Eads v. Taylor Auto. Grp.

• Docket Number: SD37808
• Decision Date: 16 January 2024
• Parties: DANIELLE (ROLLINS) EADS, Appellant, v. TAYLOR AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, LLC, D/B/A TAYLOR CHRYSLER DODGE JEEP RAM and TIMOTHY J. TAYLOR, Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

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DANIELLE (ROLLINS) EADS, Appellant,
v.
TAYLOR AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, LLC, D/B/A TAYLOR CHRYSLER DODGE JEEP RAM and TIMOTHY J. TAYLOR, Respondents.

No. SD37808

Court of Appeals of Missouri, Southern District, In Division

January 16, 2024

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PHELPS COUNTY Honorable Kenneth G. Clayton, Judge

OPINION

BECKY J.W. BORTHWICK, J.

Danielle Eads (“Eads”) appeals the decision of the Circuit Court entering judgment, after a jury trial, in favor of Taylor Automotive Group, LLC, (“Taylor Automotive”) on Eads' claims of breach of contract, fraud in the inducement, and alleged violations of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”).^[1] Eads raises three points on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in giving an edited instruction which added an extra element to the cause of action, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in excluding from evidence an investigative report from the Missouri Department of Revenue (“DOR”), and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in

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refusing to publish to the jury an exhibit which included a manual detailing rules and procedures Taylor Automotive was required to follow. Finding no merit in Eads' points, we affirm the trial court's judgment.^[2]

Factual Background and Procedural History

In May 2019, Eads entered into an agreement with Taylor Automotive to purchase a 2015 Jeep Wrangler ("Jeep"), trading in her 2014 Lincoln MKX ("Lincoln"). Taylor Automotive prepared an Application for Missouri Title which required a certificate of title, but Taylor Automotive did not give the certificate of title to Eads when she bought the Jeep. When Eads asked Taylor Automotive about the missing certificate of title, she was told it was "in the mail." Eads made repeated telephone calls regarding the status of the title and was always told, "I'm working on it." Eads was able to transfer her license plates from her Lincoln to the Jeep, but when the plates expired thirty days later, Taylor Automotive placed its dealer plate on the Jeep. The DOR, through an investigator named Andrew Delleart, then contacted Taylor Automotive and was told that they were "working on" acquiring title. Delleart advised Taylor Automotive they "better get [Eads] the title or offer [Eads] her money back." Taylor Automotive did not acquire the certificate of title to the Jeep until December 2019, at which time Taylor Automotive

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had already sold the Lincoln.

Eads filed a four count Petition against Taylor Automotive alleging breach of contract, conversion, fraud in the inducement, and unlawful business practice in violation of Sections 407.025 and 407.020.^[3] Although the record is silent, the parties report and agree the trial court dismissed Count II, for conversion, prior to trial. The trial court granted Taylor Automotive's motion in limine to exclude evidence of an investigative report created by Delleart containing his conclusions and opinions regarding Taylor Automotive's wrongdoing.

At trial, Delleart testified he initially contacted Taylor Automotive and told them he "was there in reference to a complaint about them selling [Eads] a vehicle and not delivering her a title, and then also a dealer plate violation." During his testimony, he identified several exhibits, which included a Vehicle and Marinecraft Titling Manual and a Missouri Dealer Operating Manual. He further testified both of those manuals were in effect at the time the Jeep was sold. Eads' trial counsel moved to admit both manuals, which were marked Exhibit 11-A and 12-A, respectively. After opposing counsel objected by asserting that the manuals contained statutes which should not be shown to the jury, the trial court noted that "if it is requested by the jury to be given to them in deliberation, I'm not inclined to grant that," and both exhibits were admitted into evidence.

Eads also made an offer of proof regarding Delleart's investigative report. During the offer of proof, Delleart testified that during the investigation DOR determined that Taylor Automotive failed to deliver title at the time of sale and misused dealer plates in violation of Sections 301.210 and 301.560.7. After Delleart's offer of proof testimony, Eads' trial counsel

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marked the investigative report as Exhibit 801 and sought to admit it "for the offer of proof purposes." The following discussion occurred between the trial court and Eads' trial counsel:

The Court: Exhibit 801 is admitted for purposes of the offer of proof only. It is not an exhibit that will be returned -- or given to the jury if they request exhibits. All right

Trial Counsel: Well, Judge, I would wait for you to -- when we get up to that bridge, not pre-ruling -

The Court: Well, I believe at this point that's going to be the ruling. If you can change my mind, I suppose that will -- will -- we'll cross that when we get to it. But at this point it's only been offered as part of the offer of proof; correct, [trial counsel]?

Trial Counsel: Yes.

Eads never sought to admit Exhibit 801 into evidence at trial for purposes other than the offer of proof with Delleart.

During the jury instruction conference, Eads' trial counsel initially stated he had no objection to Jury Instruction 18, the verdict directing instruction based on MAI 39.02 for the MMPA claim. Eads' trial counsel later asserted that he had originally submitted an instruction that was denied by the trial court off the record. He stated that off the record, "the first objection was as to the definition below that the Court is not allowing me to submit." He then stated that the trial court did not allow him to put in "all the elements mentioned in the comments to Rule 39.02," but instead restricted Eads to two of them. He did not include any further detail or argument building on his objection at the instruction conference. The trial court noted that Eads' trial counsel did submit a different version of MAI 39.02 and the trial court modified the first paragraph. The trial court permitted Eads' trial counsel to file an unedited written instruction and mark it as Exhibit 900, but that instruction was not submitted to the jury.

In jury deliberations, the jury requested a copy of Exhibit 11-A. The trial court stated:

The Court: Well, I've been very careful not to provide them with statutory provisions or references so that they would be guided by the law as set forth in the instructions. I think that sending these items -- even though they are in evidence, sending these items back to

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the jury gives them the ability to find all of the things that we've been very careful not to present to them as irrelevant.

The trial court informed the jury that they were to be guided by the evidence as presented to them during the trial.

The jury found in favor of Taylor Automotive on all claims. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdicts in favor of Taylor Automotive. Eads filed a motion for new trial in which Eads stated "[t]he trial court erred, as a matter of law, in denying [J]ury Instruction 900," but did not indicate how or why the trial court erred. The trial court denied Eads' motion for new trial. Eads appealed.

Discussion

Point One

Eads asserts the trial court erred as a matter of law in giving Jury Instruction 18 because the edited version given by the court does not accurately state the law, as the MMPA includes several ways to prove unlawful conduct and the trial court edited the language from the MAI pattern instruction so that it added an extra element to the action.

However, we cannot reach the merits of Eads' point unless it is properly preserved for appellate review. "Counsel shall make specific objections to instructions considered erroneous." Rule 70.03. "'No party may assign as error the giving or failure to give instructions unless that party objects thereto on the record during the instructions conference, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.'" Penzel Construction Co., Inc., v. Jackson R-2 Sch. Dist., 635 S.W.3d 109, 127 (Mo.App. 2021) (quoting Rule 70.03). "'The same objection must also be raised in the motion for a new trial.'" Holmes v. Kansas City Pub. Sch...