Elbert v. Connecticut Yankee Council, Inc., No. CV 01-0456879 S (CT 7/16/2004)
| Decision Date | 16 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 01-0456879 S,CV 01-0456879 S |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Charles A. Elbert v. Connecticut Yankee Council, Inc. et al. |
The defendants Connecticut Yankee Council, Inc. (Yankee Council) and Pam Sugrue have moved to strike Counts One though Ten of the plaintiff's Third Revised Complaint, dated November 25, 2003.
The defendants argue that Count One, a tort claim for wrongful termination, should be stricken because the plaintiff has failed to identify the explicit statutory, constitutional or judicially conceived notion of public policy allegedly violated by his termination. Moreover, the grounds advanced by the plaintiff in support of his claim that he was wrongfully discharged, being that he was fired on false accusations of wrongful conduct, and without the benefit of a complete investigation of those charges, do not amount to a violation of any public policy recognized by Connecticut.
Regarding Count Two, defendants argue that the plaintiff's claim that his termination allegedly violated the due process clause of the Connecticut Constitution, fails as a matter of law because the due process clause provides no avenue of redress when the conduct complained of involves the actions of a private citizen. The due process clause, the defendants argue, is only applicable when the conduct at issue is a state action, and neither the Yankee Council nor Sugrue are alleged to be state actors.
Count Three purports to state a claim for interference with custodial rights. The defendants argue that to state a claim for interference with custodial rights, the plaintiff must allege "an extralegal taking of custody." Thus, plaintiff must allege that the Yankee Council abducted his son, and the plaintiff has not done so.
Counts Four and Nine are defamation claims. The defendants argue that the plaintiff has failed to identify an unprivileged publication of a defamatory statement. The plaintiff has not alleged that any alleged defamatory statement was communicated to anyone other than those to whom the defendants were privileged to communicate this information.
Count Five is a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants argue that the plaintiff fails to allege conduct attributable to the Yankee Council that was extreme and outrageous.
In Count Six the plaintiff alleges a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendants argue that the plaintiff has failed to identify unreasonable conduct attributable to the Yankee Council that occurred during the termination process. The plaintiff's allegations in the defendants' opinion do not allege that the plaintiff was terminated in a particularly humiliating or egregious manner.
The plaintiff has alleged a claim for false imprisonment in Count Seven. The defendants argue that the plaintiff must allege that his liberty was restrained under the threat of present force, against his will and that the plaintiff has failed to do so.
Count Eight sounds in negligent hiring, supervision, training and retention. The defendants claim that in order for the plaintiff to sufficiently plead a cause of action for negligent hiring, training, retention or supervision, the plaintiff is required to allege that the Yankee Council was on notice of its employee's alleged propensity to engage in the wrongful conduct at issue, and, despite this notice, took no action. The defendants argue that the plaintiff has failed to allege these necessary elements, as the plaintiff's Count Eight is devoid of allegations demonstrating that Yankee Council was on notice of its employee's alleged propensity to slander others. Further, Count Eight is deficient because a claim for negligent hiring, training, retention or supervision will only lie when the conduct at issue is criminal, violent or otherwise similarly wrongful.
The plaintiff in Count Ten alleges a tortious interference with a business expectancy/contractual relation. The defendants state that a claim such as this, will not lie when the alleged interference is an agent of the defendant employer. The rule in Connecticut, argues the defendants, is that an agent may not be charged with having interfered with a contract of the agent's principle absent an allegation that the agent acted outside the scope of her authority or for personal gain. Count Ten, it is claimed, is devoid of any allegations.
A factual summary reveals that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant Yankee District Council of the Boy Scouts of America as a program specialist from September 1, 2000 to July 19, 2001. Defendant Pam Sugrue is alleged to have been a volunteer with the Yankee Council.
On July 17, 2001, the plaintiff, while supervising children at a camp organized by the Yankee Council, noticed that his minor son was involved in an altercation with another child attending a camp maintained by the defendant Yankee Council. The plaintiff grabbed his son's arm, shook him, and verbally reprimanded his son, warning him that his behavior was unacceptable. Because this act of discipline occurred in the presence of the other small children (Cub Scouts), the defendant Sugrue told the plaintiff not to discipline his child in the presence of the other children. A brief verbal exchange ensued between the plaintiff and Sugrue.
Two days later, on July 19, 2001, the plaintiff alleges that his supervisor, Charles Bossert, requested that the plaintiff meet with him and Chris Harvey, a representative of the Yankee Council, to discuss the incident of July 17, 2001. During this meeting in Harvey's office, the plaintiff alleges that Harvey accused him of abusing the plaintiff's son. The plaintiff responded by stating that he had a parental right to determine how to discipline his own son. Harvey then informed the plaintiff that the plaintiff had violated the Boy Scout policy concerning child abuse. After disputing the existence of such a policy, the plaintiff left Harvey's office.
The plaintiff later returned that day to Harvey's office accompanied by his wife. He informed Harvey that he was an ordained minister, and that the defendants' accusations that he abused his child were "deeply hurtful, slander and caused him great pain and distress." The plaintiff's wife then demanded that Harvey specify the particular Boy Scout policy that the plaintiff had violated, and specify the exact misconduct that the plaintiff had allegedly engaged in. The plaintiff alleges that Harvey refused to comply with this request or to discuss the matter at all.
After leaving Harvey's office, the plaintiff alleges that he went to see Doug Krofina, the Scout Executive Director for the Yankee Council. Krofina notified the plaintiff that the plaintiff was terminated as a direct result of physically disciplining his minor child in the presence of the other Cub Scouts. The plaintiff alleges that Krofina refused to further investigate or discuss the matter.
Upon leaving Krofina's office, the plaintiff states that he proceeded back to the camp to pick up the Cub Scouts to bring them back to their parents' homes. The plaintiff claims that representatives of the Yankee Council surrounded his car and prevented him from leaving the Yankee Council premises with the Cub Scouts, who had been attending the camp. Soon after, at the request of the Yankee Council, four police cars arrived at the scene. After investigating the situation and speaking with the parents of the affected children, the police allowed the plaintiff to transport the children home, with the permission of the children's parents.
The plaintiff also alleges that the defendants, thereafter, "purported to file" a report with the Department of Children and Families concerning the physical discipline that the plaintiff inflicted on his son on July 17, 2001.
The standards for the granting of a motion to strike are well-settled. "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108, 491 A.2d 368 (1985). A motion to strike shall be granted if "the plaintiff's complaint [does not] sufficiently [state] a cognizable cause of action as a matter of law." Mora v. Aetna Life and Casualty Ins. Co., 13 Conn.App. 208, 211, 535 A.2d 390 (1988).
A motion to strike "admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis omitted.) Id. "A motion to strike is properly granted where a plaintiff's complaint alleges legal conclusions unsupported by facts." Id. "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 170, 544 A.2d 1185 (1988). A motion to strike "is to be tested by the allegations of the pleading demurred to, which cannot be enlarged by the assumption of any fact not therein alleged." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., 179 Conn. 541-50, 427 A.2d 822 (1980).
Upon deciding a motion to strike, the trial court must construe the "plaintiff's complaint in [a] manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). "The allegations of the pleading involved are entitled to the same favorable construction a trier would be required to give in admitting evidence under them and if the facts provable under its allegations would support a defense or a cause of action, the motion to strike must fail." Mingachos v CBS, Inc., supra, 196 Conn. 108-09. However, if the plaintiff has alleged mere conclusions of law unsupported by the requisite facts, the motion to strike should be granted. Cavallo v. Derby Savings Bank, 188 Conn. 281, 285, 449...
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