Dupuy v. McColgan
Decision Date | 16 July 1952 |
Citation | 246 P.2d 155,112 Cal.App.2d 237 |
Parties | DUPUY v. McCOLGAN, as Franchise Tax Commissioner. Civ. 8107. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Morrison, Hohfeld, Foerster, Shuman & Clark and Leon De Fremery, San Francisco, Walker Slack, San Francisco, for appellant.
Ernest P. Goodman, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent.
Eight actions were commenced against the State Franchise Tax Commissioner to obtain a refund of personal income taxes paid by plaintiffs under protest for the years 1935 and 1936. The eight actions were consolidated for trial and were tried on a stipulation of facts from which the court made findings and drew the following conclusions of law:
'I
'II
'That the Monarch Investment Company was a Personal Holding Company within the meaning of section 2(o) of the California Personal Income Tax Act of 1935.
'III
'That the income of Monarch Investment Company was properly includable in the incomes of all the plaintiffs in these actions under the provisions of section 34 of the Personal Income Tax Act of 1935.'
A single judgment was entered in favor of defendant Franchise Tax Commissioner and plaintiffs have appealed.
Section 2(o) of the Personal Income Tax Act of 1935, so far as here relevant, provided:
'The words 'personal holding company' means any corporation (other than a corporation exempt from taxation under section 101 of the Federal Revenue Act of 1934, and other than a bank or trust company incorporated under the laws of the United States or of any State or Territory, a substantial part of whose business is the receipt of deposits, and other than a life insurance company or surety company) if (1) at least eighty per centum of its gross income for the taxable year is derived from royalties, dividends, interest, annuities, and (except in the case of regular dealers in stock or securities) gains from the sale of stock or securities, and (2) at any time during the last half of the taxable year more than fifty per centum in value of its outstanding stock is owned, directly or indirectly, by or for not more than five individuals.'
Section 34 of the Personal Income Tax Act of 1935 provided:
The portion of the act here involved provides that the income of personal holding companies is taxable 'if (1) at least eighty per centum of its gross income for the taxable year is derived from royalties'. The sole question to be determined upon this appeal is whether the income from the oil lease was 'rent' or 'royalty'. If 'rent', it was not part of the income of a holding company; if 'royalty', it was. As expressed by appellant: 'The solution to the question as to whether Monarch was or was not a personal holding company depends upon whether payments received by Monarch under an oil lease constitute 'royalties' within the meaning of said section. If these payments were not 'royalties', as the word was used in the section, Monarch was not a personal holding company and the decision should have been for the appellants.'
The lease here involved was executed on February 14, 1917, between Sunset Monarch Oil Co. (the name of Monarch Investment Company prior to May 28, 1920) and the Standard Oil Co. and reads that 'the Lessor has leased, let and demised and by these presents does lease, let and demise unto the Lessee * * * the land hereinafter described, with the sole and exclusive right to the Lessee to drill for, produce, extract and take oil, gas, asphaltum and other hydrocarbon substances' etc.
The lease then provides:
'Other than the royalty gas, the Lessor's royalty shall be delivered to the Lessor on the part of the land where produced and saved, and, if taken in kind, such royalty shall be delivered as produced and saved into tanks maintained on the land for that purpose by the Lessee, * * * Should the Lessor elect from time to time to have the Lessee purchase such royalty, the Lessee, upon thirty (30) days' notice in writing of such election, hereby agrees to purchase, take and receive all of said rents or royalty, and shall pay therefor the current prices paid by the Lessee from time to time to producers for products of like character, gravity and quality, in the Sunset Oil Field, and such payments shall be made to the Lessor on the 15th day of each month, for all rent and royalty produced during the preceding calendar month.
'The rent and royalty aforesaid shall be ascertained, computed and paid monthly, * * *.'
The original term of the lease was 20 years, but by a supplemental agreement dated December 7, 1931, the term was increased to 30 years.
It is agreed by both appellant and respondent that the definition of a personal holding company contained in Section 2(o) of the California Personal Income Tax Act of 1935 was taken verbatim from the Federal Revenue Act of 1934. In order to ascertain the meaning of 'royalties' in section 2(o) we should consider the scope of the term 'royalties' in the Federal Revenue Act of 1934.
Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, defines the word 'royalty' as * * *.'
In Black's Law Dictionary, third edition, the word 'royalty' is defined as:
'Royalty also sometimes means a payment which is made to an author or composer by an assignee or licensee in respect of each copy of his work which is sold, or to an inventor in respect of each article sold under the patent.'
It would appear from the foregoing definitions that the term 'royalty' as referring to a share of the product or profit of a mine or of a forest is deeply rooted in English history, and that by common usage the payments of a share of the product under oil leases are referred to as 'royalties'. It is a general rule of...
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