DuPree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30 of Crawford County, 82-175

• Decision Date: 31 May 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-175,82-175
• Parties: , 11 Ed. Law Rep. 1091 Jim DuPREE et al., Appellants, v. ALMA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 30 OF CRAWFORD COUNTY et al., Appellees.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 90

651 S.W.2d 90

279 Ark. 340, 11 Ed. Law Rep. 1091

Jim DuPREE et al., Appellants, v. ALMA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 30 OF CRAWFORD COUNTY et al., Appellees.

No. 82-175.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

May 31, 1983.

Friday, Eldredge & Clark by George Pike, Jr., Little Rock, for Little Rock School Dist. and North Little Rock School Dist.

Seay & Bristow by Bill Bristow, Jonesboro, for Clover Bend School Dist. et al.

Daily, West, Core, Coffman & Canfield by Ben Core, Fort Smith, Stephen L. Spitz and Long & Silverstein by David Long, Washington, for appellees.

Pryor, Robinson & Barry by H. Clay Robinson, Fort Smith amicus curiae for Fort Smith Sp. School Dist.

Cearley, Mitchell & Roachell, Little Rock, amicus curiae for Arkansas Educ. Assn HAYS, Justice.

The issue presented on appeal is the constitutionality of the current statutory method of financing public schools in Arkansas under Act 1100 of 1979, the Minimum Foundation Program and vocational funding under § 7 of Act 1004 of 1975 (authorized under Act 363 of 1967). Appellees, eleven school districts, ¹ brought this class action suit against appellants, Jim DuPree and other members of the Arkansas State Board of Education (also joined by other districts ²), charging that the present system violates the state constitution's guarantee of equal protection (Art. II, § 2, 3, 18 )³ and its requirement that the state provide a general, suitable and efficient system of education (Art. XIV § 1 ⁴). The appellees' basic contention is the great disparity in funds available for education to school districts throughout the state is due primarily to the fact that the major determinative of revenue for school districts is the local tax base, a basis unrelated to the educational needs of any given district; that the current state financing system is inadequate to rectify the inequalities inherent in a financing system based on widely varying local tax bases, and actually widens the gap between the property poor and property wealthy districts in providing educational opportunities. The trial court found the present system to be in violation of the constitutional provisions in question, which decision we affirm. We will first comment on the trial court's finding and then address the points raised on appeal.

The funding for Arkansas schools comes from three sources: state revenues provide 51.6%, local revenues 38.1%, and federal revenues 10.3%. The majority of state aid is distributed under the Minimum Foundation Program (MFP). In 1978-79 MFP constituted 77.1% of all state aid. Act 1100 of 1979, the current MFP program, is similar to prior MFP programs and consists of two major elements: base aid and equalization aid. The base aid program originated under the Minimum School Budget Law of 1951. The formula was based on a calculation of teacher and student population per district. The base aid program contained a "hold-harmless" provision which guaranteed that no district would receive less aid in any year than it received the previous year. As a result, a district with declining enrollment would over the years get continually higher aid per pupil. While Act 1100 eliminates the district "hold-harmless" provision, it still contains a pupil "hold-harmless" provision which has no bearing on educational needs or property wealth; the base aid year is permanently held at the 1978-79 level, and the inequities resulting from thirty years of the district "hold-harmless" provision are being carried forward without compensating adjustments.

The funds remaining after allocation for base aid are distributed under "equalization aid". Under this section of the act, half of the remaining funds are distributed under a flat grant on a per pupil basis. Districts receive the same amount of aid under this provision irrespective of local property wealth and revenue raised. The remaining funds under the equalization provision are then distributed under a formula directed at equalizing the disparity between the poor and wealthy districts. Of the total allocated under this program in 1979-80, this accounted for only 6.8% of MFP aid.

The other area of contention is the distribution of funds for vocational education. In order for a school district to institute a program of vocational education approved for state funding, it must first establish a program with local funds. The state will consider funding a portion of the program only if the program is already operational. Obviously, this requirement works to the advantage of the wealthier school districts which can raise the funds and to the disadvantage of the poorer districts which lack the resources for such programs.

Against this backdrop of funding is the undisputed evidence that there are sharp disparities among school districts in the expenditures per pupil and the education opportunities available as reflected by staff, class size, curriculum, remedial services, facilities, materials and equipment. In dollar terms the highest and lowest revenues per pupil in 1978-79 respectively were $2,378 and $873. Disregarding the extremes, the difference at the 95th and 5th percentiles was $1,576 and $937. It is also undisputed that there is a substantial variation in property wealth among districts. The distribution of property wealth, measured as equalized assessed valuation per pupil in average daily attendance (ADA) in 1978-79, ranged from $73,773 to $1,853. These wealth disparities are prevalent among both large and small districts. As the system is currently operating, the major determinative of local revenues is district property wealth and the amount a school district can raise is directly related to its property wealth.

The range in revenues among school districts in Arkansas is not limited to the extremes. There are a substantial number of children affected by the revenue disparities. In 1978-79, only 7% of the pupils resided in school districts with over $1,500 per pupil in state-local revenues, while over 21% resided in districts with less than $1000 in state-local revenues, and 55% of the districts were below the state mean. This great disparity among the districts' property wealth and the current state funding system as it is now applied does not equalize the educational revenues available to the school districts, but only widens the gap.

The appellants devote little attention to the constitutional provisions in question, but contend that there is no requirement of uniformity of educational opportunities throughout the state, that the constitution only requires that all children receive a "general, suitable and efficient" education. Appellants point to cases from other jurisdictions finding no violation of equal protection clauses under similar funding systems, decisions based primarily on the legitimate state interest of promoting local control. See Board of Education v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359 (1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981). The arguments are not persuasive.

Most cases finding similar state financing systems unconstitutional have found their state's equal protection clause to be applicable and to require equal educational opportunities. See Washakie County School District No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.1980); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va.1979); Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal.3d 728, 135 Cal.Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal.1976); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn.1976). In at least one jurisdiction, the court found its constitution demanded an equal education opportunity based solely on an education clause similar to ours. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.1973).

There is no sound basis for holding the equal protection clause inapplicable to the facts in this case. The constitutional mandate for a general, suitable and efficient education in no way precludes us from applying the equal protection clause to the present financing system, in fact under the interpretations of such cases as Robinson, supra, that clause only reinforces the decision that the equal protection clause applies.

We can find no legitimate state purpose to support the system. It bears no rational relationship to the educational needs of the individual districts, rather it is determined primarily by the tax base of each district. The trial court found the educational opportunity of the children in this state should not be controlled by the fortuitous circumstance of residence, and we concur in that view. Such a system only promotes greater opportunities for the advantaged while diminishing the opportunities for the disadvantaged.

Those jurisdictions finding no equal protection violation in a system based on district wealth generally uphold the system of funding by finding a legitimate state purpose in maintaining local control. We find however, two fallacies in this reasoning. First, to alter the state financing system to provide greater equalization among districts does not in any way dictate that local control must be reduced. Second, as pointed out in Serrano, supra, 135 Cal.Rptr. at 364, 557 P.2d at 948, "The notion of local control was a 'cruel illusion' for the poor districts due to limitations placed upon them by the system itself.... Far from being necessary to promote local fiscal choice, the present system actually deprives the less wealthy districts of the option." Consequently, even without deciding whether the right to a public education is fundamental, we can find no constitutional basis for the present system, as it has no rational bearing on the educational needs of the districts.

We come to this conclusion in part because we believe the right to equal educational opportunity is basic to our society. "It is the very essence and foundation of a civilized culture: it is the cohesive element that binds the fabric of our society together." Horton, 376 A.2d at 377, Bogdanski, J. conc. Education becomes the essential prerequisite that...