Dutch Point Credit Union, Inc. v. Caron Auto Works, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 12322,12322
• Parties: DUTCH POINT CREDIT UNION, INC. v. CARON AUTO WORKS, INC., et al.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

Page 882

648 A.2d 882

36 Conn.App. 123

DUTCH POINT CREDIT UNION, INC. v. CARON AUTO WORKS, INC., et al.

No. 12322.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 29, 1994.

Decided Sept. 27, 1994.

Robert C. Lubus, Jr., with whom, on the brief, were David M. Kutzner, Waterbury, and Charles M. Stango, Law Student Intern, for appellant (plaintiff).

Priscilla J. Green, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., for appellee (defendant Comm'r of Motor Vehicles).

Before EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, FREEDMAN and SCHALLER, JJ.

SCHALLER, Judge.

The plaintiff appeals from the trial court's judgment for the defendants ¹ regarding the sale of a motor vehicle pursuant to General Statutes § 14-150. The plaintiff claims on appeal that the trial court improperly (1) determined that § 14-150 satisfies constitutional guarantees of due process of law, and (2) denied its claim for damages.

The plaintiff was the first lienholder of record on an automobile owned by Elizabeth Oree. After the vehicle was involved in an accident in Manchester and at the request of the Manchester police department, the defendant Caron Motors, Inc. (Caron Motors), towed the vehicle to its place of business. The named defendant, Caron Auto Works, Inc. (Caron Auto), then took possession of the vehicle after Oree asked Caron Auto to repair it. Several weeks after this discussion, however, Oree had neither paid the deposit requested by Caron Auto before it would commence work on the vehicle nor removed the vehicle from Caron Auto's premises.

Believing that Oree had abandoned the automobile and seeking to recover towing and storage expenses, Caron Auto filed with the department of motor vehicles (department) a notice of intent to sell an abandoned vehicle pursuant to General Statutes § 14-150. Caron Auto published notice of its intent to sell in the Hartford Courant, but did not notify the plaintiff of its intent to sell the vehicle. The plaintiff's lien was readily ascertainable from the vehicle's certificate of title on file at the department. At a public auction, Caron Auto sold the vehicle to Caron Motors. Caron Motors, in turn, sold the vehicle to a bona fide purchaser. Both sales were made free of the plaintiff's lien on the vehicle, and the plaintiff was not notified of the vehicle's sale.

The plaintiff then commenced an action against Caron Auto, Caron Motors and the defendant commissioner of motor vehicles seeking to recover damages from Caron Auto and Caron Motors on the ground that the sale of the vehicle should have been made subject to the plaintiff's lien. The plaintiff also sought a declaratory judgment with respect to the constitutionality of § 14-150.

The trial court ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages ² and that the provisions of § 14-150 did not deprive the plaintiff of due process protection. In its memorandum of decision, the court determined that the department receives approximately 25,000 requests per year from garage owners for permission to sell abandoned vehicles, and, in order to enable a garage owner to provide actual notice to a lienholder in each case, the department would have to send the garage owner a copy of the vehicle's certificate of title. The court stated that it believed that furnishing a copy for each request would unduly burden the department.

The plaintiff claims on appeal that the trial court improperly concluded that the sale of the vehicle pursuant to § 14-150 was constitutional. The plaintiff also contends that because the sale of the vehicle was improper, it is entitled to damages for Caron Auto's conversion of its property interest. Before reaching the plaintiff's claims, we consider, sua sponte, whether the circumstances of this case have rendered the appeal moot. "It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grace Community Church v. Bethel, 30 Conn.App. 765, 769, 622 A.2d 591, cert. denied, 226 Conn. 903, 625 A.2d 1375, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 383, 126 L.Ed.2d 332 (1993).

In this case, the plaintiff obtained a judgment against Oree in an effort to collect the amount owed on the lien. The plaintiff however, did not recover the full amount of the debt. ³ As a result, we conclude that the plaintiff's claim for damages is not moot, as the plaintiff is entitled to attempt to recover the full amount secured by its lien. Because the plaintiff's claim for damages is based on a determination that the sale of the vehicle violated principles of due process, the plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief is also not moot, and we now address the constitutionality of § 14-150. ⁴

Pursuant to § 14-150, ⁵ an abandoned vehicle that presents a menace to traffic or public safety will be towed and stored at the command of a public officer. The statute creates a lien on the vehicle for storage charges, and provides for the sale of the vehicle after a certain period of storage in order to pay for certain charges, including those for towing and storage. A garage owner who stores a vehicle valued at $500 or less may sell the vehicle, provided the garage owner notifies the owner of the vehicle, if known, and the department of his or her intent to sell. A garage owner who stores a vehicle valued at more than $500 must sell the vehicle at a public auction, provided the garage owner sends notice by mail of the date and place of the sale to the last place of abode of the vehicle owner, if known, and provided the garage owner advertises the sale "in a newspaper published or having a circulation in the town where such garage ... is located three times, commencing at least five days before such sale." General Statutes § 14-150. The statute does not, however, provide for actual notice to lienholders of the vehicle.

Section 14-150 effectuates the state's interest in enforcing traffic laws and in protecting the public from hazardous street conditions. The statute provides a means for those assisting the state in the towing and storage of abandoned vehicles to recover the costs of their services. The plaintiff claims, however, that the statute deprives lienholders of procedural due process of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution and article first, § 8, of the state constitution. ⁶ The plaintiff contends that the sale of a vehicle subject to a lien without actual notice to the lienholder deprives the lienholder of property without due process of law.

The due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions can be violated only by conduct of the state, as they do not restrict the actions of private persons or entities. State v. Holliman, 214 Conn. 38, 43, 570 A.2d 680 (1990). Here, pursuant to § 14-150, a public officer makes the determination that a vehicle should be towed and summons a towing company to tow the vehicle. The towing company removes the vehicle only at the direction of the officer, who designates the garage where the vehicle is to be stored. The garage owner obtains a lien and may sell the vehicle to recover costs pursuant to the statutory scheme designed to effectuate the state's interest in enforcing traffic laws and maintaining public safety. The state monitors the sale of an abandoned vehicle by requiring notice of intent to sell and by establishing the procedures for the transfer of title of the vehicle. Because the state is prominently involved in the towing, storage and sale of an abandoned vehicle, we conclude that state action exists to trigger the constitutional requirements of due process. See Stypmann v. City & County of San Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338, 1341-42 (9th Cir.1977).

In order to prevail on its procedural due process claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) its property interest is cognizable under the due process clause, (2) it has been deprived of its property interest, and (3) the deprivation of the property interest has occurred without due process of law. Double I Limited Partnership v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 218 Conn. 65, 76, 588 A.2d 624 (1991). Here, the plaintiff, as a lienholder, possesses a substantial property interest in the vehicle that is significantly affected by the sale of the vehicle pursuant to § 14-150. Because the purchase of the vehicle results in the passage of title free of all liens on the vehicle, the sale nullifies the plaintiff's property interest. The plaintiff's interest, therefore, is entitled to due process protection.

"[P]rior to an action which will affect an interest in life, liberty, or property protected by the Due Process Clause ... a State must provide 'notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.' " Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 795, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 2709, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983). We conclude that the circumstances of this case are analogous to those of the United States Supreme Court case of Mennonite Board of Missions, where the court found that the notice requirements of a statute allowing for the sale of property were insufficient to provide due process of law. In that case, the state statute allowed for the sale of real property where the payment of property taxes had been delinquent for a specified period of time. The statute required notice by publication to advertise the sale and notice by mail to the owner of the property subject to sale. The statute, however, did not provide for actual notice to a mortgagee of the property. As a result, property could be sold free of all liens and encumbrances without actual notice being provided to a mortgagee. ⁷ The United States Supreme...