Dupont v. Kember

• Citation: 501 F. Supp. 1081
• Decision Date: 14 November 1980
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 80-544-A.
• Parties: Honorable Joseph B. DUPONT, Sr. et al. v. Harry J. "Soup" KEMBER, Jr. et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

501 F. Supp. 1081

Honorable Joseph B. DUPONT, Sr. et al. v. Harry J. "Soup" KEMBER, Jr. et al.

Civ. A. No. 80-544-A.

United States District Court, M. D. Louisiana.

November 14, 1980.

William C. Dupont, Plaquemine, La., A. Edward Hardin, Middleton & Hardin, Baton Rouge, La., for plaintiffs, Dupont and Richard A. Medlen.

Judy F. Pierce, Staff Atty., La. Dept. of Justice, Baton Rouge, La., for defendants, Harry J. Kember, Jr., and Houston C. "Hammy" Gascon, III.

Patrick W. Pendley, Freeman & Pendley, Ltd., Plaquemine, La., for defendants, E. J. "Nessie" Francise and Spencer R. "Jack" Emmons, Jr.

Samuel C. Cashio, Maringouin, La., Jack T. Marionneaux, Plaquemine, La., for defendant Gascon.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN V. PARKER, Chief Judge.

The judge and marshal of the City Court of the City of Plaquemine, Louisiana, have instituted this action against a State Representative, an Assistant District Attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial District Court of Louisiana, the President of the Iberville Parish Police Jury and a Legislative Aide to the State Representative. They allege deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities secured to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Jurisdiction of this Court is claimed under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 because of alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Plaintiffs pray for a temporary restraining order (which was denied), preliminary and permanent injunctions and money damages. The matter was heard on the motion of plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction and, in order to preserve the status quo, a preliminary injunction was issued.

As it is required to do, the Court sua sponte raised the issue of federal jurisdiction. Rule 12(h)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Carlsberg Resources Corporation v. Cambria Savings & Loan Association, 413 F.Supp. 880, 881 (W.D.Pa.1976); McGahey v. Giant Food, Inc., 300 F.Supp. 475, 477 (D.Md. 1969). Following the conclusion of the hearing, the Court directed all parties to submit briefs on that issue. Briefs have been filed and the matter has now been submitted for decision.

At its 1980 Session, the Louisiana Legislature adopted Act 498, a measure introduced by defendant, Representative Kember, which was signed by the Governor and under Louisiana's Constitution became effective sixty days after adjournment of the Legislature (July 14, 1980). The statute deals only with the City Court of Plaquemine and it reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, restricts the personnel of the Court to a "judge, a marshal and a clerk of court" and reduces the pay of the judge and the marshal.¹

The complaint alleges that Representative Kember "illegally introduced legislation, local in nature, which legislation, after being passed by the Louisiana Legislature, became Act 498 of 1980 Regular Session," that the statute does not become effective until January 1, 1985, but that the defendants have "conspired" to enforce it immediately, thus depriving plaintiffs of unspecified rights and privileges secured to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States and that, in any event, Act 498 is unconstitutional and its enforcement by the defendants constitutes violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Plaintiffs rely exclusively upon various provisions of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 for their contentions that Act 498 does not become effective until January 1, 1985, as well as their contentions that it is unconstitutional and otherwise invalid.

The following facts were established at the trial of the motion for preliminary injunction: Defendant, E. J. Francise, is a member and president of the Iberville Parish Police Jury who took office on June 2, 1980. He is generally familiar with the provisions of Act 498 and he discussed the effective date of that act with the defendant, Houston C. Gascon, III, an Assistant District Attorney. Under Louisiana law, the District Attorney is the official adviser to police juries. He is aware that the state statute has the effect of reducing the salaries of the judge and other court personnel. The Police Jury has taken no official action to change those salaries. Mr. Carl Grant is the Secretary-Treasurer of the Police Jury, an appointed, not elected, position. He is not a member of the jury and has no vote. The Police Jury has taken no action regarding the City Court since the adoption of Act 498. Mr. Grant has discussed the provisions of Act 498 with the defendant Kember and he specifically asked Mr. Kember for help in obtaining an interpretation of the act. Kember obtained an opinion from the Louisiana Legislative Council which concludes that the act became effective sixty days after adjournment of the Louisiana Legislature in 1980. Kember wrote a "To Whom It May Concern" letter dated September 10, 1980, attaching copies of the act and of the opinion of the Legislative Council. Kember either delivered or had delivered copies of this opinion to Mr. Grant and several of the other defendants. Mr. Grant testified that he feels compelled to abide by any law adopted by the Legislature regarding salaries and that although the Police Jury has taken no action concerning the salaries of the City Court, if the state law is effective, he will apply it. He testified that neither defendant, Spencer R. Emmons, Jr., Kember nor Francise ever instructed him to take any action to reduce the pay of any of the employees of the City Court. Emmons is a Legislative Aide to Kember and at Kember's direction, he simply delivered a copy of Act 498 and the Legislative Council's opinion to a person in the Police Jury Office and to defendant Gascon. Judge Joseph B. Dupont, Sr., testified that as originally established the City Court included four wards of the parish, including all of the limits of the City of Plaquemine, that he was elected to a six-year term of office and was reelected one year ago and that he lives in one of the wards originally included within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court but outside the limits of the city. He fears that the act may "gerrymander" him out of office because of the location of his home. He further testified that his salary has been reduced and that the act limits the personnel that may be employed by the Court, which will result in reduced service by the Court.

As originally constituted, the City Court of Plaquemine included areas located outside of the limits of the city, and the 1980 legislation restricts the territorial jurisdiction to the city limits. Both plaintiffs reside outside of the city limits, and state law apparently requires that they reside within the territorial area of the court they serve. From these provisions, plaintiffs assume an attempt to deprive them of the offices to which they have been elected in accordance with state law. In brief the plaintiffs claim that the 1980 law was introduced by Kember because of political differences between plaintiffs and him. No evidence to that effect was offered at the trial of this matter, and there is nothing in this record to support such a conclusion. Assuming, however, that there was evidence of Kember's alleged bad motives, that would not help the plaintiffs. It is well established that the motivation of particular members of a state legislature (or of the Congress of the United States) does not render a valid statute invalid. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1682, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968); State of Arizona v. State of California, 283 U.S. 423, 455, 51 S.Ct. 522, 526, 75 L.Ed. 1154 (1931); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 24 S.Ct. 769, 49 L.Ed. 78 (1904); Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810). Legislators with evil motives have been known to pass sound legislation while legislators with the purest of motives have adopted evil and unconstitutional laws. Consequently, courts are not even permitted to inquire into alleged evil motives of state legislators; they look only at the results of statutes. Daniel v. Family Insurance Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224, 69 S.Ct. 550, 552, 93 L.Ed. 632 (1949); United States v. Des Moines Navigation and Railway Co., 142 U.S. 510, 544, 12 S.Ct. 308, 318, 35 L.Ed. 1099 (1892); Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1869); Globe Seaways, Inc. v. Panama Canal Co., 509 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1975); LaBauve v. Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries Commission, 444 F.Supp. 1370, 1383 (E.D.La.1978).

Here, the rights claimed by plaintiffs-to hold their respective offices for the entire terms to which they have been elected, to unreduced compensation and to adequate court personnel-all arise from state, not federal law.

This action is brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, which provide, in pertinent part:

"1983. Every person who, under color of any statute, ... of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ...."

"1985.

* * * * * *

"(3) If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire ... for the purpose of depriving ... any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; ... if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages ...." (Emphasis supplied)

As to the claim under Section 1985, plaintiffs offered no evidence of any conspiracy among these defendants, and the Court finds that there was no such conspiracy. More to the point, however, it is clear that an action under Section 1985 must be predicated upon some class-based discrimination. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d 338...