Eadie v. Krause
| Decision Date | 22 December 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 4472.,4472. |
| Citation | 381 S.C. 55,671 S.E.2d 389 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Christopher A. EADIE, Appellant, v. Steven M. KRAUSE and Krause & Moorhead, P.A., Respondents. |
Thomas A. Pendarvis, of Beaufort, for Appellant.
R. Hawthorne Barrett and Charles E. Hill, of Columbia, for Respondents.
In this legal malpractice action, Christopher A. Eadie (Eadie) appeals from a trial court order granting summary judgment in favor of Steven M. Krause and the law firm of Krause and Moorhead, P.A. (Krause). We affirm.
The instant case arises from a workers' compensation claim in which Krause was retained to represent Eadie in an action seeking workers' compensation benefits for injuries he sustained while completing a job for Complete Company, Inc. (Complete).
Complete is a small commercial industrial maintenance business incorporated in Tennessee and wholly owned by Ronald Rigsby (Rigsby). In May 1997, Eadie, a resident of Anderson, South Carolina, learned that Rigsby was looking for help doing concrete repair for Home Depot. Having performed concrete repairs in the past, Eadie, while in South Carolina, called Rigsby in Tennessee to inquire about the work. During their conversation, Rigsby allegedly offered to pay Eadie to perform concrete repairs at a Home Depot store in North Carolina. Eadie allegedly accepted Rigsby's offer and began work at the North Carolina Home Depot shortly thereafter.1
After completing the job in North Carolina, Complete retained Eadie to perform four similar repairs at Home Depot locations in North Carolina and Florida. For each job, Eadie personally purchased or rented the necessary supplies and equipment to complete the work. Eadie's rate of pay was calculated by Rigsby based upon the square footage of the concrete repair.
On June 10, 1997, Eadie was seriously injured in a one-vehicle accident while picking up concrete in Atlanta, Georgia, for a concrete repair job at a Home Depot store in Charlotte, North Carolina. Eadie was rendered paraplegic as a result of the accident.
In August 1997, Eadie retained Krause to represent him in the workers' compensation and personal injury claims arising from the accident. On September 19, 1997, Krause filed a Form 50 with the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission indicating Complete as Eadie's employer. In response Complete filed a Form 51 asserting the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission lacked jurisdiction on the grounds that the employer and "alleged employee" were not subject to South Carolina law and that the employer-employee relationship did not exist. Depositions of Eadie and Rigsby were conducted on February 16, 1998, and a hearing on the matter was scheduled for April 14, 1998. The hearing was eventually postponed and no further proceedings were commenced before the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission.
In June 1998, Eadie filed notices of claim with the Georgia State Board of Workers' Compensation and the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Krause's office assisted Eadie in filing these notices to toll the statute. At this time, Krause associated attorney Philip R. Newman (Newman) of Puryear & Newman, in Franklin, Tennessee, to represent Eadie in a Tennessee action. Newman filed a complaint in the circuit court for Williamson County, Tennessee, seeking workers' compensation benefits against Complete and Home Depot.
Subsequently, Krause associated Georgia counsel and filed a civil action on behalf of Eadie. Eadie alleged that Construction Materials Ltd., the company from which Eadie received the concrete, improperly loaded the trailer that Eadie was towing at the time of the accident. This case settled in April 2001 and Eadie received $590,000 as a result of that lawsuit.
In the Tennessee case, Home Depot, Complete, and Complete's insurer moved for summary judgment on the basis that Eadie was not an employee. Additionally, Complete alleged that Eadie had affirmatively sought workers' compensation benefits in three other states and therefore had made a binding election of remedies, under Tennessee law, barring him from recovery in Tennessee. The Tennessee trial court found in favor of Complete as to the election of remedies argument and granted Home Depot's summary judgment motion on the ground that Eadie was not an employee of Home Depot.
Thereafter, Eadie appealed to the Tennessee Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel (Tennessee Appeals Panel). In a memorandum opinion dated December 19, 2003, the three-judge panel affirmed the trial court's finding that Eadie was not an employee of Home Depot and unanimously reversed the trial court's ruling as to Complete on the election of remedies issue. The Tennessee Appeals Panel held that Eadie's filing of notices of claim in other states did not amount to an election of remedies. In arriving at its determination, the panel noted that Eadie did not receive any compensation benefits in the other three states, nor had any of his claims been denied.
Complete and its insurer appealed the decision of the Tennessee Appeals Panel to the Supreme Court of Tennessee. In its final opinion, dated August 27, 2004, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the filing of a claim in South Carolina, the request for a hearing here, and the taking of depositions in the matter constituted affirmative acts to obtain benefits in another state sufficient to constitute a binding election of remedies that barred Eadie's claim in Tennessee.
On November 16, 2005, Eadie filed the instant action against Krause and his law firm alleging that the defendants failed to timely and properly commence workers' compensation proceedings on Eadie's behalf and that as a result of defendants' acts and omissions, Eadie lost the ability to recover workers' compensation benefits. Krause and his law firm filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Eadie did not have a valid South Carolina workers' compensation claim because: (1) he was an independent contractor; and (2) his purported employer, Complete, was not subject to the jurisdiction of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission as it lacked the requisite number of employees to fall within the purview of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. Eadie opposed Krause's motion asserting his complaint was broader than a consideration of the South Carolina workers' compensation matter. Eadie argued that material facts are in dispute with regard to whether he was an employee of Complete and entitled to workers' compensation benefits under Tennessee, North Carolina, or Georgia law.
At oral argument before the trial court, the parties focused primarily on the question of whether Eadie was an employee or an independent contractor of Complete at the time of his injury. As such, the trial court requested the parties submit additional memoranda on independent contractor law in the four states at issue. Additionally, the trial court requested that any further materials pertinent to the motion be submitted by May 28, 2007. Eadie responded by filing several affidavits, exhibits, and supplemental memoranda on or shortly after the deadline. Krause filed a responsive affidavit as well as Eadie's responses to requests to admit.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Krause on July 9, 2007. Eadie filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which was denied on August 23, 2007. This appeal followed.
When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, the appellate court applies the same standard that governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP. Boyd v. Bellsouth Telephone Telegraph Co., Inc., 369 S.C. 410, 415, 633 S.E.2d 136, 138 (2006). Summary judgment is proper where no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), SCRCP; Town of Summerville v. City of North Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008); Hurst v. East Coast Hockey League, Inc., 371 S.C. 33, 36, 637 S.E.2d 560, 561 (2006). In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., 368 S.C. 424, 434, 629 S.E.2d 642, 648 (2006).
Eadie maintains the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the ground disputed issues of material fact exist concerning whether Krause's alleged professional errors proximately caused injuries to Eadie. Specifically, Eadie argues the existence of disputed issues of material fact concerning: (1) whether the acceptance of the telephone offer of employment took place in Tennessee and was sufficient to establish jurisdiction in Tennessee;2 (2) whether Eadie was an employee of Complete under Tennessee law or an independent contractor; and (3) whether the application of Tennessee's election of remedies doctrine was reasonably foreseeable.3
In order to prevail in a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) a breach of duty by the attorney; (3) damage to the client; and (4) the damage was proximately caused by the breach of duty. Holy Loch Distributors, Inc. v. Hitchcock, 340 S.C. 20, 26, 531 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2000). The plaintiff must prove that he most probably would have been successful in the action if the attorney had not committed the alleged malpractice. Brown v. Theos, 345 S.C. 626, 629, 550 S.E.2d 304, 306 (2001) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, where a plaintiff alleging legal malpractice fails to show that the underlying claim would have been successful, defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. This principle accords with the requirement that the alleged act of negligence proximately causes damage.
Given the burden of the plaintiff in a legal...
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Ethics Watch
...jurisdictions whose law could control the matter is necessary as part of the decision whether to take the case. See Eadie v. Krause, 381 S.C. 55, 671 S.E.2d 389 (Ct. App. 2008) (affirming trial court's decision to grant summary judgment for defendant attorney because it was not foreseeable ......