Durham v. MGM Nat'l Harbor
| Docket Number | Civil TJS-21-1247 |
| Decision Date | 31 July 2023 |
| Parties | PEARL DURHAM, Plaintiff, v. MGM NATIONAL HARBOR, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) (ECF No. 47) filed by Defendant MGM National Harbor, LLC (“MGM”).[1] Having considered the submissions of the parties (ECF Nos. 47, 48 & 51), I find that a hearing is unnecessary. See Loc. R 105.6. For the following reasons, the Motion will be granted.
Plaintiff Pearl Durham (“Ms. Durham”) filed this lawsuit against MGM to recover for injuries she sustained as a result of MGM's alleged negligence. See ECF No. 4. In Ms. Durham's operative pleading, the “Amended Complaint” filed at ECF No. 4, she alleges that she was a patron of the MGM National Harbor in Prince George's County, Maryland on April 3, 2017. Id. at 2. On that date, she slipped and fell in the bathroom of a casino on the premises, which is owned and operated by MGM. Id. She suffered injuries to her left knee. About four months later, on August 16, 2017, Ms. Durham alleges that she fell in the vicinity of Gallery Place in Washington, D.C., and suffered injuries. She alleges that MGM's negligence related to the April 3, 2017 fall proximately caused her injuries on August 16, 2017. Id.
MGM timely removed the case to this Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. ECF No. 1. The Court entered a scheduling order on August 18, 2021, and discovery went on for more than one year, through October 6, 2022. ECF Nos. 24 & 35. MGM now moves for summary judgment and its Motion is fully briefed and ripe for decision.
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). If sufficient evidence exists for a reasonable jury to render a verdict for the party opposing the motion, then a genuine dispute of material fact is presented and summary judgment should be denied. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Yet the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [opposing party's] position” cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 252.
The facts themselves, and the inferences to be drawn from those facts, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2008). A party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of its pleading but must cite “particular parts of materials in the record” or “show[] that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Supporting and opposing affidavits are to be made on personal knowledge, contain such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively the competence of the affiant to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4).
Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are not in dispute. To the extent that any facts are in dispute, they will be viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Durham, the non-moving party. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 ().
On April 3, 2017, Ms. Durham and her friend were patrons at the MGM Casino. While at the casino, Ms. Durham played the slot machines. Sometime during her visit, Ms. Durham needed to use the restroom. When she entered the restroom, Ms. Durham did not see any indication that the restroom was being cleaned or that the floor might be wet or slippery. ECF No. 47-3 at 12. But when she opened the door of the restroom stall to exit, Ms. Durham saw a worker with a mop and bucket filled with water immediately outside the stall. Id. at 10-12. She observed that the worker “was trying to mop the floor.” Id. at 11. Ms. Durham came out of the stall, having been “taught to take care of [her]self and look both ways or look to make sure that [she was] going to be safe,” but became startled and “went down.” Id. at 11-12. Ms. Durham was injured and sought treatment for her injuries.
On August 16, 2017, Ms. Durham fell down while walking on 7th St. N.W. in Washington, D.C. She does not recall exactly where she fell but it was around Gallery Place. Ms. Durham was injured and sought treatment for her injuries.
Ms. Durham claims that MGM was negligent in relation to her April 3 injury by failing to properly maintain its premises, failing to warn her of a dangerous condition, failing to properly inspect its premises, failing to remedy a dangerous condition, and failing to exercise ordinary and reasonable care. ECF No. 4 at 2-3. She also claims that MGM is liable for the injuries that she suffered on August 17, alleging that the injury she suffered on April 3 caused her to fall this second time. Id. at 3.
In Maryland, the elements of a negligence claim are “(1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of the duty.” Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Allfirst Bank, 394 Md. 270, 290 (2006); see also Rybas v. Riverview Hotel Corp., 21 F.Supp.3d 548, 560 (D. Md. 2014). In a claim involving premises liability, the status of the person injured on the property at the time of the incident is critical to determining the defendant's duty to that person. A person invited or permitted to be on another's property for purposes related to the owner's business is an invitee. See, e.g., Wagner v. Doehring, 315 Md. 97, 102 (1989). In this case, there is no dispute that Ms. Durham was an invitee on the premises. The duty of a landowner to a business invitee was summarized by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Mondawmin Corp. v. Kres, 258 Md. 307, 313 (1970):
The Restatement of the Law of Torts, Second, sec. 343, sets forth the standards governing the relationship of landowner and business invitee with respect to a hazardous condition. The landowner is subject to liability for harm caused by a natural or artificial condition on his land if (a) he knows or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover the condition, (b) he should expect that invitees will not discover the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, (c) he invites entry upon the land without (1) making the condition safe, or (2) giving a warning.
Under Maryland law, “a proprietor of a store owes a duty to his customers to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and he will be held liable for injuries sustained by a customer in consequence of his failure to do so.” Moulden v. Greenbelt Consumer Servs., Inc., 239 Md. 229, 231-32 (1965). Accordingly, the “duties of a business invitor thus include the obligation to warn invitees of known hidden dangers, a duty to inspect, and a duty to take reasonable precautions against foreseeable dangers.” Tennant v. Shoppers Food Warehouse Md. Corp., 115 Md.App. 381, 388 (1997). But “[s]torekeepers are not insurers of their customers' safety, and no presumption of negligence arises merely because an injury was sustained on a storekeeper's premises.” Giant Food, Inc. v. Mitchell, 334 Md. 633, 636 (1994). The invitee Rybas, 21 F.Supp.3d at 562. “Accordingly, the owner or occupier of land has no duty to warn of an open, obvious and present danger.” Id. “The burden is upon the customer to show that the proprietor . . . had actual or constructive knowledge that the dangerous condition existed,” and that “that knowledge was gained in sufficient time to give the owner the opportunity to remove [the danger] or warn the invitee.” Rehn v. Westfield Am., 153 Md.App. 586, 593 (2003) (internal quotation omitted). A business proprietor may be deemed to have constructive notice of a dangerous condition “if it is shown that the condition existed for a length of time sufficient to permit a person under a duty to discover it if he had exercised ordinary care.” Rawls v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 207 Md. 113, 120 (1955). “What will amount to sufficient time depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and involves consideration of the nature of the danger, the number of persons likely to be affected by it, the diligence required to discover or prevent it, opportunities and means of knowledge, the foresight which a person of ordinary care and prudence would be expected to exercise under the circumstances, and the foreseeable consequences of the conditions.” Rehn, 153 Md.App. at 593.
In its Motion, MGM argues that it is entitled to summary judgment for two reasons: (1) Ms. Durham cannot establish the existence of any dangerous condition on MGM's premises that caused her injuries; and (2) even if a dangerous condition existed, it was necessarily open and obvious.[2] ECF No. 47-1 at 16-19.
MGM does not dispute that it owed a duty to Ms. Durham on April 3, 2017, the date when she fell in the restroom...
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