Dutchess County Chapter, Civil Service Emp. Ass'n, Inc. v. Dutchess County
| Decision Date | 24 April 1979 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Arbitration between DUTCHESS COUNTY CHAPTER, CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, and DUTCHESS COUNTY and the Dutchess County Sheriff, Respondents. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Mangold & Mahar, Poughkeepsie (Thomas D. Mahar, Jr., and Paul J. Eckelman, Poughkeepsie, of counsel), for petitioner.
Stephen J. Wing, County Atty. (Donald Cappillino, S. Asst. County Atty., of counsel), for respondents.
In the current phase of a public sector labor dispute involving the work assignments and job duties of deputies of the Sheriff of Dutchess County, petitioner, a labor union representing the employees of the Sheriff's office, and one Dennis O'Keeffe, a deputy affected, seek confirmation of an arbitrator's award dated November 13, 1978. Respondents have made a cross-application to vacate that award. At issue is whether the arbitrator violated public policy in making the determination. For the reasons given below, this question is answered in the affirmative.
On February 19, 1976, petitioner and respondents entered into a collective agreement under article 14 of the Civil Service Law, commonly known as the Taylor Law. By its terms, this agreement was made retroactive to January 1, 1975, and it expired on December 31, 1977.
Under this agreement, the prerogative to assign employees and to direct the working force was reserved to the employer, identified jointly as the County and the Sheriff. General reference was made in the contract to job specifications, descriptions and duties. It was provided that employees were to be given copies of such material when hired, and that they were to receive copies of any changes in job description and job duties when such changes were effected. In this connection, the agreement stated that "(e)mployees * * * (would) not be required to work outside of the job description against their wish except in case of emergency."
Further, the contract specified that nothing therein should be construed to delegate "(t)o others the authority conferred by law on the SHERIFF or any COUNTY official, or in any way * * * (to reduce) or * * * (to abridge) such authority * * * ".
Under the agreement, provision was made for the resolution of grievances in a procedure which culminated in (1) binding arbitration for matters covered by contract definition, and (2) advisory arbitration for matters not so included.
The following definition was given for a grievance in the contract.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the process of classifying the position of deputy sheriff, the Commissioner of Personnel of Dutchess County had established the character and scope of the duties of that title. According to his statement, the "(w)ork consists primarily of routine patrol tasks and civil process duties". However, for the purpose of illustrating job duties encompassed by the position, the Commissioner listed fifteen examples of work in his manual. These examples are wide ranging and include the task of escorting prisoners to jail and to court and of having them booked on charges.
Subsequently to the expiration of the collective agreement, and during the month of April of 1978, deputy sheriff O'Keeffe was reassigned from patrol duty to transporting prisoners to and from the county jail and the county court house. On April 21, 1978, a grievance complaint was filed in O'Keeffe's behalf, protesting his assignment to what was termed out-of-title work and branding this assignment as violative of the contract.
It appears that, for some unexplained reason, at the initial stage of grievance procedure, a member of the county attorney's staff catapulted the O'Keeffe grievance and two others of a similar nature into binding arbitration, by signing a written stipulation which accomplished just that.
At arbitration, respondents sought, without avail, to disavow this stipulation on the ground that it was entered into without knowledge or consent of the Sheriff, whose policy, it was said to be, was to eschew arbitration of claims under an expired agreement. Failing in this, respondents then called a technician from the office of the Personnel Commissioner. This witness testified to having participated in the position classification work involving the title of deputy sheriff, and he stated that prisoner escorting was an integral part of the job of a deputy. The arbitrator rejected this testimony and held that such duty was a function more properly carried out by other types of employees of the Dutchess County Sheriff's office. On this basis, he sustained the grievance, determining that the protested assignment called for the performance of work which was outside of the scope of a deputy's job duties. The arbitrator ordered immediate cessation of the reassignment.
In petitioning for confirmation of the award, the union urges that, even if it were to be conceded that the arbitrator had misjudged the job duties of the deputy's position, such an error of law or fact would not serve as a basis for disturbing the award.
By way of rejoinder, and in support of their cross-petition to vacate the award, respondents argue that the grievance here is not arbitrable, since the whole business of classifying civil service positions and of determining job duties consistent with titles is reserved to the Commissioner of Personnel, who, in Dutchess County, has sole jurisdiction over administration of the Civil Service Law. In this regard, respondents say that any aggrieved employee may protest out-of-title work to the Commissioner under local rules, and, if unsuccessful, may have resort to judicial review. They assert that, by his...
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