Durette v. Aloha Plastic Recycling, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 October 2004
• Docket Number: No. 23854.,23854.
• Citation: 100 P.3d 60,105 Haw. 490
• Parties: Ronald L. DURETTE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALOHA PLASTIC RECYCLING, INC., a Hawai`i Corporation, Defendant-Appellee, Richard Doran, Harold Haroun, and Thomas Reed, Defendants.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

100 P.3d 60

105 Haw. 490

Ronald L. DURETTE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALOHA PLASTIC RECYCLING, INC., a Hawai`i Corporation, Defendant-Appellee, Richard Doran, Harold Haroun, and Thomas Reed, Defendants.

No. 23854.

Supreme Court of Hawai`i.

October 29, 2004.

As Corrected November 1, 2004.

Lloyd A. Poelman and Sanford J. Langa, Wailuku, of Poelman & Langa, on the briefs, for plaintiff-appellant Ronald L. Durette.

Paul Yamamura, Lila Barbara Kanae, and Wesley D. Shimazu, Honolulu, of Kanae & Yamamura, on the briefs, for defendant-appellee Aloha Plastic Recycling, Inc.

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, and DUFFY, JJ.

Opinion of the Court by LEVINSON, J.

The plaintiff-appellant Ronald L. Durette appeals (1) the order, filed on October 8, 1998, of the circuit court of the second circuit, the Honorable Boyd P. Mossman presiding, granting defendant-appellant Aloha Plastic Recycling, Inc.'s [hereinafter, "APR"] motion for summary judgment as to Durette's claim of unjust enrichment. Durette also appeals the following order and judgment of the circuit court of the second circuit, the Honorable Joseph E. Cardoza presiding: (2) the order, filed on April 24, 2000, denying Durette's (a) motion for reconsideration of the October 8, 1998 order granting summary judgment, (b) motion for reconsideration of Durette's oral motion made at trial to amend his complaint to include his unjust enrichment claim, and (c) motion to make additional findings of fact (FOFs) under Hawai`i Rules of Civil Procedure Rule (HRCP) 52(b) (2004)¹ and to enter judgment under HRCP Rule 59 (2004)² regarding his unjust enrichment claim and unpaid wages claim, [hereinafter, "motions for reconsideration"];³ and (3) the first amended judgment, filed on October 4, 2000.

On appeal, Durette contends, inter alia, that "it was error as a matter of law for the circuit court to dismiss [his] unjust enrichment claim via summary judgment[.]"

In response, APR argues, inter alia, as follows: (1) "[b]ased on [Durette's] non-compliance with [Hawai`i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP)] Rule 28(b)(4) [(2004)⁴], [Durette's] points of error should be disregarded"; (2) "the trial court properly dismissed [Durette's] unjust enrichment claim because [Durette] received all that he was entitled to receive under the parties' existing agreement[,]" and (a) "there was no unjust enrichment because [APR] did not receive any unjust benefits[,]" (b) "there was no implied contract since there was no mutual assent on essential terms[,]" (c) "[Durette] was paid the full amount that he was promised under the existing agreement[,]" and (d) "the trial court's ruling was supported by the [FOFs] and should not be overturned[]"; and (3) "the trial court's rulings should be affirmed."

Durette replies, inter alia, (1) that "APR's understanding of HRAP Rule 28(b)(4) as applied to the points of error urged in [Durette's] appeal is misguided and should be summarily rejected[,]" (2) that "[t]he critical standard of review for this appeal is that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted APR's [m]otion for [s]ummary [j]udgment in regard to Durette's unjust enrichment claim[,]" and (3) that the facts, viewed "in the light most favorable to Durette" and "[a]ppl[ied] ... to the law of unjust enrichment, [indicates that] the trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted APR's motion for summary judgment[.]"

For the reasons discussed infra in Section III, we hold that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the retention of the benefit of Durette's services by APR was "unjust," such that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of APR and entering the October 4, 2000 first amended judgment. In light of our holding, we need not reach Durette's challenge to the April 24, 2000 order denying Durette's motions for reconsideration. Accordingly, we (1) vacate the circuit court's (a) October 8, 1998 order granting APR's motion for summary judgment and (b) October 4, 2000 first amended judgment and (2) remand this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 27, 1997, Durette filed a complaint in the circuit court of the second circuit, alleging the following counts against APR, as well as the defendants Richard Doran, Harold Haroun, and Thomas Reed [collectively hereinafter, "the Defendants"]:⁵ (1) fraud (Count I); (2) breach of implied contract (Count II); (3) unjust enrichment (Count III); and (4) unpaid wages (Count IV). Durette prayed

that judgment ... be entered as to Count I against [the D]efendants and/or any of them, jointly and severally; that judgment be entered as to Count II[] and Count III against [APR] individually; and that judgment be entered as to Count IV against [APR] individually including civil remedies as provided by [HRS] Chapter 388; also as to all counts for damages to which [Durette] maybe entitled pursuant to proof adduced at trial, as well as cost of suit, attorney's fees, pre- and post-judgment interest, together with such other and further relief as to which [Durette] may be entitled pursuant to [HRCP] Rule 54[.]

On April 2, 1998, Durette and Haroun stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of Durette's complaint against Haroun. On September 1, 1998, APR filed a motion for summary judgment as to all of Durette's claims, as well as a memorandum in support of the motion. In the memorandum, APR maintained, inter alia, as follows:

Absent [Durette's] single allegation that `[APR] has been unjustly enriched to the detriment of [Durette], [he] has presented no evidence that such ... unjust enrichment occurred.

The Supreme Court of Hawai`i has stated the following:

While unjust enrichment is a broad and precise term defying definition, the Supreme Court in deciding whether there should be restitution is guided by the underlying conception of restitution, that is, the prevention of injustice.

Small v. Badenhop, 67 Haw. 626, 701 P.2d 647 (1985).

In the instant case, there has been no showing of injustice. [Durette] admits that he was fully compensated for all the services he provided [APR] and for expenses.... Additionally, [Durette] did not have any knowledge of the amount of profits, if any, [APR] made while [Durette] was employed as an independent contractor, and has not presented any evidence that [APR] was unjustly enriched to his detriment.... In fact, [APR] did not post a profit while [Durette] was providing his consultant services in 1994-1996.... Additionally, [Durette] does not even know if... Doran or Reed ... drew salaries as of May 1996.... [Durette] was the only person involved with [APR] who was fully compensated for his services and expenses. There has been no showing of any injustice. Accordingly, the doctrine of unjust enrichment is not applicable in the instant case.

On September 2, 1998 Doran and Reed jointly filed a motion of summary judgment and a memorandum in support of the motion.

On September 16, 1998, Durette filed a memorandum in opposition to APR's September 1, 1998 motion for summary judgment and Doran and Reed's September 2, 1998 motion for summary judgment. Durette advanced, inter alia, the following contentions as to his unjust enrichment claim:

"The basis of recovery on quantum meruit is that a party has received a benefit from another which it is unjust for him to retain without paying therefor." Maui Aggregates, Inc. Vs. Reeder, 446 P.2d 174 at 176, 50 Haw. 608 (1968)....

[Durette's] unjust enrichment claim is that the services he performed for ... [APR] were worth more than the token amount paid. [The] Defendants agreed with [Durette] that this was true up until the day that [Durette] quit.

... APR has presented no evidence and has not even suggested that the token amount paid [to Durette] was the fair value. APR wants to take a windfall from [Durette] and not pay him the fair amount for his services. APR's own representations to [Durette] in April 1996 were that [Durette's] services were worth $45,000.00 per year. The value of [Durette's] services is a question of fact for trial.

APR's unjust enrichment argument includes again the claim that "[Durette] admits that he was fully compensated for all the services he provided [APR] and for expenses[.]" ...

[APR] wants to exploit one statement made by [Durette] in his deposition, taken out of context of the sentence asked, and ignore [Durette's] complaint, the remainder of [Durette's] deposition and the Affidavit of Ronald L. Durette attached hereto....

The legal standard on a motion for summary judgment is that the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts alleged in the materials ... considered by the court in making its determination on a motion for summary judgment must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion....

... APR's final unjust enrichment argument is so creative that there is no case law or logic to back it up. APR claims that because it hasn't made a profit, it wasn't unjustly enriched by not paying [Durette]. The logical[ly] absurd [implication] of APR's argument is that any employer who does not make a profit does not have to pay its employees.

Durette also attached, inter alia, an "Affidavit of Ronald L. Durette" to his memorandum in opposition, which averred in relevant part:

3. In August of 1994, ... APR and I entered into an oral employment agreement.

4. From August of 1994 until January 1995, a period of six months, I worked for ... APR on a part time basis as a sales and marketing executive.

5. From February of 1995 until October 21, 1995, a period of twenty-one months, I worked for ... APR on a full time basis as a sales and marketing executive.

6. October 31, 1996 was the last day that I worked for ... APR.

7. During my employment, ... APR gave me reimbursement for my expenses.

8. During the period of my employment, I was only partially paid for the services I performed in the amount of $19,650.00.

9.

...