Durham Land Co v. Kilgore
| Decision Date | 04 December 1937 |
| Docket Number | No. 26417.,26417. |
| Citation | 56 Ga.App. 785,194 S.E. 49 |
| Parties | DURHAM LAND CO. v. KILGORE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
The evidence in the present case was sufficient to authorize an award by the Industrial Commission to the claimant who was the mother of the deceased workman, in that the deceased workman was an employee of the defendant and not of another as an independent contractor. The judge of the superior court therefore did not err in affirming the award on appeal.
Error from Superior Court, Walker County; C. H. Porter, Judge.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Annie Kilgore, claimant, for the death of her husband, Robert Kilgore, opposed by the Durham Land Company, employer. To review a judgment of the superior court affirming an award of the Industrial Commission in claimant's favor, the employer brings error.
Affirmed.
Rosser & Shaw, of La Fayette, for plaintiff in error.
McClure & McClure, of Chattanooga, Tenn., for defendant in error.
Robert Kilgore was killed while working in a coal mine belonging to the Durham Land Company. It is admitted that he died as a result of injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment; also that his mother, the claimant, was, at the time of his death, totally dependent upon him for support. The sole question presented for consideration is whether the deceased, at the time of his death on January 8, 1935, was an employee of the Durham Land Company. In determining this question it is necessary to determine whether one R. E. Thompson, who employed the deceased, was himself an employee of the Durham Land Company or an independent contractor. It was aptly said in Liberty Lumber Company v. Silas, 49 Ga.App. 262 (2) 175 S.E. 265, 266 that: "In claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, where the question is whether the injured person, or the person under whom he was working, occupied the relation of an employee or of an independent contractor toward the [al-leged] employer, the line of demarkation is often so close that each case must be determined upon its own particular facts." However, there is a very distinct line of demarkation between these two relationships. If the employer had or assumes the right under the contract to control and direct how the work shall be done, that is to say, that the employee has or assumes the right under the contract to control the manner in which the details of the work are to be executed, as distinguished from the mere right to superintend it so that the desired results are obtained, the relationship is that of master and servant If, on the other hand, the employer has or assumes only the right under the contract to superintend the work to the end that the desired results so contracted for are obtained, and does not have or assume the right under the contract to control the manner in which it is done, which right is vested in the contractor, the relationship is that of employer and independent contractor. Thus it has been said that where a contract is entered into providing for the execution of a specific kind or piece of work, for a stated compensation, "the test to be applied in determining whether the relationship of the parties under" the "contract for the performance of labor is that of employer and servant, or that of employer and independent contractor, lies in whether the contract gives, or the employer assumes, the right to control the time, manner, and method of executing the work, as distinguished from the right merely to require certain definite results in conformity to the contract." Yearwood v. Peabody, 45 Ga.App. "451 (2) 164 S.E. 901. See, also, Bentley v. Jones, 48 Ga.App. 587, 173 S.E. 737, and cit. In considering this...
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