Dyer v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys.
| Decision Date | 05 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:18-cv-3284-TCB |
| Citation | 426 F.Supp.3d 1350 |
| Parties | Nathaniel Borrell DYER, Plaintiff, v. ATLANTA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL SYSTEM (Atlanta Public Schools), Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Nathaniel Borrell Dyer, Atlanta, GA, pro se.
Brandon Moulard, Laurance Joseph Warco, MaryGrace Kathleen Bell, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.
This case comes before the Court on the motion [34] for summary judgment of Defendant Atlanta Independent School System a/k/a Atlanta Public Schools ("APS").
Plaintiff Nathaniel Dyer is a graphic designer by trade but spends much of his time as a community advocate for issues related to children and education in the Atlanta area. Over the past decade or more, Dyer has repeatedly found himself at odds with Atlanta schools and their leadership.
A significant incident in this rocky relationship occurred in 2006, while Dyer was volunteering at John F. Kennedy Middle School. He alleges that APS caused him to be prosecuted for false arrest after he broke up a violent fight between two students. The charges were eventually dismissed, but Dyer was no longer allowed to volunteer at the school.
After this disruptive episode, Dyer remained engaged with APS. He considered it his mission to police APS and its officials for "federal violations and problems plaguing the district...." [1-1] at ¶ 12.
In 2009, Dyer distributed a flyer that depicted former interim superintendent of APS Erroll Davis in a Ku Klux Klan robe. Dyer argues that Davis's role in reassigning students to different schools is akin to the activities of the KKK and contends that he is engaging in "psychological warfare" to draw the public's attention to the APS system. [82] at 21–24.
Dyer would subsequently make other flyers containing inflammatory rhetoric. One depicts members of the APS board of education as flying monkeys; another calls the APS board members buffoons and clowns.
Dyer's activism continued to get him in trouble with APS and its officials. In addition to his messaging via printed flyers, Dyer would deliver his criticisms of APS during public comment sessions at APS board meetings. Though Dyer attended many school board meetings, three are particularly relevant.
In January 2016, Dyer attended an APS school board meeting in which he admits to using the words "nigger," "coons," and "buffoons," all in reference to the board members. The board subsequently suspended Dyer from attending board meetings until July 2016, noting that the comments failed to advance any meaningful discourse at the meetings and that the language was inappropriate—in the board's view—to use in front of the children who were present. In the letter informing Dyer of his suspension, he was warned that if he spoke at another meeting using similar language, he might be permanently suspended.1
After the conclusion of his first suspension, Dyer attended another board meeting on October 10, 2016. During the public comment portion of that meeting, he used the word "Sambos"2 in reference to children at APS. Arguing that he was not given an opportunity to finish or expound upon his statement before being asked to step down, Dyer refused to leave the podium.
Police were ultimately notified, and they escorted Dyer from the meeting amidst his shouting.
The next day, Dyer received a letter informing him that he had been suspended from speaking at APS board meetings for fourteen months, through December 31, 2017. He was warned that similar conduct in the future would result in a permanent suspension of speaking privileges. The letter also served as a trespass warning, instructing Dyer not to set foot on APS property until January 1, 2018, or risk being arrested for trespassing.
On February 5, 2018, Dyer attended another board meeting. This time, Dyer was, in his word, "harassed" by resource officers for attending. [1-1] at ¶ 23. Dyer did not speak during that board meeting, but he passed out photoshopped fliers containing the tagline "unnigged coming soon" and a photo of APS Superintendent Meria J. Carstarphen wearing a football jersey superimposed with the word "FALCOONS." The next day, Dyer received a suspension letter that accused him of using "racist and hate-filled epithets," [1-1] ¶ 47, that "fail[ed] to advance any meaningful discourse." [34-6] at 45. He was suspended for the remainder of board chair Jason Esteves's term and warned again that he would be arrested for trespassing if he stepped onto APS property during that same period. Dyer was also warned a second time that any further such conduct might result in a permanent suspension of his speaking privileges at board meetings.
On June 7, Dyer filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against APS for violations of his right to free speech under the First Amendment (count 1) and right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment (count 2). He also alleged state-law claims, but the Court dismissed the state-law claims in its order [22] granting in part and denying in part APS's motion [2] to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Now, APS has moved [34] for summary judgment. Dyer has filed objections [35].3
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). There is a "genuine" dispute as to a material fact if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." FindWhat Inv'r Grp. v. FindWhat.com , 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). In making this determination, however, "a court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations of its own." Id. Instead, the court must "view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Id.
"The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact." Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). If the nonmoving party would have the burden of proof at trial, there are two ways for the moving party to satisfy this initial burden. United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop. , 941 F.2d 1428, 1437–38 (11th Cir. 1991). The first is to produce "affirmative evidence demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case at trial." Id. at 1438 (citing Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 331, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). The second is to show that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ).
If the moving party satisfies its burden by either method, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue remains for trial. Id. At this point, the nonmoving party must " ‘go beyond the pleadings,’ and by its own affidavits, or by ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc. , 64 F.3d 590, 593–94 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ).
Dyer's remaining claims concern two alleged constitutional violations brought pursuant to § 1983.
Section 1983 creates no substantive rights. See Baker v. McCollan , 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). Rather, it provides a vehicle through which an individual may seek redress when his federally protected rights have been violated by an individual acting under color of state law. Livadas v. Bradshaw , 512 U.S. 107, 132, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994).
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements. First he must allege that an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by federal law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty. , 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). Second, he must allege that the act or omission was committed by a state actor or a person acting under color of state law. Id.
Here, the issue of state action is uncontested, so the Court need only consider whether Dyer was deprived of his federal constitutional rights.
Dyer first contends that APS's suspensions infringed upon his First Amendment right to free speech. Second, he contends that his rights were suspended without due process of law as required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Dyer alleges that APS violated his First Amendment right to free speech by excluding him from public property and instructing him not to communicate with APS officials during the suspensions.
First Amendment claims proceed in three steps. First, the Court determines whether Dyer's "speech [was] protected by the First Amendment...." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. , 473 U.S. 788, 797, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985). If so, the Court next "must identify the nature of the forum" in which Dyer spoke. Id. Then the Court asks "whether the justifications for exclusion from the relevant forum satisfy the requisite standard." Id. For a limited public forum, the standard is reasonableness. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va. , 515 U.S. 819, 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995).
APS does not contest in its motion for summary judgment that Dyer's speech is protected, and the parties do not dispute that the school board meetings were limited public fora. Accordingly, the operative question is whether APS's regulation of Dyer's speech was reasonable.
To be reasonable, restrictions on speech in limited public fora must be "content-neutral conditions for the time, place, and manner of access, all of which must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant...
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