Dyer v. Thorstad

• Decision Date: 01 October 1886
• Citation: 35 Minn. 534,29 N.W. 345
• Parties: DYER AND ANOTHER, COPARTNERS, ETC., v THORSTAD, SHERIFF, ETC.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

35 Minn. 534

29 N.W. 345

DYER AND ANOTHER, COPARTNERS, ETC.,vTHORSTAD, SHERIFF, ETC.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

October 1, 1886.

Appeal from an order of the district court, Douglas county, denying motion for new trial.

M. R. Tyler, for appellants, William J. Dyer and another, Copartners, etc.

Nelson, Reynolds & Treat, for respondent, John C. Thorstad, Sheriff, etc.

DICKINSON, J.

This is an action in the nature of replevin, to recover a piano which the defendant had seized under a writ of attachment against one Streeter at the suit of one Deering. The plaintiffs' asserted title, and the right of possession is based upon the alleged fact that they, formerly owning the piano, sold it conditionally to Streeter; the written contract of sale, by its terms, reserving the title in the plaintiffs until payment of the price, with the right to retake possession in case of default. Breach of the conditions of payment is alleged.

This contract was not filed in the city of St. Paul, where the plaintiffs resided, as is prescribed by section 2, c. 38, Gen. Laws 1883, amending section 16, c. 39, Gen. St. 1878; but upon the trial the plaintiffs offered to show that prior to the levying of the writ of attachment in favor of Deering the latter had actual notice of the contract, and that the conditions in respect to payment had been broken. The exclusion of this evidence is the principal ground of error assigned. The question is thus presented as to whether actual notice to a creditor of the vendee, under such a contract, renders ineffectual as to such creditor the provision of the statute which declares that such contracts “shall be absolutely void as against creditors of the vendee, and as against subsequent purchasers, and mortgagees in good faith, unless” the contract be filed as prescribed. Gen. St. 1878, c. 39, § 15. After prescribing as to the filing of such instruments, the law further reads, (section 17:) “Every note, or other evidence of indebtedness, or contract, filed in pursuance of this chapter, shall be held and considered to be full and sufficient notice to all parties interested of the existence and conditions thereof, but shall cease to be notice, as against the creditors of the vendee, and subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith, after the expiration of one year,” etc.

We consider the manifest purpose of the statute to be to afford notice (in respect to property sold upon condition) that the title remains in the vendor; the object being to thus protect those who otherwise might be defrauded. This is in accordance with the construction which has ordinarily been placed upon similar statutes, and upon registry laws generally. Tolbert v. Horton, 31 Minn. 518;S. C. 18 N. W. Rep. 647;Bank of Farmington v. Ellis, 30 Minn. 270;S. C. 15 N. W. Rep. 243;Lamberton v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 24 Minn. 281, and cases cited; Allen v. McCalla, 25 Iowa, 464, and cases cited; Gooding v. Riley, 50 N. H. 400, and cases cited.

The authorities referred to also sustain the conclusion that, as to one seeking to acquire rights in respect to the property, with actual notice of the facts, and of the prior rights of others, the reason for the law failing, the statute ceases to be operative to divest the superior title, or to prefer to the real owner one who seeks to acquire a title from another known to have none. So far as the statute relates to “subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith,” is to be taken as settled by the decisions of this court construing the statute relating to chattel mortgages, the language of which, so far as it can affect this...