Durham v. Farabee

• Decision Date: 20 December 1985
• Citation: 481 So.2d 885
• Parties: Jackie Wayne DURHAM v. Douglas David FARABEE. 84-172.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 885

481 So.2d 885

73 A.L.R.4th 687

Jackie Wayne DURHAM v. Douglas David FARABEE.

84-172.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 20, 1985.

Leo E. Costello of Costello & Stott, Birmingham, for appellant.

Edgar M. Elliott III and Karon O. Bowdre of Rives & Peterson, Birmingham, for appellee.

MADDOX, Justice.

The issue on this appeal is whether the fact that the defendant Douglas David Farabee paid without contest a fine based on a traffic citation for failing to yield the right of way is admissible in a subsequent personal injury action brought against him as a result of an accident allegedly resulting from that failure to yield. The trial court ruled that this evidence was not admissible. We disagree and reverse.

The facts of this case are simple, and, for purposes of this appeal, largely undisputed. On February 21, 1979, Farabee attempted to make a left turn at an intersection and failed to see an approaching motorcycle driven by plaintiff Jackie Wayne Durham. Durham's motorcycle struck the side of Farabee's car and Durham sustained numerous personal injuries, for which he brought suit.

As a consequence of the accident, Farabee was issued a traffic citation for failing to yield the right of way. He subsequently paid a fine based on the citation, paying at the Birmingham Municipal Court, and this payment of the fine was, in effect, a plea of guilty to the citation. The trial court refused to allow Durham's attorney to present to the jury proof of the payment of this fine. The jury returned a verdict for Farabee. Durham contends that the failure to allow the evidence of the payment of the fine was error.

Generally, a person's conviction in a criminal case is admissible against him in a civil action to show that he did the act for which he was convicted. Yancey v. Farmer, 472 So.2d 990 (Ala.1985):

"As a general rule a person's conviction in a criminal case is admissible against him in a civil action to show that he did the act for which he was convicted. If, however, the accused is entitled to a trial de novo in circuit court on an appeal of a district court conviction, the district court's judgment of conviction is vacated by such an appeal and the district court conviction is not admissible to prove that the accused did the act he was accused of. [C. Gamble,] McElroy's Alabama Evidence, §§ 269.05(1), -(4) [3d ed. 1977]."

Some courts have created an exception, and refuse to allow convictions for traffic violations into evidence as proof of negligence. Keebler v. Willard, 91 Ga.App. 551, 86 S.E.2d 379 (1955); Bolen v. Buyze, 16 Mich.App. 252, 167 N.W.2d 808 (1969). The reason for this exclusion is that, "[f]aced with a small penalty for a petty infraction, the driver may not have defended with vigor, and the quality of justice accorded him in the traffic court may be open to question." Note, Admissibility of Traffic Convictions as Proof of Facts in Subsequent Civil Action, 50 Col.L.Rev. 529, 530 (1950); see, Loughner v. Schmelzer, 421 Pa. 283, 218 A.2d 768 (1966). Other courts, however, have followed the general rule even where traffic violations are involved. In Kelch v. Courson, 103 Ariz. 576, 579, 447 P.2d 550, 553 (1968), a case involving facts very similar to those presented here, the Arizona Supreme Court stated:

"Plaintiffs also maintain that the trial court erred in refusing their requested instruction No. 12 to the effect that defendant's plea of guilty, in traffic court, to a violation of a statute enacted for the safety of the public 'is evidence of negligence per se.' Plaintiff proved that defendant had pleaded guilty to the citation he had received for making an improper left turn. It is a well-settled rule that a plea of guilty in a criminal case is admissible in evidence in a civil case involving the same issues. Hays v. Richardson, 95 Ariz. 263, ...