Duval County Ranch Co. v. Harlingen Nat. Bank

• Decision Date: 08 February 1979
• Docket Number: No. 1419,1419
• Citation: 577 S.W.2d 563
• Parties: DUVAL COUNTY RANCH COMPANY and Clinton Manges, Appellants, v. HARLINGEN NATIONAL BANK et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 563

577 S.W.2d 563

DUVAL COUNTY RANCH COMPANY and Clinton Manges, Appellants, v. HARLINGEN NATIONAL BANK et al., Appellees.

No. 1419.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi.

Feb. 8, 1979.

C. H. Duvall, Guerra & Duvall, Roma, for appellants.

Jeffrey L. Jackson, Rollins M. Koppel, William S. Dubois, Stiernberg, Skaggs & Koppel, Harlingen, for appellees.

OPINION

BISSETT, Justice.

The question presented by this appeal is whether the trial court correctly rendered judgment for the plaintiffs on the ground that there has been a breach of the "Stipulation for Entry of Judgment" previously made and signed by all parties. We answer that question in the affirmative.

Harlingen National Bank, Dial M. Dunkin and Charles Shofner, plaintiffs in the trial court and appellees in this Court, brought suit against Duval County Ranch Company, a Texas corporation, which is wholly owned by Clinton Manges, and the said Clinton Manges, individually, defendants in the trial court and appellants in this Court, seeking to recover on certain promissory notes executed by the defendants in favor of the plaintiffs. The undisputed evidence established that the notes in question executed by the defendants came into default.

On November 17, 1976, subsequent to the time said notes came into default, the defendants entered into an Interim Agreement with the plaintiffs, whereby additional collateral was furnished the plaintiffs as security for the payment of the notes. The Interim Agreement further provided for the release of certain stock in First State Bank and Trust of Rio Grande City, Texas, held by Harlingen National Bank as security, only upon defendants' proper performance or non-performance of the Interim Agreement. Made part of the Interim Agreement was an assignment of overriding royalty by the defendants in favor of the plaintiffs to further secure payment of the notes. Later, trouble developed.

A trial was had on October 6, 1977. After hearing evidence, the trial court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment in accordance with a certain "Stipulation for Entry of Judgment," made and signed by all parties, dated October 6, 1977, and filed among the papers of the cause. The judgment was reduced to writing and filed with the district clerk, but was not, at that time, signed by the trial judge since, as reflected by the Stipulation, all material facts relating to the lawsuit and the liability of the defendants were agreed to. It was particularly agreed and stipulated that the judgment would not be presented to the trial judge for signature nor would same be signed by him or entered by the district clerk except on the occurrence or non-occurrence of certain conditions; but, that upon a finding of the occurrence or non-occurrence of a condition, the judgment would be forthwith signed by the trial judge within three (3) days after the attorneys for defendants would be given written notice of such alleged breach of condition and entered by the clerk.

Included in the conditions, the breach of which would be grounds for the signing and entry of the judgment, is the following:

"2. In the event any regular payments which are presently being received from Houston Natural Gas Company by the Harlingen National Bank, as Trustee pursuant to the aforesaid Assignment, are hereafter suspended, discontinued, or amount to less than Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) per month for a period of ninety (90) days."

On February 17, 1978, the plaintiffs filed a motion for the signing of the judgment by the trial judge and its entry by the clerk of the trial court. With respect thereto, it was alleged:

". . . that regular payments received by THE HARLINGEN NATIONAL BANK as Trustee from Houston Natural Gas Company referred to in the Stipulation have amounted to less than Fifteen Thousand and No./100ths Dollars ($15,000.00) per month for a period of ninety (90) days prior to the time of the filing of this notice . . ."

It was further alleged therein that the attorney for the defendants had been given notice of the filing of such motion, and that within three days after receipt by defendants' attorney of such notice, "Plaintiffs shall present to the Court for signature a Final Judgment in the above entitled and numbered cause the form of which were previously attached to the aforesaid Stipulation as Exhibit 'A' and shall request that the same be forthwith . . . entered by the Clerk of this Court in accordance with said Stipulation."

On February 27, 1978, a hearing was held on plaintiffs' motion. Neither the defendants nor their attorney were present at that hearing. Following the presentation of evidence by the plaintiffs, the judgment, the terms of which had been previously agreed upon by the parties, as aforesaid, was signed by the trial judge as the judgment in the case.

On March 31, 1978, the trial court overruled the defendants' motion for a new trial. The defendants have appealed.

There...