Dyas v. Poole
| Decision Date | 28 October 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-56324.,01-56324. |
| Citation | 317 F.3d 934 |
| Parties | Rhonda Jean DYAS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Susan POOLE, Warden; Attorney General of the State of California, Respondents-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Carl H. Horst, Deputy Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for the respondent-appellant.
Carrie Hempel, U.S.C. Law School, Los Angeles, CA, for the petitioner-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Harry L. Hupp, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-97-07530-HLH.
Before LAY,** CANBY, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
The opinion filed October 28, 2002, and appearing at 309 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.2002) is amended. The amended opinion is filed herewith.
The panel has voted unanimously to deny the appellants' petition for panel rehearing. Judge Paez has voted to deny appellants' petition for en banc rehearing, and Judges Lay and Canby so recommend.
The full court has been advised of appellants' petition for rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R.App. P. 35.
Appellants' petition for panel rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc are denied. No further petitions for panel or en banc rehearing will be entertained.
The State of California appeals a conditional grant of a writ of habeas corpus. The district court held that petitioner Rhonda Jean Dyas had been unconstitutionally shackled during her trial and that the shackling prejudiced her. The State does not dispute that the shackling was unconstitutional; it challenges only the holding that Dyas was prejudiced.
Dyas was convicted in California state court of first degree murder and robbery in 1991. The murder was carried out by Dyas's husband and another man. Dyas prevented another person, Tina Boyd, from going into the room during the murder and may have been otherwise involved. Testimony at trial was contradictory and the jury took 3-1/2 days to deliberate following Dyas's 5-day trial.
During trial, Dyas was kept in leg shackles in the courtroom. Her attorney had asked that she not be shackled in the courtroom. The trial judge denied the request, stating only that he did not believe the shackles would be "so visible that they come to the attention of the jury at all unless it's brought to their attention" and that the nature of the case was such that he preferred the defendants to wear leg restraints. The trial judge conducted no inquiry or test when the jury was seated to see whether Dyas's shackles were visible to the jurors.
Dyas was also shackled while being led to and from the courtroom. Dyas's attorney asked the jurors on voir dire if they would be able to disregard seeing the defendants led into the courtroom in shackles, to which the jurors responded that they would.
The California Court of Appeal held that keeping Dyas shackled during trial was constitutional error. The appellate court held that the proper test of harmlessness was that of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), which placed the burden on the prosecution to show that constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court then ruled, however, that the error was harmless because the trial court had "found" that the jurors would not be able to see the shackles from the jury box, and there was no evidence to support Dyas's argument that the jurors could see the shackles when they entered and left the box. Dyas sought post-conviction relief in the state courts, asking for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the jurors saw her in shackles during the trial. The evidentiary hearing and post-conviction relief were denied.
Dyas subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. The magistrate judge found that the state trial judge had simply made a presumption of fact that the jurors could not see Dyas's shackles, and that the state courts thereafter had denied an evidentiary hearing to determine the actual facts. The magistrate judge accordingly conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine what the jurors actually saw.
Three jurors, one prospective juror who had been excused, members of Dyas's defense team, and Dyas testified at the hearing. One of the jurors and the prospective juror had been able to see Dyas's shackles from the jury box. Another juror recalled seeing Dyas in shackles in the hallway outside the courtroom. Dyas testified that the shackles caused her pain and inhibited her communication with her attorney, although she had not complained of these problems during the trial. The magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant a writ of habeas corpus, finding that there was prejudice because at least one juror was able to see the shackles and the evidence was not overwhelming. The district court adopted the recommendation and granted the writ.
The district court's issuance of the writ was consistent with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The state courts' determination that the jury could not have seen the shackles during trial was unreasonable in the absence of any inquiry to establish the facts concerning what the jury could see. See § 2254(d)(2). The magistrate judge found that the state trial judge had simply made a presumption of fact, and no evidentiary hearing was conducted thereafter by any state court. In addition, the state court of appeal held against Dyas the absence of evidence of what the jury could see, which was contrary to the requirement of Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, that the prosecution bear the burden of showing harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Because the standards of § 2254(d)(1) and (2) are met, we proceed to the question of prejudice.
When a defendant has been unconstitutionally shackled, the court must determine whether the defendant was prejudiced. See Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir.2002). Our conclusion that Dyas was prejudiced is virtually compelled by our decision in Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 633 (9th Cir.1999). There we pointed out that shackling during trial carries a high risk of prejudice because it indicates that the court believes there is a "need to separate the defendant from the community at large, creating an inherent danger that a jury may form the impression that the defendant is dangerous or untrustworthy." Rhoden, 172 F.3d at 636 (citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986)). Prejudice is particularly likely here because at least one juror saw Dyas's shackles during the trial from the jury box. Id. (). It is likely...
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