Dupree v. Moore
| Decision Date | 17 September 1947 |
| Docket Number | 19 |
| Citation | 44 S.E.2d 37,227 N.C. 626 |
| Parties | DUPREE et al. v. MOORE. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
The plaintiffs sued the defendant in ejectment for possession of the land described in the complaint which they claimed by descent from the father, J. T. Dupree. The defendant answered, admitting the devolution of title upon the plaintiffs by the death of Dupree, but set up a parol purchase contract between himself and Annie Dupree Williams, one of the heirs, for and in behalf of all the plaintiffs, by virtue of which he went into possession of the lands sometime in 1941 and built thereupon, in good faith buildings and improvements claimed to be worth $1,400, for which he demands compensation in case of his ejectment, and reimbursement for his expenditures in paying taxes.
The contract alleged was an agreement, made by the said Annie Williams, that if the present defendant Moore would pay the taxes due on the place and give the heirs the difference between the taxes and $200 she would have all the heirs sign a deed.
The defendant testified that at the time this agreement was made in addition to Annie Williams there was present Bruce Dupree who said he ' Defendant did not talk with James Dupree nor Jacob Elizabeth Vines; talked to Tom and Joshua but they were under age. The defendant further testified that the taxes due amounted to $165; that he paid this and gave Annie Williams $24 for the heirs.
Annie Williams and Bruce Dupree both testified that they did not enter into any agreement to sell the land; and Annie Williams denied receiving any money for distribution to the heirs.
E A. Daniel, who was county attorney at the time, testified that some of the heirs and Moore came to his office and his recollection was that they wished to deed the land to William Arthur Moore who was to pay the taxes. But witness on investigation found that there were two minor heirs and it would take a special proceeding to convey the title to the land and that the heirs were not willing to incur the expense and said they would wait until the minors got grown.
No deed was ever made. There was evidence relating to the value of the improvements and the rental value of the land during defendant's occupancy.
Upon the pleading and testimony, somewhat confusing and distinctly contradictory, the following issues were submitted to the jury and answered as indicated:
1. Are plaintiffs the owners and entitled to possession of the land described in the complaint? Answer: Yes.
2. Did the plaintiffs enter into a verbal contract with defendant that if he would pay the taxes on the lands they would execute to him a deed therefor? Answer: Yes.
3. Did the defendant under terms of the contract and in good faith enter into possession of said lands? Answer: Yes.
4. If so, did the defendant, while in possession of the land erect improvements thereon? Answer: Yes.
5. What was the value of said improvements? Answer: $1200.
6. Did the plaintiffs have actual knowledge that the defendant was in possession of said lands under a verbal contract to purchase the same and did they have actual knowledge that he was making improvements thereto? Answer: Yes.
7. What is the fair reasonable rental value of the lands in controversy? Answer: $2.50 per week and $2 a year for lot.
8. What is the fair, reasonable rental value of the lands in controversy exclusive of improvements made thereon by the defendant? Answer: $4.
The plaintiffs moved for judgment non obstante veredicto, which motion was denied, and exception made. Plaintiffs then moved to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, which motion was declined, and plaintiffs excepted. Judgment followed according to the tenor of the issues and answers thereto, to which the plaintiffs objected and excepted and appealed.
H. S. Ward, of Washington, for plaintiff appellants.
Carter & Carter, of Washington, for defendant appellee.
The defendant appellee depends partly on existence of a parol contract to convey the lands in controversy and partly on the principle of estoppel in pais to support recovery under his cross action. But the alleged parol contract to convey is not supported by the evidence against all the plaintiffs estoppel in pais is not pleadable against the admitted minors nor is there supporting evidence as to all of the adult plaintiffs.
1. Where there has been a parol contract to convey lands and the Statute of Frands is invoked by the promissor, we say, in shorthand, that the contract is void. It cannot be specifically enforced; but the clutch of circumstance and incident comprising the whole transaction may engender important legal consequences.
A person let into possession of land under a parol contract and who has, in good faith...
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