Dyer v. Planning Bd. of Town of Schaghticoke

• Decision Date: 25 June 1998
• Citation: 251 A.D.2d 907,674 N.Y.S.2d 860
• Parties: , 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 6477 In the Matter of Douglas R. DYER et al., Respondents, v. PLANNING BOARD OF the TOWN OF SCHAGHTICOKE et al., Respondents, and Brickyard Associates Ltd., Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 860

674 N.Y.S.2d 860

251 A.D.2d 907, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 6477

In the Matter of Douglas R. DYER et al., Respondents, v. PLANNING BOARD OF the TOWN OF SCHAGHTICOKE et al., Respondents and Brickyard Associates Ltd., Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

June 25, 1998.

Wayne P. Smith (Rachel L. Samuels, of counsel), Schenectady, for appellant.

Pattison, Sampson, Ginsberg & Griffin (Antonio Milillo, of counsel), Troy, for Douglas R. Dyer and others, respondents.

Before CARDONA, P.J., and PETERS, SPAIN, CARPINELLO and GRAFFEO, JJ.

SPAIN, Justice.

Appeals (1) from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Ceresia Jr., J.), entered November 21, 1996 in Rensselaer County, which, inter alia, granted petitioners' application, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for a declaratory judgment, to annul a determination of respondent Planning Board of the Town of Schaghticoke granting respondent Brickyard Associates Ltd. a special use permit, and (2) from an order of said court, entered October 14, 1997 in Rensselaer County, which partially denied a motion by respondent Brickyard Associates Ltd. for reconsideration.

Respondent Brickyard Associates Ltd. is the owner of a 252-acre parcel of property situated in the Town of Schaghticoke, Rensselaer County. In May 1990, respondent Town of Schaghticoke adopted Local Law, 1990, No. 3 of the Town of Schaghticoke (hereinafter Local Law No. 3), which zoned the area encompassing Brickyard's property as a manufacturing district in which the operation of manufacturing facilities was authorized by special use permit. In 1995, Brickyard applied to respondent Planning Board of the Town of Schaghticoke for a special use permit to construct a hot mix asphalt plant in conjunction with a related mining operation on a 10-acre parcel of land within the property. Following public hearings and review pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8) (hereinafter SEQRA), the Planning Board granted the special use permit, apparently on the ground that the hot mix asphalt plant constituted a manufacturing facility within the meaning of Local Law No. 3.

Petitioners, the City of Mechanicville and the owners of real property in close proximity to the proposed asphalt plant, commenced this combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and action for declaratory judgment against the Planning Board, the Town and Brickyard seeking a judgment annulling the special use permit, declaring Brickyard's use of the property for asphalt production to be illegal and enjoining Brickyard from operating the asphalt plant. Following joinder of issue, Brickyard moved for summary judgment dismissing the petition/complaint; petitioners cross-moved for summary judgment against all respondents. Supreme Court, initially determining that petitioners had standing to challenge the issuance of the special use permit, denied Brickyard's motion and granted petitioners' cross motion on grounds that, inter alia, the Planning Board's determination that the hot mix asphalt plant was a manufacturing facility operable under a special use permit was arbitrary and capricious and that Brickyard failed to establish a legal nonconforming use. Consequently, Supreme Court annulled the Planning Board's determination which granted the special use permit to Brickyard. Brickyard appeals.

Brickyard thereafter moved for reconsideration seeking, inter alia, to reargue the issue of standing and to renew the motion for summary judgment based upon newly discovered facts involving the Town's alleged failure to file a copy of the zoning map with the Secretary of State. According to Brickyard, because this failure invalidated Local Law No. 3 and eliminated all zoning restrictions in the Town, it could operate the hot mix asphalt plant without a special use permit. Supreme Court denied both branches of the motion, finding, inter alia, that Brickyard had not demonstrated its entitlement to renewal by failing to show that the newly discovered facts were not previously available. Brickyard also appeals from the order denying its motion for reconsideration.

Initially, while we agree with Supreme Court's judgment annulling the special use permit issued to Brickyard, we conclude that the court erred in deciding that the City had standing to challenge the Planning Board's determination issuing the special use permit. Town Law § 274-b (9) provides that review of a determination issuing a special use permit may be sought by any "person aggrieved" by the determination. Moreover, in order to demonstrate that one is aggrieved by the environmental impact of an administrative action, there must be evidence of special environmental damage which is different from that suffered by the public at large (see, Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v. Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 76 N.Y.2d 428, 433, 559 N.Y.S.2d 947, 559 N.E.2d 641; Matter of Piela v. Van Voris, 229 A.D.2d 94, 95, 655 N.Y.S.2d 105; Matter of City of Plattsburgh v. Mannix, 77 A.D.2d 114, 117, 432 N.Y.S.2d 910). Although...