Durham v. Parks, Civ. No. 4-82-862.

• Citation: 564 F. Supp. 244
• Decision Date: 12 May 1983
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 4-82-862.
• Parties: Mary DURHAM, Plaintiff, v. Gregg W. PARKS and the University of Minnesota, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

564 F. Supp. 244

Mary DURHAM, Plaintiff, v. Gregg W. PARKS and the University of Minnesota, Defendants.

Civ. No. 4-82-862.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota, Fourth Division.

May 12, 1983.

Edward Q. Cassidy, St. Paul, Minn., for plaintiff.

Stephen S. Dunham, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendants.

ORDER

MILES W. LORD, Chief Judge.

The above-entitled matter is before this court upon defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This matter was taken under advisement after oral argument. Defendants' motion states five grounds for dismissal: 1) The amended complaint contains no jurisdictional statement as required under Rule 8(a), Fed.R. Civ.P. 2) The first cause of action in the amended complaint against the University of Minnesota and Gregg Parks, sued in his official capacity, in which the plaintiff relies upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, should be dismissed because both defendants are immune from such suit under the eleventh amendment to the constitution. 3) Plaintiff's allegations of injury are too speculative and vague to afford relief and she therefore lacks standing to bring suit. 4) The second cause of action should be dismissed because it does not state a claim for violation of the Minnesota Data Practices Act. 5) If the first cause of action is dismissed, then this court has no jurisdiction over the second cause of action, a state claim, pursuant to the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.

This court will address each ground for dismissal separately. For the reasons stated herein, defendants' motion as to parts one, two and three is denied, part four is granted and part five is not applicable.

I.

This court rejects defendant's claim that this action should be dismissed for plaintiff's failure to make a jurisdictional statement in the amended complaint. The absence of such a statement in this case was an error on the part of plaintiff's counsel. The Supreme Court has emphasized that even a flawed complaint must be "so construed as to do substantial justice."

Following the simple guide of Rule 8(f) that "all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice," we have no doubt that petitioner's complaint adequately set forth a claim.... The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80, 85 (1957).

In her original and amended complaints, the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to find a reasonable basis for a claim arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Moreover, because those claims were contained in the complaint, defendants had ample notice of the existence and nature of those claims. It does not appear from the face of plaintiff's pleadings and from her briefs that she was attempting to evade the jurisdictional complexities arising from the eleventh amendment issues in this case. For these reasons, the first count of defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.

II.

Defendants' second claim for dismissal is that the University of Minnesota and Gregg Parks, sued in his official capacity, should enjoy immunity under the eleventh amendment from plaintiff's §§ 1981 and 1983 cause of action. The eleventh amendment provides:

the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subject of any Foreign State.

Additionally,

While the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a state by its own citizens the Supreme Court has consistently held that an unconsenting state is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). The fact that the state is not named as a party is of no consequence, for if a state agency or state official is the named defendant and the action is therefore in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the "state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit." Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945), quoted in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979).

The question before this court is whether such a relationship exists between the University of Minnesota and the State of Minnesota so that it could be fairly said that an action against the University is one against the state so that the University and Gregg Parks enjoy the protection of sovereign immunity.

In Eleventh Amendment cases the question of whether the state is "the real party in interest" is one of federal law, but federal courts must examine the powers, characteristics and relationships created by state law in order to determine whether the suit is in reality against the state itself.

Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 279 (5th Cir.1975).

The appropriate factors to consider when determining if a state university is actually an arm of the state are those factors set out in Jackson Sawmill Co. v. United States:

In determining whether a separate state agency or institution shares the Eleventh Amendment shield as an "alter ego" of the state, a court must look to numerous factors, no one of which is conclusive.... The most important, of course, is whether, in the event plaintiff prevails, judgment will have to be paid out of the state treasury.... Also to be considered is whether the entity sued is performing a governmental or proprietary function, whether it has been separately incorporated, whether it has the power to sue and be sued and enter into contracts, the degree of autonomy over its operations, and whether the state has immunized itself from responsibility for the agency's operations....

Jackson Sawmill Co. v. United States, 580 F.2d 302, 308 (8th Cir.1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1070, 99 S.Ct. 839, 59 L.Ed.2d 35 (1979), quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559, 564 (2d Cir.1975), rev'd on other grounds 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976) (citations omitted).

The majority of federal courts which have considered the "alter ego" relationship of a state university to its state have concluded that a suit against the university is a suit against the state for the purposes of the eleventh amendment. See, e.g., Perez v. Rodriguez, 575 F.2d 21 (1st Cir.1978); Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910, 97 S.Ct. 2959, 53 L.Ed.2d 1083 (1977); Prebble v. Brodrick, 535 F.2d 605 (10th Cir.1975); Long v. Richardson, 525 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1975); Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3 (4th Cir.1975); Brennan v. University of Kansas, 451 F.2d 1287 (10th Cir.1971); Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir.1971); Walstad v. University of Minnesota Hosps., 442 F.2d 634 (8th Cir.1971); Vaughn v. Regents of University of California, 504 F.Supp. 1349 (E.D.Cal.1981); Weisbord v. Michigan State University, 495 F.Supp. 1347 (W.D. Mich.1980); An-Ti Chai v. Michigan Technological University, 493 F.Supp. 1137 (W.D.Mich.1980); Zentgraf v. Texas A & M University, 492 F.Supp. 265 (S.D.Tex.1980); but see, e.g., Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 538 F.2d 991 (3d Cir.1976); Dyson v. Lavery, 417 F.Supp. 103 (E.D.Va.1976); Gordenstein v. University of Delaware, 381 F.Supp. 718 (D.Del.1974). However, the "weight" of the above-cited authority is not dispositive of the issue as "the status of each university must be considered on the basis of its own peculiar circumstances." Jacobs v. College of William and Mary, 495 F.Supp. 183, 189 (E.D.Va.1980), citing Soni v. Board of Trustees, 513 F.2d 347, 352 (6th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919, 96 S.Ct. 2623, 49 L.Ed.2d 372 (1976).

This court must thus undergo an analysis of the relevant factors as they pertain to the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota.

The University of Minnesota was incorporated under "An Act to incorporate the University of Minnesota, at the Falls of St. Anthony." Territorial Laws 1851, c. 3. Those rights originally conferred upon the University were then perpetuated unto the University through article 13, section 3, of the Minnesota Constitution.¹

So the University, in respect to its corporate status and government, was put beyond the power of the Legislature by paramount law, the right to amend or repeal which exists only in the people themselves.

University of Minnesota v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 265, 220 N.W. 951 (1928).

The laws of incorporation provided that the government of the University was vested in the Board of Regents which is elected by the legislature. The University was created as a body corporate which has been described as a highly autonomous body. Early case law illustrates that, many times when the legislature enacted legislation with the purpose of exercising control over the management of the University, the legislation has been declared unconstitutional because of the body corporate status. In University of Minnesota v. Chase, the Supreme Court said that article 13, section 3, of the constitution prohibited the legislature from supervising the finances of the University.²

The territorial act of incorporation provided that the Regents of Minnesota have the power to sue or be sued, to contract or be contracted with, and to enact laws for the government of the University. Territorial laws 1851, c. 3. Further, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has interpreted the territorial laws as giving the University the power to manage its finances without legislative control,³ to construct dormitories on campus without legislative approval,⁴ and to have its decisions concerning the management of its...