Dykes v. Hamilton County

• Decision Date: 01 December 1945
• Citation: 191 S.W.2d 155,183 Tenn. 71
• Parties: DYKES et al. v. HAMILTON COUNTY et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

191 S.W.2d 155

183 Tenn. 71

DYKES et al. v. HAMILTON COUNTY et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

December 1, 1945

Appeal from Chancery Court, Hamilton County; Peabody Howard Chancellor.

Suit by C. T. Dykes and others, as taxpayers, against Hamilton County and others, for a declaratory judgment that certain parts of the act creating the Humane and Juvenile Court Commission is invalid. From a decree sustaining defendants' demurrer to the bill, complainants appeal.

Assignments of error overruled and decree affirmed. Whitaker Hall, Haynes & Allison, Wilkerson & Wilkerson, and Thos. S Myers, all of Chattanooga, for defendants, appellees.

NEIL Justice.

This suit originated in the Chancery Court of Hamilton County by bill filed by complainants seeking a declaratory judgment involving the constitutionality of Chapter 489 of the Private Acts of 1945. The complainants, suing as taxpayers, asked for a declaration that certain parts of the act, which creates the Humane and Juvenile Court Commission, be declared invalid.

The act assailed creates a juvenile court and also a juvenile court commission for the county. Since only the commission is assailed, we will give a brief summary of Section 4 of said act, also Section 6 and 21, which relate to its duties.

The commission is self-perpetuating in that when a vacancy occurs the act provides that it shall be filled by the remaining members of the commission, 'subject however to confirmation by the County Judge and County Council of Hamilton County.' All appointments not thus confirmed are declared to be null and void.

Section 4 provides the duties of the commission generally to be (1) to see to the enforcement of all laws for the purpose of prohibiting and restraining inhuman treatment of children and protecting women and children deserted by husbands and fathers; (2) to prepare and maintain proper detention homes for delinquent and dependent white and colored children; and (3) title to all property shall be vested in a board of trustees selected by the commission, but shall remain under the control of said commission.

Section 6 provides, in substance, that the Judge of the Juvenile Court shall appoint a chief administrative officer or director, who, with the approval of the judge, shall appoint other assistants and employees to carry on the non-judicial work of the court. The director and all other employees must be appointed from a list of eligible persons established through examinations conducted by the Humane and Juvenile Court Commission.

Section 21 provides (1) that all expenses in complying with the provisions of this act shall be a county charge; and (2) the County Council shall each year appropriate funds sufficient for the efficient operation of said court.

The bill alleges that before the act became effective on 'the first Monday in April, 1945,' the commissioners, who were named in the said act, met and appointed W. L. Scott and O. J. Hubbuch (two of their members) as trustees to hold title to all property to be acquired by the commission, and that before the act became effective the said 'trustees' were deeded certain real estate by Minnie C. Ewing for $7,500, with lien retained to secure deferred payments, etc. The bill charges 'that the act of the legislature creates the office of Humane and Juvenile Court Commissioner, that such is a county office,' and that 'said county office is to be filled other than by the people or the County Court,' which is in express violation of Article XI, section 17, of the Constitution of Tennessee.

The validity of the deed is questioned on the ground that it was executed and delivered prior to the date when the act took effect and when there were no trustees legally in existence.

The defendants, who are members of the Humane and Juvenile Court Commission, as named in the act, also Roy H. Beeler, Attorney General of the State, demurred to the bill upon several grounds, but the one chiefly relied on and which is conceded to raise the determinative question is 'that the Commissioners are not county officials and do not hold a county office.' The Attorney General filed an answer stating that he in his official capacity had no interest in the subject matter of the litigation.

The chancellor sustained the demurrer and complainants have appealed and filed three assignments of error. Assignment Number I, which relates to the right of complainants to file the bill, is pretermitted inasmuch as defendants concede that as taxpayers they are entitled to seek a declaratory decree.

Assignment Number II is as follows:

'The Chancellor erred in sustaining defendants' demurrers and in failing to hold that the deed of March 10, 1945, from Minnie C. Ewing to W. L. Scott and O. J. Hubbuch, Trustees, is void and that therefore the vendor's lien note of 7500.00 is void and not binding upon Hamilton County. This was error: (1) Because said deed, being made to grantees having no existence, is void and passes no title. It therefore is open to collateral attack. (2) Because said deed and vendor's lien note obligated Hamilton County for the payment of $7,500.00. Since complainants are county taxpayers, they therefore have a standing in court to question the legality of the payment of county funds.'

Assignment Number III:

'The Chancellor erred in sustaining defendants' demurrers, in holding that Chapter 489 of the Private Acts of 1945 did not create a county office and in holding said act is constitutional. This was error: (1) Because said act creates the office of Humane and Juvenile Court Commissioner for Hamilton County and the holders of said office are county officials. (2) Because holders of said office are directed to be elected 'otherwise than by the people or the County Court' and therefore said act is contrary to Constitution Article 11, section 17, and is unconstitutional.'

The Private Act of 1945, whereby a Juvenile Court and Humane and Juvenile Court Commission were created for Hamilton County, provides a tribunal for dealing with delinquent children, also women and children who have been deserted. The act confers broad powers upon the juvenile judge and the humane commission, the latter being an important and necessary adjunct of the court to the end that all laws be enforced that have as their purpose the protection of women and children from 'inhuman treatment.' The jurisdiction of the court and also the commission seems to be confined to Hamilton County, and complainants therefore insist that it was the duty of the chancery court to hold that the said commission exercises the functions of a county office as distinct from any other office; that it was the intention of the legislature in passing the act to create a county office. This insistence is based upon the fact arguendo that all expenses of the court and the commission must be borne by the county.

The legislature clearly had in mind the erection of a tribunal that was to deal with the life of a child, the future of the home, and the welfare of its members, as well as to protect society from wrongs arising from juvenile delinquency. The judge performs judicial functions; while the commission performs administrative duties. We think the duties of the humane commission are incidental to the powers exercise by the Judge of the Juvenile Court.

It plainly appears that the legislature intended to create, and did create, a juvenile court, and also created an office by providing for the humane commission. But was it a county office as contemplated by Article XI, section 17, of the Constitution of Tennessee? This question has been the subject of many judicial decisions. The act in question fixed the term of office of the commissioners and also provides that they shall serve without compensation. The members of the commission do not act separately in the performance of their duties, but collectively. While the commission as a unit is an office, we are not impelled to reach the conclusion that it is a county office in the sense that vacancies must be filled by the people or the county court. The mere fact that a person may hold an important public office whose duties are strictly confined to county affairs, and his salary paid by the county, does not make it a county office. Prescott v. Duncan, 126 Tenn. 106, 148 S.W. 229.

The constitutional...