Durkee v. Koehler
Decision Date | 17 May 1905 |
Docket Number | 13,796 |
Citation | 103 N.W. 767,73 Neb. 833 |
Parties | CHARLES T. DURKEE v. GUSTAVE KOEHLER |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
ERROR to the district court for Hall county: JOHN R. THOMPSON JUDGE. Reversed with directions.
REVERSED.
F Dolezal, for plaintiff in error.
W. H Thompson, contra.
DUFFIE, C. ALBERT and JACKSON, CC., concur.
In an action to foreclose a mortgage on what is known as the Koehler Hotel property in the city of Grand Island, Charles T. Durkee and more than twenty other lienholders were made parties defendant. Durkee filed an answer and cross-petition showing that he had furnished certain material and done labor in the erection of the hotel, and had taken the necessary steps to secure a mechanic's lien therefor. He asked that the amount due him be ascertained; that the property be sold and the proceeds applied to the satisfaction of his lien, and that he have personal judgment for any deficiency. A decree was entered in the case on February 29, 1896, which, among other things, established the lien of Durkee, but placed him in the third class. An appeal was taken, and the judgment of the district court affirmed. See Grand Island Banking Co. v. Koehler, 57 Neb. 649, 78 N.W. 265. The decree of the district court did not contain any finding on the question of the right of any of the lienholders to a personal judgment against Koehler in case of a deficiency, and but two or three of the lienholders asked for such a finding. The property was sold June 14, 1900, and the proceeds of the sale distributed among the lienholders having priority over Durkee. The sale was confirmed June 30, 1900, and on October 31, 1902, Durkee filed a motion for a deficiency judgment, which was overruled by the court by an order entered December 14, 1903, from which order Durkee has appealed to this court.
It is insisted by the appellee, and the district court apparently proceeded upon the theory, that a deficiency judgment could not be entered against the owner of the property upon the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien by action brought upon the chancery side of the docket. It is said in brief of appellee that "our statute governing mechanics' liens provides but two modes of enforcement: First, under section four, to obtain a judgment on the account in civil action, continuing the lien and sequestering, by reason thereof, the rents and profits of the lands; and, second, by a petition in chancery as in other cases of liens; that, the plaintiff in error having elected to pursue the course in chancery, he is not entitled to a personal judgment against the defendant, but simply to a decree finding the amount due, ordering a sale of the property, and application of the proceeds, as is the practice in such courts." We are not inclined to agree with the appellee in this position. An examination of the statute relating to mechanics' liens clearly shows, as we think, the intention of the legislature to allow a personal judgment against the owner of the property on which the lien is claimed for the amount due upon the account of the lienholder, whatever the proceedings taken to enforce the lien.
Section 1, article I, chapter 54, Compiled Statutes, 1903 (Ann. St. 7100), the act giving mechanics' and laborers' liens, defines who are entitled thereto and for what a lien may be claimed. Sections 2 and 3 provide the proceedings to secure a lien. Section 4 is as follows: When we consider that courts of equity have no power to enforce this statutory lien unless expressly authorized by law, or unless, perhaps, there exists some impediment or difficulty which would render the remedy given by the statute unavailing, it seems to us clear that section 4 was designed by the legislature as one of the methods of enforcing the lien given by the statute and by a sale of the property. The general rule is that when, by the statute, a new right is given and a specific remedy provided, or a new power and also the means of executing it are provided by statute, the power can be executed and the right vindicated in no other way than that prescribed by the statute. Coleman v. Freeman, 3 Ga. 137; Quimby v. Sloan, 2 E. D. Smith (N.Y.) 594, 615; Otley v. Haviland, 36 Miss. 19; Phillips, Mechanics' Liens (3d ed.), sec. 2.
A statute of Wisconsin, substantially like section 4, was given this construction by the supreme court of that state in Dewey v. Fifield, 2 Wis. 73. The court said:
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