Eaddy v. Greensboro-Fayetteville Bus Lines

• Citation: 5 S.E.2d 281,191 S.C. 538
• Decision Date: 02 November 1939
• Docket Number: 14957.
• Parties: EADDY v. GREENSBORO-FAYETTEVILLE BUS LINES, Inc.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

5 S.E.2d 281

191 S.C. 538

EADDY v. GREENSBORO-FAYETTEVILLE BUS LINES, Inc.

No. 14957.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

November 2, 1939

W Marshall Bridges, of Florence, for appellant.

McEachin & Townsend, of Florence, for respondent.

C. T GRAYDON, Acting Associate Justice.

Linnie Eaddy, a colored woman, purchased a ticket on March 27, 1938 at Marion, South Carolina, to Scranton, South Carolina, by way of Florence. The original ticket was purchased from the Queen City Coach Company but at Florence, South Carolina, the plaintiff was required to transfer from the bus of that company to a bus of the Greensboro-Fayetteville Bus Lines Inc., to reach her destination. The trip from Marion to Florence was made without unusual incident and at Florence the plaintiff had to wait a considerable time before the bus of the appellant arrived, which time she spent in the bus station at Florence. Upon the arrival of the bus of the defendant the plaintiff, with her infant in arms, boarded the same for transportation to Scranton, surrendering her ticket and turning over her baggage to the operator of the bus. The testimony shows that the plaintiff had been for some time in New York City and although she was born and raised near Scranton she had never made a bus trip from Florence to her old home and she was not acquainted with the road at this point. The bus was due to arrive at Scranton about 7:50 P. M.

The plaintiff testified that the driver of the bus announced the station of Scranton and that she, with her baby in arms, proceeded to move forward to the exit at the front of the bus near the operator and there was allowed to leave the bus with her baby, and her baggage was given to her by the bus driver. The plaintiff further testified that at the time it was raining and cold and that she was put out at a filling station operated by white people and after the bus had left she inquired and found that she was at Effingham and not at Scranton. She then made her way to the house of a colored person and after explaining the situation, received assistance with the baby to make it more comfortable and then inquired about continuing her journey to Scranton. She ascertained that a train left about 9:40 P. M. and she, with Annie Belle Daniel, the person to whose house she went in aid of assistance, walked to the depot and secured a lantern and flagged the train which carried the plaintiff to her destination at Scranton.

The plaintiff further testified that both she and her baby were made sick by the exposure and that as a result she was unable to take care of the baby and was forced to hire some one to assist in the nursing of the baby during its illness. The plaintiff was sick, according to her statement, about two weeks and the baby about three weeks.

The operator of the bus testified that on the occasion of March 27, 1938, he had two passengers for Effingham and one for Scranton; that he always called the stations properly as he was thoroughly familiar with the route; that he had no independent recollection of the plaintiff and her baby being passengers on the bus and denied that he had given any incorrect or erroneous information.

The case was submitted to the jury which rendered a verdict against the appellant herein in the sum of One Hundred ($100) Dollars actual damages and Four Hundred ($400) Dollars punitive damages. The appellant raises three exceptions to the rulings of the lower Court which challenge the correctness of the verdict and judgment.

The first exception charges error on the part of the Trial Judge in submitting to the jury the question of punitive damages.

In order to assess punitive damages it is necessary that there be present in the testimony some evidence of wilfulness or of such gross disregard of the rights of others or such gross negligence that wilfulness may be inferred. In the consideration of this case it is necessary to remember that the defendant is a common carrier of passengers for hire and is subject to all of the rules of law appplicable to such common carriers. As such carrier it owes to its passengers the highest degree of care to safely transport and deliver them to their destination. This is the rule which was applied in the earlier times to stage coaches and then to railroads and with the advent of other means of transportation the rule should be applied with equal force to these new common carriers. The question as to whether punitive damages should be assessed is one which must, of necessity, largely depend on the circumstances of each individual case, the relationship of the parties and the duties owed...