Durkin v. Williams
| Decision Date | 03 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021-0580 |
| Citation | 169 Ohio St.3d 10,201 N.E.3d 827 |
| Parties | DURKIN, Exr., v. WILLIAMS, Judge. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Michele Morris ; and Gregory T. Plesich Co., L.P.A., and Gregory T. Plesich, Akron, for petitioner.
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Carrie Hill and John Galonski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondent.
{¶ 1} Petitioner, John Durkin, executor of the estate of Virginia Durkin, seeks a writ of prohibition against respondent, Judge Steven O. Williams, who is presiding over the underlying action involving the Durkin estate in the Summit County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division. John contends that Judge Williams's appointment of a special master commissioner under R.C. 2101.06 disregards the law of the case established in In re Estate of Durkin , 9th Dist. Summit No. 28661, 2018-Ohio-2283, 2018 WL 2986682 (" Durkin I "). John attempted to appeal the order appointing the special master commissioner, but the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order. In re Estate of Durkin , 9th Dist. Summit No. 29532, 2021-Ohio-1076, 2021 WL 1227965 (" Durkin II "). John then brought the present original action.
{¶ 2} We denied Judge Williams's motion to dismiss and granted an alternative writ. 164 Ohio St.3d 1437, 2021-Ohio-3233, 173 N.E.3d 1219. For the reasons set forth below, we now deny the writ.
{¶ 3} In August 2015, Virginia Durkin died a resident of Summit County. Virginia's daughter, Patricia O'Halloran, predeceased her by several months. Virginia's will provided for her estate to be divided equally between her children, Patricia and John; if Patricia predeceased Virginia, then Patricia's share would pass to her three children per stirpes. See Durkin I at ¶ 2. The will was admitted to probate, and John was appointed as the executor in accordance with the will.
{¶ 4} The administration of the estate became contentious when Patricia's son, Daniel O'Halloran, contended that John had abused his power of attorney while Virginia was alive and that he had not included in the estate inventory assets that should have been included. A brief overview of the probate proceedings is necessary to understand John's prohibition claim.
{¶ 5} John filed the estate inventory in October 2015, and the probate court approved it in December 2015. The inventory listed $503,320 in savings bonds as the sole asset of the estate. In May and June 2016, Daniel submitted untimely objections to the inventory as well as objections to the estate's final account.
{¶ 6} In August 2016, the probate-court magistrate held a hearing on Daniel's objections, and at that hearing, Daniel contended that John had engaged in fraud and self-dealing in his roles as attorney in fact for Virginia and executor of her estate. Daniel later obtained information regarding assets that he believed should have been included in the estate, and the magistrate ordered disclosures regarding two individual retirement accounts ("IRAs") Virginia had held.
{¶ 7} In February 2017, the magistrate issued a decision disposing of (1) Daniel's exceptions to the inventory and accounting, (2) Daniel's motion to remove John as executor, and (3) various other motions and objections. With respect to one IRA, the magistrate found that John had engaged in self-dealing when, after Patricia's death, he used his power of attorney to substitute himself for Patricia as beneficiary. Based on that finding, the magistrate set aside the substitution and ordered that the IRA be included in the estate. With respect to one of Virginia's bank accounts, the magistrate imposed a constructive trust on one-half of that account because the funds were traceable to a certificate of deposit that had designated Patricia as a beneficiary—the magistrate ordered that that portion be included in the estate. With respect to the savings bonds, the magistrate upheld their inclusion in the estate, rejecting Daniel's contention that they ought to have been re-registered with him and his siblings as beneficiaries. The magistrate also reduced a fine for a contempt citation against Daniel to $500. In all other respects, the magistrate rejected Daniel's contentions.
{¶ 8} Daniel filed objections to the magistrate's decision. In May 2017, the probate court issued a final judgment entry overruling the objections and adopting the magistrate's decision. The entry specifically stated: (1) "John remains as Executor" and (2) "[t]he Court accepts the Estate Accounting." The court also denied Daniel's motions objecting to the payment of John's fiduciary fees as executor and the estate attorney's fees, sustained the finding of contempt against Daniel, and stated that there was "no just cause for delay."
{¶ 9} Daniel appealed the final judgment, and in June 2018, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the probate court's order. Durkin I , 2018-Ohio-2283. The appellate court reversed the contempt finding against Daniel, id. at ¶ 39-40, 44, but it rejected Daniel's seven other assignments of error. The court remanded for further proceedings "consistent with" its decision. Id. at ¶ 44. The court of appeals also issued a special mandate requiring the probate court to carry the appellate court's judgment into execution.
{¶ 10} On remand, the probate-court magistrate issued an order in January 2019 that (1) vacated the contempt finding against Daniel and (2) required John to file an amended inventory reflecting the magistrate's rulings that had been adopted in the probate court's May 2017 final judgment entry. John duly filed the amended inventory, and Daniel filed objections. Daniel also sought to disqualify the probate-court judge—Judge Elinore Marsh Stormer—on grounds of bias. Although the judge denied any bias, she voluntarily recused herself, and Judge Williams was assigned to the case.
{¶ 11} At an April 2019 status conference, Judge Williams expressed an "inclination" to remove John as executor. But after holding a hearing on the removal issue, Judge Williams declined to remove John as executor. Instead, in August 2019, Judge Williams appointed a special master commissioner, in accordance with R.C. 2101.06, and instructed that commissioner to "investigate and make a report to the [Probate] Court as to whether any additional assets should be included in the [estate] after examining the actions of John Durkin acting with the Power of Attorney from Virginia Durkin."
{¶ 12} John attempted to appeal the August 2019 order appointing the special master commissioner, arguing that it violated the mandate of the earlier appeals-court decision with respect to the disposition of several of Daniel's assignments of error. In March 2021, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order. Durkin II , 2021-Ohio-1076.
{¶ 13} One judge dissented, stating that she would conclude that the order was final and appealable; she also stated: "Perhaps an appropriate remedy under these circumstances would be for [John] to file an action requesting an extraordinary writ, given that he contends that the visiting judge disregarded this Court's prior decision." Id. at ¶ 14 (Carr, J., dissenting).
{¶ 14} In May 2021, John filed this action seeking a writ of prohibition.
{¶ 15} Generally, to demonstrate entitlement to a writ of prohibition, a petitioner must show (1) that a court has exercised judicial power, (2) that its exercise of judicial power is unauthorized by law, and (3) that denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. See State ex rel. Greene Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. O'Diam , 156 Ohio St.3d 458, 2019-Ohio-1676, 129 N.E.3d 393, ¶ 16. But a petitioner does not need to prove the third requirement—the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law—if he can show that the court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to exercise its judicial power as it did. Id. at ¶ 26. This exception from the general rule comes into play in this case because the availability of a discretionary appeal from Durkin II () qualifies as an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, even though this court might have denied jurisdiction. See State ex rel. O'Malley v. Collier-Williams , 153 Ohio St. 553, 2018-Ohio-3154, 108 N.E.3d 1082, ¶ 14-15. Therefore, to be entitled to the requested writ, John must show that Judge Williams patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to appoint a special master commissioner in the underlying case.
{¶ 16} John predicates his prohibition claim on Judge Williams's alleged "fail[ure] to comply with the appellate court's mandate directed to [the probate] court." He asserts that because "the appellate court's decision in [ Durkin I , 2018-Ohio-2283,] is the law of this case," it "governs any other court which subsequently considers this case." The law-of-the-case doctrine states that "[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, such as an intervening decision by the Supreme Court, an inferior court has no discretion to disregard the mandate of a superior court in a prior appeal in the same case." Nolan v. Nolan , 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984), syllabus. Equally established is the principle that " ‘a writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy to prevent a lower court from proceeding contrary to the mandate of a superior court.’ " State ex rel. Cordray v. Marshall , 123 Ohio St.3d 229, 2009-Ohio-4986, 915 N.E.2d 633, ¶ 32, quoting State ex rel. Crandall, Pheils & Wisniewski v. DeCessna , 73 Ohio St.3d 180, 182, 652 N.E.2d 742 (1995).
{¶ 17} Although it is settled that the law-of-the-case doctrine may furnish the grounds for a writ of prohibition in a proper case, the court adjudicating the prohibition claim must determine...
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