Dycus v. State, 51781

Decision Date25 March 1981
Docket NumberNo. 51781,51781
Citation396 So.2d 23
PartiesEarl DYCUS v. STATE of Mississippi.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

Ronald Reid Welch and Mary Carroll Henkel, Jackson, for appellant.

Bill Allain, Atty. Gen., by Karen Gilfoy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Before PATTERSON, C. J., and BROOM and LEE, JJ.

BROOM, Justice, for the Court:

Murder conviction and life imprisonment sentence resulted from Earl Dycus's (defendant's) trial in the Circuit Court of Yazoo County sitting in Warren County following a change of venue. Most serious legal proposition argued here by the defendant is his contention that his handwritten inculpatory statement was erroneously admitted into evidence under the rationale of Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). Trial was upon a capital murder indictment charging the defendant with the capital murder of Rhonda McBride. After the guilt phase of the trial was completed, the trial judge imposed the life sentence without proceeding to a punishment phase of the trial. We reverse.

When driving around in Yazoo County at about 8:45 a. m. on Saturday, April 23, 1977, David Kirk observed smoke coming from the LeRoy McBride house. Kirk pulled in front of the McBride driveway where he met the defendant (in another vehicle) backing away from the house. Kirk testified that the defendant told him "he had just got there and the house was on fire." For some time residents of the house had been LeRoy McBride and his family: his wife, Martha; his 16-month old daughter, Rhonda; his wife's sister, Mary Jackson; and his wife's brother-in-law, defendant Earl Dycus. Upon discovery of the smoke, Kirk, after a brief discussion with the defendant, went to a nearby house and telephoned the Yazoo City Fire Department while the defendant remained at the burning house. Shortly after 9 a. m., Yazoo City firemen and county sheriff's deputies arrived at the scene and were told by the defendant that he thought someone might be in the house because he could hear "hollerin." Defendant Dycus then used one of the deputies' car radio to notify family members of the fire.

After the fire was under control, Fire Department Captain Stewart discovered two bodies in the front room of the house where the fire's hot spot was centered. Rhonda's body was in the closet; the body of her mother, Martha, was under some bed springs. Fire Chief Woodward investigated the cause of the fire and testified that he found neither combustible material such as gas or kerosene nor electrical outlets in the area where the fire originated. His conclusion was that the fire began in some clothing or parts of debris.

Shortly after the child's (Rhonda's) father, LeRoy McBride, and grandmother, Mrs. George McBride, arrived, the defendant took them back to the George McBride home in Yazoo City before the fire was brought under control. After the defendant took his in-laws into Yazoo City, Sheriff Hood arrived at the fire. He caused a coroner's jury to be assembled at the fire scene where the bodies were identified as Martha and Rhonda. When the sheriff learned that the defendant had been present at the fire scene, he ordered Deputy Woods to pick up the defendant. Defendant Dycus was picked up at the McBride home and taken to the sheriff's office for questioning, and it is conceded that he was under arrest as a matter of fact without a warrant. Sheriff Hood testified that Deputy Woods gave the defendant his Miranda rights when he picked him up and again at the sheriff's office. Deputy Jennings testified that in the sheriff's office he had heard Woods read the defendant his Miranda rights. Sheriff Hood arrived back at his office around mid-morning and questioned the defendant about his recent release from Parchman Penitentiary. After this brief conversation, Sheriff Hood contacted Yazoo County Prosecutor Norquist and requested permission to take the defendant to the funeral home to identify the bodies of Martha and Rhonda. The finding of the circuit judge at trial was that the defendant was taken to the funeral home for a dual purpose: "to confirm who they were and to persuade him to come clean...." Following his conversation with the county prosecutor, Sheriff Hood handcuffed the defendant and took him to view the bodies. There, according to the record, defendant Dycus made an oral confession followed by his written confession and a tape recorded confession a short time later in the sheriff's office. The indictment before us charged Dycus with the murder of Rhonda while engaged in the commission of arson without intent to effect her death.

Dr. Forrest Bratley, a pathologist, performed an autopsy on Rhonda's body. He testified that her death was due to carbon monoxide poisoning and lack of oxygen due to burning in the room.

As a result of pre-trial suppression hearings, the circuit judge disallowed both the oral and tape recorded statements. He admitted into evidence the defendant's handwritten inculpatory statement (sandwiched in between the other two) which the record establishes was made one to two hours after the oral statement. Except for the defendant's statement, there is no testimony of incendiary origin of the fire.

WAS THE WRITTEN STATEMENT INADMISSIBLE AS AN EXPLOITATION OF AN ILLEGAL ARREST FOLLOWED BY ILLEGAL DETENTION AND CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION IN CONTRAVENTION OF DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION? (Dunaway v. New York, supra).

Clearly established by the record is the fact that the defendant was taken into custody at the McBride home when no evidence indicated (to the law officers) his participation in the fire or that he was connected with it. At oral argument the state took the position that the sheriff had a right to arrest Dycus because the sheriff knew Dycus had not completed a previous penitentiary sentence (it was apparently unknown to the sheriff that Dycus had been legally given an early release). The record shows that the first officer to contact Dycus after the fire was discovered was Deputy Sheriff Stanley who stated that he asked Dycus no questions when he came in contact with Dycus at the scene of the fire. It was an hour or more after Dycus was picked up that anyone discussed with him or questioned him about his being out of the penitentiary. The argument of the state is that the defendant spontaneously admitted to the officers at the funeral home that he "did it" and would admit what they wanted to know. He then made the written statement after being advised of his rights and signing a written waiver. Dycus's version is that he had gone to the house from his employment to obtain some clothes and found the house burning. He testified that after being taken to the funeral home, his head was pushed by the officers against the genital area of Martha (his sister-in-law) and told to kiss her as he had done before. He further testified that the officers threatened to make him stay there and watch tests (autopsy, etc.) to be performed upon the bodies of the two dead females until he confessed, all of which he says made him sick and coerced him into giving the statement. The state contends that the trial judge correctly determined that the statement admitted into evidence was voluntary after hearing all the officers testify as to what occurred when the writing was made. Agee v. State, 185 So.2d 671 (Miss.1966).

We cannot accept the state's contention that the defendant failed to press for a ruling as to the inadmissibility of the handwritten statement and therefore waived his objection. To have "pressed" any harder could hardly have been done in prudence. On March 17, 1978, defendant filed a motion to suppress challenging the admission of all written and oral statements as violating the Fourth and Fourteenth (U. S. Constitution) Amendments, i. e., fruits of an illegal arrest made without probable cause. During the proceedings on the motion, the appellant objected to the introduction into evidence of the three statements for lack of probable cause and therefore fruit of a poisonous tree. On April 14, 1978, the circuit judge rendered his order suppressing the oral and taped statements. The written statement, however, was found to be voluntary and therefore admissible. Again, during the trial, defense attorneys objected to the introduction into evidence of the handwritten statement. The trial judge sustained the objection at that time because of the absence of proof of corpus delicti. Defendant (when the issue arose again) renewed his objection based upon an "illegal arrest from which the taint had not been removed ..." but the court nevertheless overruled the objection and admitted the statement into evidence. On at least four different occasions, the defendant objected to the admission into evidence of the handwritten statement. At the suppression hearing the court stated that since the jury was not present, the statement could be let in despite the fact that it might later be suppressed.

In arriving at our decision here, we must be made mindful of the context of the case which includes the aspect that the trial court disallowed both the oral admission of guilt and the tape recorded statement. No cross-appeal was taken by the state from the trial court's action in disallowing these two items of evidence. Before us for our determination is the query: Was there probable cause for the seizure and detention of the defendant? We must also decide whether under Dunaway, supra, there were intervening events which severed any connection of the written confession accepted into evidence with the taint of circumstances surrounding the first disallowed confession.

In Dunaway, supra, a recent case, the proprietor of a pizza parlor was killed in an attempted robbery and an informant gave the police information which implicated Dunaway in the crime. At the time of Dycus's arrest he had not made any admission as to his connection with any crime, and...

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  • Abram v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • July 29, 1992
    ...216-19, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2258-60, 60 L.Ed.2d 824, 838-840 (1979); Patterson v. State, 413 So.2d 1036, 1039-40 (Miss.1982); Dycus v. State, 396 So.2d 23, 26-27 (Miss.1981). But in Henry, the Court recognized the converse--"Just as self-evident is the coercive effect of prolonged incarceration.......
  • Henry v. State
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  • Dycus v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • August 10, 1983
    ...the trial was completed, the trial judge imposed the life sentence without proceeding to a punishment phase of the trial. Dycus v. State, 396 So.2d 23, 24 (Miss.1981). No issue of the propriety of the circuit judge's ruling and order sentencing Dycus to life imprisonment was raised on the f......
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