 and 7 in another group, and grounds 3, 4, 5, and 8 in still another group.
Grounds 1 and 2 are: (1) Because the publication set forth in the declaration is insufficient in law to constitute a cause of action; and (2) because the words set forth in the declaration concerning a corporation are not libelous per se, and therefore not actionable without averment of special damages.
It is true that special damages are not averred in the declaration. Defendant insists that, because plaintiff is a corporation, a mere legal fiction, that the publication is not libelous per se, because it cannot be rendered infamous or odious, or made the object of ridicule or contempt, and same does not injure it in its business, trade, profession, or occupation, or financial or business standing.
Defendant also insists that the publication, when read and construed in the sense in which the readers of the paper would ordinarily understand it, including display lines, if given its natural, necessary, and reasonable construction, does not reflect upon plaintiff, and is therefore not libelous, without averment of special damage. The first and important question to be determined is whether or not the alleged publication is libelous per se, because, if it is not, the first and second grounds of the demurrer should be sustained, and the suit dismissed.
Many opinions from all jurisdictions in the United States, both state and federal, are to be found in the reported cases, but to enumerate them would be tedious and of no avail. From the very nature of things, it is impossible to adopt an accurate and readily applicable definition of written language which is libelous per se. Each case must stand or fall upon its own publication, and the court must determine from the publication itself, unaided by extrinsic evidence, whether or not it is actionable without averment of special damage; but certain rules have been laid down, and they are uniform, for the guidance of courts in such cases.
Newell, in his work on Defamation, Slander, and Libel, at page 181, lays down the rule that,
And at section 448, in his 3d Edition, under head of "Corporations," Mr. Newell says: He then quotes from the old English case of South Hetton Coal Co. v. North Eastern News Association, 1 Q. B. 133, an opinion by Lord Esher, to the effect that
And at section 449, Mr. Newell says: "Incorporated companies, established for the purpose of transacting business, may maintain actions of libel the same as individuals for words affecting their business or property, if special damages are alleged and proved. Shoe & Leather Bank v. Thompson, 18 Abb. Prac. (N. Y.) 413.
In the case of Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins, 4 H. & N. 87, it is said that "a joint-stock company, incorporated under St. 19 and 20 Vict. c. 47, may sue in its own corporate name for words imputing to it insolvency, dishonesty, and mismanagement of its affairs, and this although the defendant be one of its own shareholders." All the text-writers and reported cases, including reported cases from our own state, adopt the foregoing rule. See, also, Ohio & Mississippi Railway Co. v. Press Publishing Co. (C. C.) 48 F. 206; Bank v. Bowdre Brothers, 92 Tenn. 723, 23 S. W. 131; Fry v. McCord Bros., 95 Tenn. 677, 33 S. W. 568; Memphis Telephone Co. v. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. (6th Cir.) 145 F. 904, 76 C. C. A. 436; Security Benefit Association v. Daily News Publishing Co. (C. C. A.) 299 F. 445; Culmer v. Canby et al. (6th Cir.) 101 F. 195, 41 C. C. A. 302.
In the case of International Text-Book Co. v. Leader Printing Co. (C. C.) 189 F. 86, it was held by District Judge Killits that "no special damages are alleged, but the law seems to be well settled that, where a libel contains an imputation upon an individual or a corporation in respect to its business, the same becomes libelous per se, and in an action thereon it is not necessary to allege special damages." Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. Press Publishing Co. (C. C.) 48 F. 206; Victor Safe & Lock Co. v. Deright, 147 F. 211, 77 C. C. A. 437, 8 Ann. Cas. 809; Sternberg Manufacturing Co. v. Miller, etc., Mfg. Co., 170 F. 298, 95 C. C. A. 494; Cooley v. Galon, 109 Tenn., 1; Bank v. Bowdre Bros., 92 Tenn. 723, 23 S. W. 131; Mattson v. Albert, 97 Tenn. 232, 36 S. W. 1090.
Defamatory words, falsely spoken or written of a party, which prejudice such person in his profession, trade, or business, are actionable in themselves, without proof of special damages. Bank v. Bowdre Bros., 92 Tenn. 723, 23 S. W. 131; Mattson v. Albert, 97 Tenn. 232, 36 S. W. 1090; Williams v. McKee, 98 Tenn. 138, 38 S. W. 730; J. B. James Co. v. Bank, 105 Tenn. 1, 58 S. W. 261, 51 L. R. A. 255, 80 Am. St. Rep. 857.
Tested by the foregoing rule, laid down by text-writers and reported cases, is the publication in question libelous per se? Does it reflect upon plaintiff in the management of its business? Or does it injure plaintiff in its business or in a pecuniary way? I repeat, before a corporation can maintain a suit for libel, the publication must reflect upon the management of its business, must attack it in the method of conducting its affairs, must accuse it of fraud or mismanagement, or of financial inability, and must be such as is reasonably calculated to cause it pecuniary loss.
In determining whether or not the publication in question is libelous per se, one must read the entire publication, including headlines (Commercial Publishing Co. v. Smith 6th Cir. 149 F. 707, 79 C. C. A. 410; Washington Post v. Chaloner, 250 U. S. 295, 39 S. Ct. 448, 63 L. Ed. 987, and many other cases to the same effect), and, from the whole, say whether or not the charges contained therein would necessarily produce in the minds of sensible persons that plaintiff had been guilty of fraud or misconduct in the management of its business, in its contract with the United States government.
Referring to the publication in question, the first thing the reader would see upon opening the paper would be the sensational headline, reaching entirely across the first page, in large, boldface black type, "McLane Bares Old Hickory Fraud Charges;" next, in large, boldface black type, but not so large, "Claims Government Lost Many Millions," and next follows: "Detailed Figures on Alleged Irregularities Connected with Powder Plant Revealed by District Attorney." And then, throughout the entire publication, is a charge that the government auditors had unearthed "wholesale frauds," "amounting to millions of dollars," and that these charges were made after an "extensive" survey of the records at Old Hickory, "and which covered a period of time extending over several months;" that "after many months of work on the preliminary investigation, during which time the matter was fully presented...
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