Dupuis v. Submarine Base Credit Union, Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 March 1976
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: William G. DUPUIS v. SUBMARINE BASE CREDIT UNION, INC., et al.

Page 1093

365 A.2d 1093

170 Conn. 344

William G. DUPUIS v. SUBMARINE BASE CREDIT UNION, INC., et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

March 16, 1976.

James T. Haviland II, Town Atty., Groton, for appellant (plaintiff).

Matthew Shafner, Groton, for appellees (defendants).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and BARBER, JJ.

BARBER, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff, who is the building inspector and zoning officer of the town of Groton, instituted this action in October, 1972, seeking to enjoin the defendants from continuing the construction of an office building and, further, seeking an order compelling the defendants to apply to the duly designated boards and officials of the town for permission to proceed with the construction. After a hearing, the Court of Common Pleas (Santaniello, J.) declined to issue a temporary restraining order and the defendants completed construction of the building. The plaintiff subsequently amended his complaint to claim an order compelling the defendants to apply to the appropriate commissions and officials for permission to use the building, and, in the event permission were denied, compelling the defendants to remove the building. The case was tried to the court (Williams, J.) upon a stipulation of facts which may be summarized as follows:

The named defendant, Submarine Base Credit Union, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the 'credit union,' is a nonstock corporation organized under the laws of this state, providing savings, lending, check cashing and counseling services for its 29,000 members. Membership in the credit union is limited to military personnel and their families and civil service employees of the submarine base. The general manager and assistant treasurer of the credit union is also a defendant in this action.

On January 1, 1972, the United States, acting by the department of the navy, leased 1.15 acres of land to the credit union. The land, located off Gungywamp Road in Groton, had been acquired by the United States by condemnation at some time subsequent to February 1, 1940. The lease runs for twenty-five years and provides for the reversion of title to the building thereon to the United States unless the building can be removed before the expiration of the lease. The lease states that the use of the premises will effectuate the purposes of the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1790, and provides that the premises are limited to use as a 'Credit Union at the Submarine Base' and that memberships be restricted to federal employees and members of their families.

During the summer and fall of 1972, the credit union constructed, at a cost of approximately $500,000, an office building on the leased premises which it is presently using as its main office and place of business. The defendants neither applied for nor obtained a building permit or a certificate of occupancy. The manager and the superintendent of the company engaged in construction of the buidling were told, upon inquiry at the building inspector's office, that the property did not come under the jurisdiction of the town of Groton. ¹

The court found in the defendants' favor on all issues. Numerous claims of law were raised by both parties, and the plaintiff has assigned error in the court's rulings in favor of the defendant on the following claims of law: (1) The defendant credit union, as a private corporation, erecting a building on federal lands for the furtherance of federal purposes, is immune from local zoning laws; (2) the town of Groton is estopped from enforcing its zoning laws and building codes with respect to the credit union building; and (3) the relief requested by the plaintiff is not appropriate or available in this case.

I

The defendants base their contention that they are immune from local zoning ordinances and building code provisions on two grounds. First, they argue that federal ownership of the leased land vests exclusive jurisdiction over that land in the federal government. Second, they claim that they are furthering a governmental purpose and, therefore, the supremacy clause (U.S.Const., art. VI, cl. 2) exempts them from local regulation. The subordinate facts set forth in the finding do not support either of these claims.

The constitution declares that Congress shall have the power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any lands acquired by the United States 'for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.' ² Two prerequisites to the vesting of exclusive jurisdiction over such lands must be satisfied: the state in which the lands are located must consent, and the United States must accept such jurisdiction. Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U.S. 186, 207, 58 S.Ct. 233, 82 L.Ed. 187. Connecticut has consented to the acquisition of land by the United States for the above named purposes, and has ceded exclusive jurisdiction over such lands to the federal government. General Statutes § 48-1. ³ But for all lands acquired by the United States since February 1, 1940, Congress has required that a federal official file with the governor of the state in which the lands are located a notice of acceptance of jurisdiction, either exclusive or partial, over the lands, and, in the absence of such a notice, 'it shall be conclusively presumed that no such jurisdiction has been accepted.' 40 U.S.C. § 255. ⁴ See Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312, 63 S.Ct. 1122, 87 L.Ed. 1421. Although the parties stipulated that the land leased by the credit union had been acquired by the United States at some time subsequent to February 1, 1940, there was no evident offered, nor does a search of the record reveal any, tending to prove that the statutory procedure for the acceptance of jurisdiction has been followed. Therefore, the trial court could not have properly concluded that exclusive jurisdiction over the leased land has been vested in the United States.

In the absence of an acceptance of either partial or exclusive jurisdiction, the United States' possession of lands is that of an ordinary proprietor. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 164, 83 S.Ct. 426, 9 L.Ed.2d 292; Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 531, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed. 264. As noted in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 141-42, 58 S.Ct. 208, 212, 82 L.Ed. 155: '(I)t is not unusual for the United States to own within a State lands which are set apart and used for public purposes. Such ownership and use without more do not withdraw the lands from the jurisdiction of the State. The lands 'remain part of her territory and within the operation of her laws, save that the latter cannot affect the title of the United States or embarrass it in using the lands or interfere with its right of disposal.' (Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 650, 50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed. 1091.)' The Groton zoning ordinances and building code constitute a valid exercise of the state's police power; see Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303; State v. Hillman, 110 Conn. 92, 100, 147 A. 294; and as such they are applicable to federal lands to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the federal purpose in acquiring the lands and are not contrary to federal statutes. See James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 60 S.Ct. 431, 84 L.Ed. 596.

The defendants claim that the acquisition of the land in question by the federal government predates the enactment by the town of Groton of its zoning ordinances and, therefore, the latter are inapplicable, citing United States v. Mississippi Tax Commission, 412 U.S. 363, 369-70, 93 S.Ct. 2183, 37 L.Ed.2d 1; Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Department of Agriculature, 318 U.S. 285, 294, 63 S.Ct. 628, 87 L.Ed. 761; and James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, supra. Those cases hold that, in situations where the federal government has taken exclusive jurisdiction over lands, state laws effective prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction remain in effect and state laws passed subsequent to the acquisition of jurisdiction have no effect. But no acquisition of exclusive jurisdiction having been shown in the present case, the cited cases are not apposite.

The defendants have not shown that the Groton building code and zoning ordinances are inconsistent with federal purposes or contrary to any federal laws. They have offered department of defense directive No. 1000.10, dated July 11, 1969, which states that it is defense department policy to make credit union facilities available to department personnel. The defendants have not explained, nor can we perceive, how this policy is inconsistent with a requirement that credit union office buildings comply with local building codes and zoning ordinances. The only federal laws referred to by the defendants are 12 U.S.C. §§ 1770 and 1771. The former section merely permits the discretionary allotment of space in federal buildings to credit unions organized under state law, and the latter section permits conversion from federal to state credit union and from state to federal credit union.

In the absence of exclusive jurisdiction acquired by the United States and also the absence of any conflicting federal law, we have no need to consider the supremacy clause of the United States constitution. See U.S.Const., art. VI, cl. 2; art. I § 8, cl. 17. Both United States v. City of Chester, 144 F.2d 415, 420 (3d Cir.), and State v. Stonybrook, Inc., 149 Conn. 492, 495, 181 A.2d 601, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 185, 83 S.Ct. 265, 9 L.Ed.2d 227, are cases involving government housing which, pursuant to the express terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1521(b), are immune from federal, state, and municipal building regulations. See Groton v. Laird, 353 F.Supp. 344, 350 n.10 (D.Conn.), which cites the City of Chester case as its only authority for the statement that the navy is exempt from local zoning ordinances. The immunity of the United States from municipal building and zoning...