United States ex rel. Steigler v. Board of Parole
Decision Date | 14 November 1980 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 80-255. |
Citation | 501 F. Supp. 1077 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Herbert F. STEIGLER, Petitioner, v. BOARD OF PAROLE and Walter Redman, Warden, Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
Walter C. Tuthill, Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, Del., for petitioner.
Duane D. Werb, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, Del., for respondents.
This is an action for habeas corpus relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, brought by Herbert F. Steigler ("petitioner") against the Board of Parole of the State of Delaware ("the Parole Board") and Walter Redman, Superintendent of the Delaware Department of Corrections ("Respondents"). Petitioner seeks an Order directing his immediate release on parole.
At the time of the offenses for which petitioner was convicted,1 as well as at the time of his sentencing and resentencing, the Delaware statute relating to the authority of the Parole Board to grant paroles and the procedures to be followed in parole proceedings provided in part that:
(d) All paroles shall issue upon order of the Board duly adopted. Said order shall recite the conditions thereof, which may be altered as the Board may determine, and a copy shall be provided to the parolee and the Department. 11 Del.C. § 4347(d); 54 Del.Laws, c. 349, § 7 (approved July 8, 1964).
The rules of the Board2 in effect at the above referenced times provided that "any action taken by the Board is decisive upon the agreement of a majority of the Board members." Parole Board Procedures, (Exhibit A, page J-3; Petitioner's Opening Brief). Thus, up through the time of petitioner's resentencing, the favorable vote of a simple majority of the membership of the Board was sufficient to grant paroles in all cases.3
On July 2, 1973, subsequent to the date of petitioner's resentencing, subsection (d) of Section 4347 was amended by House Bill No. 185 ( )4 to read in its entirety as follows:
(d) All paroles shall issue upon order of the Board duly adopted by at least three of the five members of the Board, provided, however, no person who has been convicted of and imprisoned for murder, rape, kidnapping or any offense relating to the sale, attempt to sell, delivery, or possession with intent to sell or deliver a narcotic drug shall be granted a parole except by order of the Board duly adopted by at least four of the five members of the Board. 59 Del.Laws, c. 125, § 1.5
Petitioner first appeared before the Board on March 18, 1975. Following that hearing, the Board recommended to the Board of Pardons that it award petitioner a reduction in sentence. On February 26, 1976, petitioner applied to the Board for a reduction in his parole eligibility date. Following a hearing on the matter, the Board granted petitioner's request and set a reduced parole eligibility date of June 11, 1979.
On October 10, 1978, petitioner applied to the Board for a further reduction in his parole eligibility and for an immediate release on parole. The report of the Department of Corrections (the "Department") submitted in connection with the application recommended a release on parole at that time. Notwithstanding the recommendation of the Department, the Board denied parole. By letter to petitioner dated November 9, 1978, the Board reported that three of its members had voted in favor of a parole and that two had voted against it. The November 9 letter stated: "As you may already know, a majority of four of the five Board Members must favor parole in your offense category before it may be granted."
Petitioner next appeared before the Board on August 28, 1979, and then again on August 26, 1980. In both instances, he met the same result: the vote was three in favor of parole, two against.
Petitioner's claim for relief herein is predicated on these three decisions of the Parole Board. Had the Board applied the "unamended" law on any of these occasions, then petitioner would have had the requisite votes for release on parole. The question for the court is whether the application of the amended § 4347(d) to petitioner unfairly aggravated the conditions of punishment imposed upon him and thereby violate the provisions of Section 10, Article I of the United States Constitution relating to ex post facto laws.
In response to the petition, respondents urge that relief should be denied on two grounds: first, that parole is a matter of grace and a restriction on the availability of parole, accordingly, may not be said to adversely affect any right held by the defendant; and, second, that the change in Section 4347(d) was "only a procedural one".
Respondents' first argument is untenable. Courts have consistently regarded parole laws as part of the definition of the punishment provided for crime and have held that retroactive application of a change of law which substantially diminishes the possibility of parole violates the ex post facto clause. See e. g., Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 94 S.Ct. 2532, 41 L.Ed.2d 383 (1974); Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission, 579 F.2d 238 (1978); Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648 (2nd Cir. 1977).
Respondents' second argument, though of greater substance, is nevertheless unpersuasive. While the cases applying the ex post facto clause have distinguished between procedural changes and amendments which alter substantive standards, the distinction is more subtle than respondents' argument suggests. The recent decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Government of Virgin Islands v. Civil, 591 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1979) clearly demonstrates this fact. The ex post facto clause issue in the Civil case was raised by the repeal of a Virgin Islands statute providing that "no conviction can be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime." Civil, 591 F.2d at 257-58. The court held that repeal of that statute could not be given effect in a case where the alleged crime had been committed while the statute was still in force. Judge Weis' review of the ex post facto case law is significant help in resolving the issue currently before the court:
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