Dutka v. Sinai Hosp. of Detroit

• Decision Date: 15 August 1985
• Docket Number: Docket No. 75087
• Citation: 371 N.W.2d 901,143 Mich.App. 170
• Parties: Friedrich DUTKA, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SINAI HOSPITAL OF DETROIT, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 901

371 N.W.2d 901

143 Mich.App. 170

Friedrich DUTKA, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SINAI HOSPITAL OF DETROIT, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 75087.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 13, 1985.

Decided May 21, 1985.

Rehearing Denied July 11, 1985.

Released for Publication Aug. 15, 1985.

Eugene R. Bolanowski, Warren, for plaintiff-appellant.

Honigman, Miller, Schwartz and Cohn by William G. Christopher and Joseph G. Nuyen, Jr., Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before CYNAR, P.J., and HOLBROOK and TAHVONEN, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

On October 27, 1980, plaintiff filed a complaint against Sinai Hospital, alleging breach of an implied contract. After a bench trial, a judgment of no cause of action was entered. Plaintiff appeals to this Court as of right.

Plaintiff is a licensed physician specializing in cardiovascular surgery. He was hired by Sinai Hospital in September, 1978, as an office assistant to Dr. Adrian Kantrowitz, in the Department of Cardiovascular Thoracic Surgery. Although the hospital bylaws limited the privileges of an office assistant to writing orders on patients of the active staff member, plaintiff admitted patients and performed surgery, both of which are duties of an associate staff member. In April, 1979, plaintiff was elevated to an associate staff position and continued performing the same duties. Plaintiff expressed his desire to achieve active staff privileges to both Dr. Kantrowitz and the Chief of Staff. According to plaintiff, both men assured plaintiff that he would be elevated to active staff in the future. Plaintiff testified that in April, 1980, Dr. Kantrowitz gave his approval for plaintiff to apply for active staff status. Several weeks later, Dr. Kantrowitz asked plaintiff to withdraw his application. Dr. Kantrowitz offered no explanation for his change in position, other than that he was under "political pressure". Plaintiff decided not to withdraw his application, and in fact proceeded to file a second application when the hospital failed to take action.

Both the Credentials Committee of the Medical Staff and the Medical Staff Executive Committee recommended against the appointment, based in part upon a letter from Dr. Kantrowitz in which he stated: "I do not feel [he] is qualified for independent open heart privileges at the present time". Plaintiff remained a full-time employee until August 1, 1981, when he received a letter terminating his relationship with Dr. Kantrowitz.

The hospital's Board of Trustees officially denied plaintiff's applications on September 21, 1981, and March 15, 1982. Plaintiff has been in private practice since the fall of 1981. In his complaint, he sought specific performance of the alleged implied contract granting him active staff privileges, or, in the alternative, monetary damages.

Plaintiff's first claim on appeal is that the trial court improperly struck his demand for a jury. Defendant brought this motion on March 18, 1983. Defendant argued that, because plaintiff sought equitable relief in the form of specific performance, plaintiff was not entitled to a jury. Defendant also suggested that it had a right to have the equitable claim heard by the judge sitting as a chancellor in equity. The trial court accepted this argument and struck the jury demand. This was error.

The parties have a constitutional right in Michigan to have equity claims heard by a judge sitting as a chancellor in equity. Abner A. Wolf, Inc. v. Walch, 385 Mich. 253, 188 N.W.2d 544 (1971). If a plaintiff seeks only equitable relief, he has no right to a trial by jury. Robair v. Dahl, 80 Mich.App. 458, 460-462, 264 N.W.2d 27 (1978). However, in this case, the plaintiff sought both equitable relief in the form of specific performance and legal relief in the form of damages. In this situation the plaintiff had a right to have a jury hear his damage claim.

Defendant relies on cases in which a chancellor awarded equitable relief and damages as part of his decree. Rickle v. Dow, 39 Mich. 91 (1878); Chase v. Boughton, 93 Mich. 285, 54 N.W. 44 (1892); Godwin v. Lindbert, 101 Mich.App. 754, 300 N.W.2d 514 (1980). Defendant suggests that this indicates plaintiff had no right to a jury trial. We must strongly disagree. These cases, which allow a chancellor to award consequential damages along with equitable relief, do not bar plaintiff's demand for a jury where legal remedies are sought along with equitable relief. The cases defendant relies on only suggest that in some instances a chancellor may also award money damages in fashioning the appropriate remedy. The cases do not bar a jury trial on legal claims when it has been properly demanded.

We are not suggesting that a jury trial should have been held on all of the issues. Clearly, defendant had a right to a hearing before a chancellor on the specific performance claim. Abner A. Wolf, Inc., supra. However, plaintiff also had a right to a jury trial on his legal claim. ¹

While we have concluded that plaintiff should have been allowed to empanel a jury to hear his legal claim, we do not find reversal is necessary. We affirm the trial court because, even though the plaintiff had a right to have a jury hear his damage claim, it was necessary for him to show that he had a right to damages. Plaintiff had to show that a contract existed and that, if it existed, it had been breached. Our review of the record shows that plaintiff has neither pled nor proved a claim on which relief can be granted. First, we note that, while plaintiff has attempted to plead an action in contract, our reading of the complaint leads us to the conclusion that he actually is seeking judicial intervention into the decision of a private hospital to deny him staff privileges. A decision of this nature is not a proper matter for judicial intervention. Hoffman v. Garden City Hospital-Osteopathic, 115 Mich.App. 773, 321 N.W.2d 810 (1982), lv. den. 417 Mich. 1027 (1983); Regualos v. Community Hospital, 140 Mich.App. 455, 364 N.W.2d 723 (1985).

Even if plaintiff's claim were found to be adequately pled as a contract action, plaintiff would still not be entitled to relief. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, at most what plaintiff has shown was that he took the office assistant position hoping that it would lead to active staff status. At the very most the facts show that the hospital may have agreed to...