Durham v. Durham

• Decision Date: 18 June 2012
• Docket Number: Nos. S12A0537,S12A0607.,s. S12A0537
• Citation: 12 FCDR 2148,728 S.E.2d 627,12 FCDR 1861,291 Ga. 231
• Parties: DURHAM v. DURHAM, et al. Callaway v. Willard, et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

291 Ga. 231
728 S.E.2d 627
12 FCDR 1861
12 FCDR 2148

DURHAM
v.
DURHAM, et al.
Callaway
v.
Willard, et al.

Nos. S12A0537, S12A0607.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 18, 2012.

[728 S.E.2d 628]

Bruce Daniel Dubberly, Jr., Dubberly & McGovern, Glennville, for appellant in No. S12A0537.

J. Franklin Edenfield, Spivey, Carlton & Edenfield, P.C., Swainsboro, William J. Neville, Jr., Callaway, Neville & Brinson, Claxton, Luke A. Lantta, General Counsel, Nicole Jennings Wade, Bryan Cave LLP, Atlanta, for appellee in No. S12A0537.

William J. Neville, Jr., Callaway, Neville & Brinson, Claxton, for appellant in No. S12A0607.

Bruce Daniel Dubberly, Jr., Dubberly & McGovern, Glennville, J. Franklin Edenfield, Spivey, Carlton & Edenfield, Swainsboro, Nicole Jennings Wade, Luke A. Lantta, Gen. Counsel, Bryan Cave LLP, Atlanta, for appellee in No. S12A0537.

NAHMIAS, Justice.

[291 Ga. 231]The question presented by these two cases is whether appeals that involve the proper interpretation of a trust provision come within this Court's general appellate jurisdiction over “equity cases,” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III(2), because the resolution of that legal issue will affect the administration of the trust. Consistent with our precedent on this question, we conclude that such cases do not come within our equity jurisdiction.

1. These cases arise from a declaratory judgment action filed by trustee William E. Callaway, Jr., seeking to determine the effect of an in terrorem clause in an express trust. The donor, Marjorie H. Durham, executed the inter vivos trust in 2000, naming herself as a beneficiary and her four children as residual beneficiaries. Mrs. Durham died in 2009. In 2010, the trustee filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against the four trust beneficiaries, seeking an order declaring that three of the beneficiaries, Wallace Durham, Hugh Durham, and Lucinda Durham Willard, had forfeited their respective interests in the trust estate under the in terrorem clause and that the entirety of the estate should therefore be distributed to the fourth beneficiary, Lawrence Durham.¹ Lawrence filed a counterclaim and a cross-claim and later moved for summary judgment, alleging that because he was the only child who did not violate the in terrorem clause, he is the sole beneficiary of the residue of the trust estate. Lucinda also filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that she had not violated the in terrorem clause and remains a valid beneficiary of the trust. On July 6, 2011, the trial court granted Lucinda's motion for summary judgment, and on July 12, the court denied Lawrence's motion for summary judgment.

Case No. S12A0537 is Lawrence's appeal of the denial of his motion for summary judgment. After the trial court certified its ruling for immediate review, Lawrence filed an application for interlocutory appeal in the Court of Appeals, which transferred the application to this Court. We granted the application to address whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal as an “equity case” and, if so, whether the trial court erred in denying Lawrence's motion for summary judgment. Case No. S12A0607 is [291 Ga. 232]trustee Callaway's appeal of the trial court's grant of Lucinda's motion for summary judgment. The trustee filed a direct appeal in the Court of Appeals, which again transferred the case to this Court. We conclude, however, that these cases do not come within the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over “equity cases.”

2. For more than two decades, this Court has consistently held that our appellate jurisdiction over “equity cases” is limited to cases in which a specific substantive issue raised on appeal involves equitable relief rather than questions of law.

Whether an action is an equity case for the purpose of determining jurisdiction on appeal depends upon the issue raised on appeal,

[728 S.E.2d 629]

not upon how the case is styled nor upon the kinds of relief which may be sought by the complaint. That is, “equity cases” are those in which a substantive issue on appeal involves the legality or propriety of equitable relief sought in the superior court—whether that relief was granted or denied. Cases in which the grant or denial of such relief was merely ancillary to underlying issues of law, or would have been a matter of routine once the underlying issues of law were resolved, are not “equity cases.”

Beauchamp v. Knight, 261 Ga. 608, 609, 409 S.E.2d 208 (1991). Accord, e.g., Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Assn., 271 Ga. 745, 747–749, 524 S.E.2d 464 (1999); Saxton v. Coastal Dialysis & Medical Clinic, 267 Ga. 177, 178–179, 476 S.E.2d 587 (1996); Pittman v. Harbin Clinic Professional Assn., 263 Ga. 66, 66, 428 S.E.2d 328 (1993).

The parties and the dissent contend that because the resolution of these cases will affect the administration of Mrs. Durham's trust by controlling how the trustee should distribute the trust property among the four beneficiaries, the cases come within our equity jurisdiction. The parties cite a statute which says that “[t]rusts are peculiarly subjects of equity jurisdiction” and that “[a]ctions concerning the construction, administration, or internal affairs of a trust shall be maintained in superior court,” OCGA § 53–12–6(a), (b), and note that the Constitution gives superior courts exclusive jurisdiction in “equity cases.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Par. I. The dissent cites similar materials regarding the equitable nature of trusts and trust remedies. See Dis. Op. at 632.

However, in Warren v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 272 Ga. 142, 527 S.E.2d 563 (2000), we flatly rejected the argument that “cases involving the administration of trusts are always considered equitable” for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 144, 527 S.E.2d 563. The issue raised on appeal in Warren involved standing to [291 Ga. 233]enforce a trust, and the Court's reasoning followed Beauchamp and spurned the view that appeals related to trusts are to be considered any differently than other appeals involving our equity jurisdiction.

[A]s this Court's precedent makes clear, it is not the relief requested, or any classification or treatment of the case in the court below, but the issue presented on appeal that controls [our jurisdiction]. The cases cited by the parties in support of the proposition that cases involving the administration of trusts are always considered to be equity cases, regardless of the appellate issues, were decided prior to the clarification of our jurisdiction in Pittman and Beauchamp .... The principles of Pittman and Beauchamp control; this Court's equity jurisdiction is invoked when the primary issue raised on appeal is equitable.

Warren, 272 Ga. at 144, 527 S.E.2d 563.

Thus, under our jurisdictional precedent, “[f]or a matter to come within this Court's equity jurisdiction, the lower court must have rendered a judgment based upon equitable principles, and that decision must be the primary issue on appeal,” even if the case involves a trust. Id. at 145, 527 S.E.2d 563. We unanimously reiterated this point two years ago in Reeves v. Newman, 287 Ga. 317, 695 S.E.2d 626 (2010), which relied on Warren to return a case involving the imposition of an implied trust to the Court of Appeals because the appeal presented only legal questions, again rejecting the argument that cases involving the administration of trusts are always considered equitable on appeal. See Reeves, 287 Ga. at 318–319, 695 S.E.2d 626.

Our jurisdictional treatment of trust cases is consistent with our treatment of other types of cases involving equity. For example, injunctions are the quintessential form of equitable relief, see OCGA § 9–5–1 (“Equity, by a writ of injunction, may restrain [certain proceedings and acts.]”), and actions seeking an injunction must therefore be brought in superior court. See OCGA § 15–6–8(2) (saying that superior courts have the authority “[t]o exercise the powers of a court of equity”); OCGA § 15–6–9(3) (saying that superior courts have the authority “[t]o grant writs of injunction”); Lee v. Lee, 260 Ga. 356, 356, 392 S.E.2d 870 (1990) (holding that equitable remedies such as injunctions “are beyond the

[728 S.E.2d 630]

scope” of a probate court and may only be sought in superior court). Despite these provisions regarding original jurisdiction, which are similar to the trust provisions on which the parties and the dissent rely, we have refined our analysis of what is an equity case for appellate jurisdiction in many cases involving requests for injunctive relief, transferring the cases to the Court of [291 Ga. 234]Appeals when the appeals did not present a substantive issue of equitable relief. See, e.g., Redfearn, 271 Ga. at 747–748, 524 S.E.2d 464;Saxton, 267 Ga. at 178–179, 476 S.E.2d 587;Pittman, 263 Ga. at 66, 428 S.E.2d 328. In short, the case law construing this Court's jurisdiction long ago broke any direct link with the jurisdiction of the superior courts over “equity cases.” ²

We recognize that this Court has decided a few trust-related cases. See Lewis v. Van Anda, 282 Ga. 763, 653 S.E.2d 708 (2007); Ludwig v. Ludwig, 281 Ga. 724, 642 S.E.2d 638 (2007); Miller v. Walker, 270 Ga. 811, 514 S.E.2d 22 (19...