Duval Laundry Co. v. Reif

• Decision Date: 23 November 1937
• Citation: 130 Fla. 276,177 So. 726
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Parties: DUVAL LAUNDRY CO., Inc. v. REIF.

177 So. 726

130 Fla. 276

DUVAL LAUNDRY CO., Inc. v. REIF.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

November 23, 1937

Rehearing Denied Jan. 8, 1938.

Error to Circuit Court, Duval County; Miles W. Lewis, Judge.

Action by Robert B. Reif against the Duval Laundry Company, Inc. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Affirmed in reduced amount if plaintiff files remittitur, and otherwise reversed and new trial granted.

COUNSEL Milam, McIlvaine & Milam, of Jacksonville, for plaintiff in error.

Evan Evans, of Jacksonville, for defendant in error.

OPINION

CHAPMAN Justice.

We have here for review on several assignments of error a judgment for the sum of $5,000 in behalf of plaintiff below rendered in the circuit court of Duval county against the Duval Laundry Company, Inc., on the following allegations of an amended declaration:

'That at all times hereinafter mentioned, the defendant was in possession of and was operating and managing a laundry situated in the city of Jacksonville, Duval County Florida, known as Duval Laundry; that for more than 15 years prior to the 15th day of March, 1935, plaintiff had been employed by the defendant in its said business as to- wit, laundry driver; that on said last mentioned date plaintiff's employment by defendant was terminated by the defendant, and plaintiff was then dismissed by the defendant from its employment.

'And plaintiff alleges that on said date, to-wit, the said 15th day of March, 1935, the defendant wrongfully, unlawfully and maliciously caused, procured and induced numerous other laundries in said city, to-wit, the Eagle Laundry, the New York Laundry. The American Laundry, The Snow White Laundry and others to refuse employment to this plaintiff; that after the commission by defendant of said wrong, this plaintiff sought employment with the said laundries hereinbefore mentioned and was by them, by reason of the aforesaid wrong so committed by defendant, refused employment; that thereby plaintiff was rendered unable to procure employment in his said occupation and will continue so to be for a long time, to-wit, permanently, and plaintiff was thereby damaged in his said business and occupation; to the damage of plaintiff in the sum of $25,000.00.'

Defendant below directed a demurrer to the amended declaration, and the same upon hearing was by an order of the court below overruled and denied, under date of January 7, 1936, and this adverse ruling is assigned as error. There was no error in so ruling by the lower court. Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206, 1 So. 934, 11 Am.St.Rep. 367. In Dade Enterprises, Inc. v. Wometco Theatres, Inc., 119 Fla. 70, text page 73, 160 So. 209, 210, this court said:

'The weight of modern authority holds that interference with any contract amounts to a tort. That rule has been consistently adhered to in this state since the decision of this Court in Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206, 1 So. 934, 11 Am.St.Rep. 367. In such cases the injured party has an action against the party in default upon the contract, but he is not limited thereto. He may also maintain an action against the wrongdoer who induced such breach. 4 Page on Contracts, § 2426, p. 4298.

'If one maliciously interferes with a contract between two persons, and induces one of them to breach the contract to the injury of the other, the injured party may maintain an action against the wrongdoer, and where the act was intentional, malice will be inferred. To do intentionally that which is calculated in the ordinary course of events to damage, and which in fact does damage, another person in his property or trade, is malicious in the law, and is actionable if it is done without just cause or excuse. Carmen v. Fox Film Corporation, D.C., 258 F. 703; E. L. Husting Co. v. Coca Cola Co., 205 Wis. 356, 237 N.W. 85, 238 N.W. 626, 84 A.L.R. 22.'

See London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Horn, 206 Ill. 493, 69 N.E. 526, 99 Am.St.Rep. 185. 15 R.C.L. pages 53 and 54, §§ 13, 14:

'13. English Doctrine.--In England the Doctrine of Lumley v. Gye [2 El. & Bl. 216, 75 E.C.L. 216, 1 Eng.Rul.Cas. 706] was accepted by the court of appeal in 1881. Doubts as to the soundness of the decision were expressed by some of the lords in a later case; but these doubts have since been dissipated. In a case decided in 1880, [ Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q.B.D. 333], Judge Brett said that the decision of the majority in Lumley v. Gye held that 'wherever a man does an act which in law and in fact is a wrongful act, and such an act as may, as a natural and probable consequence of it, produce injury to another, and which in the particular case does produce such an injury, an action on the case will lie.' And again he said: 'Merely to persuade a person to break his contract may not be wrongful in law or fact. But, if the persuasion be used for the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or of benefitting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff, it is a malicious act, which is in law and in fact a wrong act, and therefore a wrongful act, and therefore an actionable act if injury ensues from it.' * * *'

'14. General Rule in United States.--As contracts of employees and the relation of master and servant created thereby never stood in any different position in the United States from other contracts, the doctrine of liability for inducing a breach of contract by a servant, once it gained a foothold, soon extended in the majority of jurisdictions to all classes of breach of contract, it being determined that there is no distinction in principle between enticing away the plaintiff's servant and inducing a third person to break any other contract between him and the plaintiff. In them therefore obtains the broad principle approved in England that a person who induces a party to a contract to break it, intending thereby to injure another person or to get a benefit for himself, commits an actionable wrong unless there is sufficient justification for the interference. The theory of this doctrine is that a party to a contract has a property right therein which a third person has no more right maliciously to deprive him of, or injure him in, than he would to injure his property real or personal, and that therefore such an injury amounts to a tort for which the injured party may seek compensation by an action in tort for damages. * * *'

Defendant filed a plea of not guilty to the amended declaration, and upon the issues tendered the suit was tried.

The order of the court below denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict and the order denying the motion for a new trial each raise the question of the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence, and the two motions can be considered under one assignment.

There was no evidence offered to sustain the material allegations of the amended declaration other than plaintiff's testimony. It is admitted by the parties that the plaintiff for a number of years worked for defendant in the capacity and at the work as described until March 15, 1935, when the plaintiff testified he was dismissed, and Mr. P. M. Burroughs and W. J. Watson, connected with the defendant company, testified plaintiff was not dismissed, but voluntarily declined to remain with defendant. The parties agree, further, that plaintiff did not work for defendant after March 15, 1935, and no conflicts appear for whom plaintiff worked after this day. There is a sharp conflict in the evidence of the plaintiff and the officers of the defendant about plaintiff's employment with laundries in Jacksonville which it is alleged the defendant maliciousy induced other laundries not to employ plaintiff (other than at Duval Laundry Company). In paragraph 6 of agreement between the parties, it is provided:

'Sixth. Said Driver agress that he will not at any time, while in the employ of said Company, either directly or indirectly divulge or make known to any person, whatever, the names or addresses of customers of said Company, who were the customers, patrons or agents of said Company at the time he entered the employ of said Company. That for one year immediately after his discharge by said Company or his quitting the employment of said Company, he will not either directly or indirectly, make known or divulge the names or addresses of any of the customers, patrons or agents of the said Company to any person whatsoever, and that for the space of one year after his discharge or quitting the employment of said Company, he will not either directly or indirectly, either for himself or any other person, firm, company or corporation, call upon, solicit, divert, take away or attempt to solicit, divert or take away any of the customers, business or patronage of such Company upon whom he called or whom he solicited, or to whom he catered or became acquainted with at the time of his employment with said company or with whom he became acquainted or on whom he called or to whom he catered after his employment with said Company.'

Considering the conflicting testimony adduced, the lower court was without authority at law to pursue a course other than hold that the conflict in evidence was a jury question. See Gravette v. Turner, 77 Fla. 311, text pages 314-316, 81 So. 476, 477.

'In directing a verdict, the court is governed practically by the same rules that are applicable in demurrers to evidence. Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall., 89 U.S., 116, 22 L.Ed. 780.

'A party in moving for a directed verdict admits not only the facts stated in the evidence adduced, but also admits every conclusion favorable to the adverse party that a jury might fairly and reasonably infer from the evidence. Gunn v. City of Jacksonville, 67 Fla. 40, 64 So. 435.

'When the facts are not in dispute, and the evidence, with all the inferences that a...