State v. Stonybrook, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 May 1962
• Citation: 181 A.2d 601,149 Conn. 492
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. STONYBROOK, INC. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 601

181 A.2d 601

149 Conn. 492

STATE of Connecticut v. STONYBROOK, INC.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 8, 1962.

Alfred L. Scanlan, Washington, D. C., of District of Columbia bar, with whom were Hugh A. Hoyt, Bridgeport, and, on the brief, John P. Maiocco, Jr., Bridgeport, for appellant (defendant).

Thomas J. Dolan, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was James J. O'Connell, Pros. Atty., for appellee (state).

Before BALDWIN, C. J., and KING, MURPHY, SHEA and ALCORN, JJ.

KING, Associate Justice.

The defendant was tried on a criminal information charging it, in five counts, with certain violations of municipal regulations of the town of Stratford. It was found guilty, under the first count, of permitting its dwelling units to be occupied by rentpaying tenants without its having obtained proper certificates of occupancy as required by Stratford's regulations, and, under the third count, of failing to provide noncombustible flooring under the furnaces in fifty-four of its dwelling units as required by the Stratford building code. It was found not guilty of the offenses charged in the second count, and the fourth and fifth counts were withdrawn.

The facts necessary for an understanding of our decision concerning most of the claims of error properly before us will now be summarized. On August 1, 1941, the United States government, hereinafter referred to as the government, condemned land in Stratford and began the construction of housing units under the provisions of the Lanham Act, 54 Stat. 1125, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1521 [42 U.S.C.A. § 1521]. The units were constructed under the supervision of the Bridgeport housing authority and were operated for the government by that authority until June 30, 1943, when the newly established Stratford housing authority took over the operation under a lease from the government, pursuant to federal regulations, and operated the units until January 17, 1956. During this entire period of construction and operation by the government through the agency of the housing authorities, no certificates of occupancy for the housing units were ever obtained, nor did the construction fully conform to the requirements of the building code of Stratford. On January 17, 1956, the government sold the entire project to Stonybrook Gardens, Inc., a private corporation. Two hundred thousand dollars was paid on the purchase price, and a mortgage on the property was given to the government as security for the balance. Thereafter, on the same day, Stonybrook Gardens, Inc., conveyed the property to Hyman Alpert and Joseph Alpert; on January 10, 1957, they conveyed it to the defendant. Both Stonybrook Gardens, Inc., and the defendant are corporations owned by the Alperts. Before the housing units were sold by the government to Stonybrook Gardens, Inc., the Alperts met with the building inspector of Stratford and were put on notice as to the violations of the building code. At that meeting, the Alperts said that these violations would be taken care of. The violations had been noted by the building inspector when he made an inspection of the housing units in January, 1955. A copy of this inspection report was given to the Alperts before the units were purchased by them. Fifty-four furnaces in the units did not, at the commencement of the present prosecution, have noncombustible floors, as required by the building code. No certificates of occupancy had been obtained. Private owners are required by § 206 of the building code of Stratford to obtain certificates of occupancy and by § 3707 to have noncombustible floors under the furnances of housing units such as these. The government admittedly was not bound by these provisions, since an express provision in the Lanham Act empowered the government to construct buildings under the act 'without regard to * * * State, or municipal laws, ordinances, rules, or regulations.' 54 Stat. 1126, 42 U.S.C. § 1521(b) [42 U.S.C.A. § 1521(b)].

The defendant, on a number of grounds, claims that it is not bound by the requirements of the building code. The first ground is that since the government has retained legal title to the property under a mortgage deed executed by Stonybrook Gardens, Inc., a predecessor in title of the defendant, the application of the building code to the property is contrary to the provisions of the Lanham Act and the federal constitution. It is true that as long as the government operated these housing units through its agents it was immune from the effect of the building code. 54 Stat. 1126, 42 U.S.C. § 1521(b) [42 U.S.C.A. § 1521(b)]; United States v. City of Chester, 144 F.2d 415, 420 (3d Cir.); United States v. City of Philadelphia, 56 F.Supp. 862, 866 (E.D.Pa.), aff'd, 147 F.2d 291 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 325 U.S. 870, 65 S.Ct. 1410, 89 L.Ed. 1989. Now, however, the property has been sold to a private corporation, and the claim that it is still protected by federal immunity because the government retains the legal title is inaccurate and misleading. What the government did, and all that it did, in addition to making an outright sale, was to take back a mortgage for the balance of the purchase price. The defendant, as mortgagor, is the equitable owner of the property and thus its real owner. The government has merely the security rights of a mortgagee, although owning to our common-law concept of a mortgage as an outright conveyance with a defeasance clause, as distinguished from the 'lien theory' of New York and most states outside of New England, the government has what is technically termed a legal title, subject to a right of redemption which persists until it is extinguished by an action of foreclosure. Chappell v. Jardine, 51 Conn. 64, 69; Struzinski v. Struzinsky, 133 Conn. 424, 428, 52 A.2d 2, 171 A.L.R. 929. This distinction between the common-law and lien concepts of a mortgage is well explained in cases such as Chappel v. Jardine, supra, 51 Conn. 66. Obviously, such a technical legal title as the government has, as mortgagee, is not the equivalent of a legal title in the sense in which the term would be used were the government to be treated as the present owner or operator of the property. In any true ownership, there is no right of defeasance, nor is any action of foreclosure cutting off a mortgagor's equitable right of redemption necessary to acquire full ownership. The government is not the owner of the property, nor does it have legal title thereto in such a manner as to give the defendant immunity from compliance with the Stratford building code.

There is nothing in the finding or the record to indicate that the government intended to retain ownership, possession or control of the property or that it has in any way attempted so to do. It has retained nothing except its security interest as mortgagee, and this will never ripen into anything more unless there is a default in the mortgage and foreclosure proceedings ensue--something not suggested in this case. The sovereignty of the United States and its attendant immunity from state and local regulations ended with its sale of the property. See S. R. A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 564, 66 S.Ct. 749, 90 L.Ed. 851. There is nothing in the Lanham Act indicative of a congressional intent that a private purchaser of federal housing is to be shielded by federal immunity from reasonable local regulations designed to protect the public safety. See Public Housing Administration v. Bristol Township, 146 F.Supp. 859, 863 (E.D.Pa.). Congress, in enacting legislation within its constitutional authority, will not be deemed to have intended to invalidate state or local rules for the protection of the public safety unless its purpose so to do is clearly stated. Id., 864, and cases cited. The act neither purports to, nor does, confer any authority on one in the position of the defendant, or on anyone other than the government or one acting in its behalf, to ignore, or fail to comply with, the provisions of a local building code. Of course, under the circumstances, no such authority is conferred by the federal constitution.

The principal claim advanced by the defendant for not having to comply with the provisions of the building code is that, by its own terms, the code does not apply to the housing units. This claim is based on the premise that the units were in existence at the time of the passage, on September 27, 1943, of the code, effective October 27, 1943, and therefore, under the express provisions of the code itself, the units need not conform to its provisions. Insofar as this claim is based on §§ 103 and 104 of the code, it does not merit discussion. Section 502 of the code provides, in part, that '[b]uildings in existence at the time of the passage of this Code, may have their existing use or occupancy continued, if such use or occupancy was legal at the time of the passage of this Code, provided such continued use is not dangerous to life.' Since the court made no finding that the use...