Dylak v. State
| Decision Date | 11 April 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 43A04-0503-CR-150.,43A04-0503-CR-150. |
| Citation | 850 N.E.2d 401 |
| Parties | Tadeusz DYLAK, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Mark A. Bates, Schererville, for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Nicole M. Schuster, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee.
Tadeusz Dylak appeals his conviction for reckless homicide as a class C felony.1
Dylak raises four issues, which we revise and restate as:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by quashing Dylak's subpoena duces tecum;
II. Whether the trial court properly excluded a portion of testimony from Dylak's expert witness;
III. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Dylak's conviction;
IV. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Dylak; and
V. Whether Dylak's sentence is inappropriate.
We affirm.
The facts most favorable to the conviction follow. This case involves a collision that occurred between a semi truck driven by Dylak and a pickup truck driven by Douglas Raber on May 13, 2003. During a period of eight days, a semi truck driver cannot exceed seventy hours of on duty time ("seventy hour rule"). A semi truck driver may only drive ten hours and then must not work for eight hours ("ten hour rule"). In the eight days preceding May 13, 2003, Dylak, a semi truck driver, violated the seventy hour rule by driving approximately 71.5 hours at the time of the collision. On May 7th, 8th, and 12th, Dylak also violated the ten hour rule.
On May 13, 2003, Dylak was traveling eastbound on U.S. 30 near Warsaw at approximately 10:15 p.m. A vehicle traveling eastbound on U.S. 30 would pass yellow caution lights at 200 West with a sign that reads "Congested area next 6 miles." Id. at 155. A vehicle traveling eastbound would also encounter three traffic lights before U.S. 30 intersects with Center Street. The posted speed limit on U.S. 30 was forty-five miles per hour.
Carol Forester was stopped at a red light in the right northbound lane behind her uncle's vehicle on Center Street at the well-lit intersection of U.S. 30 and Center Street. Chris Clark was also stopped at the red light in the southbound lanes of Center Street. A gray pickup driven by Raber was in the left northbound turn lane waiting to turn west on U.S. 30.
Dylak was about a hundred yards away from the light at the intersection of U.S. 30 and Center Street when the signal governing eastbound traffic on U.S. 30 turned yellow. The light stayed yellow for 4.3 seconds. Once the traffic signal controlling U.S. 30 turned red, all traffic lights at the intersection were red for 0.9 seconds before the traffic signal controlling Center Street turned green. When the light controlling traffic on Center Street changed to green, Clark "sat there for a second then proceeded across" the intersection. Transcript at 100. Clark crossed into the eastbound lanes on U.S. 30. When the light turned green, Forester's uncle paused briefly and then entered the intersection. Forester proceeded northbound and followed her uncle's vehicle into the intersection. Raber entered the intersection to turn left onto U.S. 30.
The light was red when Dylak reached the light. Dylak did not blow his horn as he entered the intersection. Dylak, who was traveling approximately forty miles per hour, swerved and barely missed Clark's vehicle. Dylak struck the pickup truck driven by Raber. Raber's pickup truck then collided with Forester's vehicle. The collision occurred 11.04 seconds after the traffic signal controlling eastbound traffic on U.S. 30 turned yellow. After the collision, Dylak told officers that he was "tired" and that he was "going to rest." Transcript at 119. Raber later died of his injuries.
The State charged Dylak with reckless homicide as a class C felony. Prior to trial, Dylak filed a request for production, which asked the Sheriff of Kosciusko County for:
All records of automobile collisions at the intersection of U.S. highway 30 and Center Street, Warsaw, Kosciusko county, Indiana, during the three year period prior to the filing of this request, including but not limited to, names of individuals involved in the accidents (if no formal report was made), legal action, if any taken by the sheriff's department, any accident investigation and/or reconstruction information related to such collision, total number of collisions reported at the above intersection, and the names of any departments who investigated any of the above requested matters, if not done by the sheriff's department, and for any other reports or information related to such collisions currently in the possession of the Kosciusko county sheriff's department.
Appellant's Appendix at 123. The State moved to quash Dylak's subpoena duces tecum because the information sought was frivolous and irrelevant and the burden to comply with the subpoena was excessive in light of any possible probative value. The trial court held a hearing on the State's motion and subsequently granted the motion to quash.
At trial, Dylak's attorney asked David Sallmann, Dylak's expert witness:
You've given us several different terms that we're not familiar with but obviously you've used them all in generating an opinion as to this accident. If you were to give an opinion since it is not speed as to what caused the accident, what would you use, using your calculations, the evidence presented to you by the State, the new information we've received through testimony, what do you believe actually caused the collision to occur if it's not speed and it's not the brakes?
Transcript at 261. The State objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. Id. Dylak did not make an offer of proof.
The jury found Dylak guilty of reckless homicide as a class C felony. On February 17, 2005, at sentencing, the trial court found the following mitigators: (1) Dylak had been a law abiding citizen; and (2) imprisonment would result in hardship to Dylak's family. The trial court stated, "And I do not find aggravating circumstances, but a sentence less than the presumptive sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime." Transcript at 329. The trial court sentenced Dylak to the presumptive sentence of four years.
The first issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by quashing Dylak's subpoena duces tecum. "The decision to enforce, modify, or quash a subpoena duces tecum is a question for the trial court and will not be disturbed unless the decision is clearly arbitrary." Turpin v. State, 435 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind.1982). Decisions regarding discovery matters, including rulings on discovery violations, are within the broad discretion of the trial court as part of its inherent power to guide and control the proceedings. Norris v. State, 516 N.E.2d 1068, 1070 (Ind.1987). We may affirm the trial court's ruling if it is sustainable on any legal basis in the record, even reasons not enunciated by the trial court. Williams v. State, 819 N.E.2d 381, 384-385 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. "Due to the fact-sensitive nature of discovery matters, the ruling of the trial court is cloaked in a strong presumption of correctness on appeal." Pioneer Lumber, Inc. v. Bartels, 673 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ind.Ct. App.1996), trans. denied.
In criminal cases, to determine if information sought is properly discoverable:
(1) there must be a sufficient designation of the items sought to be discovered (particularity); (2) the items requested must be material to the defense (relevance); and (3) if the particularity and materiality requirements are met, the trial court must grant the request unless there is a showing of paramount interest in non-disclosure.
In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind. 1998) (internal quotation omitted). "An item is `material' if it appears that it might benefit the preparation of the defendant's case." Id. at 7. The term "paramount interest:"
suggests that some fundamental and important stake is required to resist discovery. However, the depth of the interest in resisting may be no more than inconvenience if the need for it from a given source is minimal—for example, because it is readily available elsewhere without need to drag third parties into court. Whether a sufficient interest has been shown to prevent discovery will depend upon the type of interest put forth and the category of information sought. A legitimate interest in keeping the information or items confidential, for example, may suffice to deny discovery. Ultimately these factors [i.e., particularity, relevance, and paramount interest in non-disclosure] involve a balancing test that includes evaluation of the relevance of the material, its availability from other sources, the burden of compliance measured in terms of difficulty, and the nature and importance of any interests invaded.
Id. at 7-8 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
A subpoena must be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome. Oman v. State, 737 N.E.2d 1131, 1139 (Ind.2000), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 814, 122 S.Ct. 38, 151 L.Ed.2d 12 (2001). A court may "quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive." Ind. Crim. Rule 2(1); Ind. Trial Rule 45(B).
Dylak argues that the subpoena was relevant in purpose, sufficiently limited in scope, and specific in directive.2 The trial court held a hearing on the State's motion to quash the subpoena. At the hearing, Dylak's attorney stated, "Our goal is to look at that to see the investigation to see whether there is any information regarding the traffic lights, traffic patterns that would be consistent or which would be different than those that were given by the State's expert Sergeant Shuter." Transcript at 8-9. The State argued that meeting Dylak's request would be "very time consuming" but not ...
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