Williams v. State, 49A05-0312-CR-606.

• Decision Date: 13 October 2004
• Docket Number: No. 49A05-0312-CR-606.,49A05-0312-CR-606.
• Citation: 819 N.E.2d 381
• Parties: Jeffrey WILLIAMS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

819 N.E.2d 381

Jeffrey WILLIAMS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 49A05-0312-CR-606.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

October 13, 2004.

Publication Ordered November 24, 2004.

Joel M. Schumm, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

FRIEDLANDER, Judge.

Jeffrey Williams was charged with four counts of Criminal Deviate Conduct¹ and Rape,² all class A felonies. On interlocutory appeal, Williams presents a single issue for review: Did the trial court improperly deny his Motion for Specific Discovery requesting the alleged victim's mental health and prescription records?

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

On October 9, 2003, the State charged Williams with four counts of criminal deviate conduct and rape. The probable cause affidavit alleged that Williams and K.W.M. lived together, and on July 31, 2003, K.W.M. awoke to find Williams forcing his hand into her vagina. Williams allegedly proceeded to insert a curling iron into her vagina, forced her to engage in sexual intercourse, placed a curling iron in her anus, and forced her to perform oral sex on him. The probable cause affidavit also alleged that K.W.M. informed police she was on medication to help her sleep the night of the attack and as a result was disoriented at the onset. Additionally, Williams's nephew, who was staying at the apartment the night of the alleged attack, informed police he had heard K.W.M. verbally resist Williams but that she "was all drugged up because her doctor has her on medication for her seizures, and that it seemed that she was not able to fight" him off. Appellant's Appendix at 22.

On October 20, 2003, Williams filed a Motion for Specific Discovery (Motion) seeking: (1) business records from a particular Walgreens indicating any prescriptions filled by K.W.M. in the past three years; (2) mental health records, both created and gathered from other health care institutions for the purpose of treatment, in the custody of St. Francis Behavioral Health where K.W.M. had been a patient; and (3) records generated in a CHINS action involving K.W.M. and Williams.³ Williams alleged in the Motion that K.W.M. was addicted to pain medications and had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and manic depression, which affected her credibility and provided motivation to fabricate the assault allegations. The court held a hearing on the Motion on October 28, 2003, after which the trial court issued a written order stating that Williams wanted to go on a "fishing expedition" and denying the Motion on the basis of the physician-patient privilege to the extent it sought mental health and prescription records. Id. at 50. Williams filed a petition to certify the order for interlocutory appeal on October 30, 2003, which the trial court granted the following day. This court accepted the interlocutory appeal on January 30, 2004.

On appeal, Williams claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for mental health and prescription records, as the information sought was specific, material, and the State made no showing of a paramount interest in non-disclosure. Williams also asserts that the trial court erroneously denied his Motion based on the physician-patient privilege because K.W.M., the owner of the privilege, never asserted it. Finally, Williams claims that even if he failed to make a sufficient showing to require release of the documents, an in camera review should be ordered because doubts remain about materiality and the assertion of privilege.

Our standard of review in discovery matters is abuse of discretion. Kristoff v. Glasson, 778 N.E.2d 465 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Thus, we will reverse only where the trial court has reached an erroneous conclusion which is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts of the case. Id. This applies to requests for in camera review of items to determine if they are discoverable. In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d 1 (Ind.1998). Moreover, "`[d]ue to the fact-sensitive nature of discovery matters, the ruling of the trial court is cloaked in a strong presumption of correctness on appeal.'" Kristoff v. Glasson, 778 N.E.2d at 470-71 (quoting Pioneer Lumber, Inc. v. Bartels, 673 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ind.Ct.App.1996)). We may affirm the trial court's ruling if it is sustainable on any legal basis in the record, even though this was not the reason enunciated by the trial court. See Benham v. State, 637 N.E.2d 133 (Ind.1994)

.

In criminal cases, to determine if information sought is properly discoverable:

(1) there must be a sufficient designation of the items sought to be discovered (particularity); (2) the items requested must be material to the defense (relevance); and (3) if the particularity and materiality requirements are met, the trial court must grant the request unless there is a showing of "paramount interest" in non-disclosure.

In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d at 6 (citing Kindred v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1161 (Ind.1989)). To demonstrate particularity, the request must enable the subpoenaed party to identify what is sought and allow the trial court to determine whether there has been sufficient compliance with the request. In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d 1. Regarding materiality/relevance:

An item is "material" if it appears that it might benefit the preparation of the defendant's case. The relevance of some information or items may be self-evident. Nonetheless, "[w]here the materiality of the information is not self-evident the [defendant] must indicate its potential materiality to the best of his ability...."

Id. at 7 (citations omitted). Evidence is "material" if it might reasonably affect the outcome of the trial. Hulett v. State, 552 N.E.2d 47 (Ind.Ct.App.1990).

Once a party demonstrates particularity and materiality, the trial court must grant the discovery request unless there is a showing of a paramount interest in non-disclosure. Lewis v. State, 726 N.E.2d 836 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).

The term [paramount interest] suggests that some fundamental and important stake is required to resist discovery. However, the depth of the interest in resisting may be no more than inconvenience if the need for it from a given source is minimal — for example, because it is readily available elsewhere without need to drag third parties into court. Whether a sufficient interest has been shown to prevent discovery "will depend upon the type of interest put forth" and "the category of information sought." Dillard [v. State], 257 Ind. [282,] at 292, 274 N.E.2d [387,] at 392 [(1971)].

In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d at 7. Ultimately, the three-part test for discoverable information in a criminal proceeding involves balancing "the relevance of the material, its availability from other sources, the burden of compliance measured in terms of difficulty, and the nature and importance of the interests invaded." Id.

Regarding K.W.M.'s mental health records, Williams sought "medical records both created and gathered from other health care institutions for the purpose of treatment and held in the custody of St. Francis Behavioral Health." Appellant's Appendix at 38. He claimed these were necessary to establish that K.W.M. is "bipolar and suffers from manic depression, among other things" thereby providing motivation for her to fabricate the sexual assault charges. Id. at 38. We may affirm the trial court's ruling if it is sustainable on any legal basis in the record, even though this was not the reason enunciated by the trial court. See Benham v. State, 637 N.E.2d 133

.

Discovery of mental health records are subject to the particularized requirements of Ind.Code Ann. § 16-39-3-3 (West 1998), which provides that a person "seeking access to a patient's mental health record without the patient's written consent... may file a petition in a circuit or superior court requesting a release of the patient's mental health record." After a hearing on the issue, the trial court may order the release of the records based upon certain findings. I.C. § 16-39-3-7 (West 1998). A notice of the hearing must be served on both the patient and the provider maintaining the records at least fifteen days in advance of the hearing. I.C. § 16-39-3-4 (West 1998). The fifteen-day advance notice providing the patient and provider the opportunity to be heard on the issue of releasing records is "compulsory." Thompson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1273, 1276 (Ind.2002). Further, the patient has the right to have an attorney present at the hearing, and the notice must inform the patient of this right. I.C. § 16-39-3-5 (West 1998).

Williams's Motion does not mention I.C. § 16-39-3 or its requirements and was served on the State and trial court — not K.W.M. or St. Francis Behavioral Health (St. Francis). Moreover, there is no evidence that either K.W.M. or St. Francis were provided notice of the hearing or that either was present. The hearing was held eight days after Williams filed the Motion, and therefore did not comply with the compulsory fifteen-day notice period of I.C. § 16-39-3. Williams asserts that the trial court erred by setting the hearing date before the fifteen-day period had expired. Even if the fifteen-day period had passed, however, Williams did not serve his Motion on K.W.M. or St. Francis, provide notice of the hearing, or inform K.W.M. of her right to have an attorney present to protect her interests or contest release of the records. The onus does not rest with the trial court to ensure that a criminal defendant properly complies with statutory procedures in order to gain access to a victim's confidential mental health records. The trial court properly denied Williams's Motion to the extent it sought K.W.M.'s mental health records in St. Francis's custody.⁴

To make a sufficient showing that K.W.M.'s prescription drug records were discoverable, Williams must demonstrate that...