Eagleview Corporate Ctr. Ass'n v. Citadel Fed. Credit Union

• Decision Date: 02 December 2016
• Docket Number: No. 547 C.D. 2016,547 C.D. 2016
• Citation: 150 A.3d 1024
• Parties: EAGLEVIEW CORPORATE CENTER ASSOCIATION v. CITADEL FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

150 A.3d 1024

EAGLEVIEW CORPORATE CENTER ASSOCIATION

v.CITADEL FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Appellant

No. 547 C.D. 2016

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: October 20, 2016

FILED: December 2, 2016

Steven L. Sugarman, Berwyn, for appellant.

Edward J. Greene, Jr., Exton, and Matthew E. McGuire, West Chester, for appellee.

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge, HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge, HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION

OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT

Citadel Federal Credit Union (Citadel) appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County (trial court) directing it to screen its roof-mounted air-conditioning equipment. The trial court also ordered Citadel to reimburse Eagleview Corporate Center Association (Association) for the attorneys' fees and costs that it incurred to enforce a prior order of the trial court. Citadel contends that the trial court erred. It notes, first, that the prior order, which granted Citadel's request for a declaration that its air-conditioning equipment could be placed on the roof, did not order Citadel to do anything. Citadel further notes that the trial court specifically found in the prior proceeding that the visual intrusion of Citadel's equipment was de minimis , suggesting that separate screening was neither required nor necessary. We reverse and remand.

Background

In April 2010, Citadel purchased an office building located in the Eagleview Corporate Center, which center was developed pursuant to the Uniform Planned Community Act, 68 Pa. C.S. §§ 5101 –5414. An "Amended and Restated Declaration of Easements and Protective Covenants and Restrictions for the Center" (Declaration) imposes duties upon, and creates rights in, property owners in the Center. The Association is charged with the management of the Eagleview Corporate Center and enforcement of the covenants in the Declaration.

In September of 2010, Citadel installed air-conditioning condensing units that were necessary to cool its data processing equipment located inside the building. The Association claimed that the equipment violated Article VIII, Section 8.3(c) of the Declaration, which states as follows:

(c) Exterior Equipment.Exterior mechanical and electrical equipment , including, without limitation, air conditioning equipment, air handling equipment, transformers, transclosures, pump houses, communication towers, vents and fans, whether mounted on the roof or walls of any building or on the ground, shall be placed or screened so that the predominant design lines of the building or structure continue without visual distraction or interruption. If any such equipment is not screened from the view of any interior roadway, such equipment shall be separately screened as approved by the Committee. The height of any such screening shall be at least equal to the height of the equipment to be screened.

Declaration, Art. VIII, § 8.3(c) (emphasis added); Reproduced Record at 63a–64a (R.R. ___). The Association contended that Citadel's equipment presented a "visual distraction" and demanded that Citadel remove the equipment and place it on the ground. Citadel refused.

In February of 2011, the Association initiated a suit in equity against Citadel seeking to have Citadel remove the equipment and to be enjoined from making any future alteration to its building without Association approval. Citadel counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Association had no authority under the Declaration to require the placement of air conditioning equipment on the ground.

On January 23, 2014, after a bench trial, the trial court denied the Association's request for an injunction because it did not establish the requisite elements for an injunction. The Association did not establish a clear right to an injunction because the Declaration authorized the installation of equipment on the roof. Because the visual impact of the equipment was de minimis , the Association did not establish harm, let alone that greater harm would result from the denial of an injunction than from its grant.

On these factual findings and legal conclusions, the trial court entered an order that stated as follows:

1. Plaintiff's Petition for Permanent Injunction is DENIED;

2. Defendant's request for Declaratory Judgment is GRANTED;

3. Declaratory Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff, and consistent therewith, Defendant's existing roof-mounted mechanical equipment is hereby authorized and approved and is subject to the screening requirement found in the Declaration at Article VIII, § 8.3(c);

4. Defendant's request for counsel fees is DENIED.

Trial Court op., 1/23/2014, at 10.

In May 2014, the Association asked Citadel about its plans for screening the rooftop equipment. When Citadel declined to discuss the matter, the Association filed a "petition to compel" Citadel's compliance with the trial court's January 23, 2014, order. In connection therewith, the Association requested attorney fees and costs. The trial court conducted a hearing on January 7, 2016, at which both parties presented evidence.

The Association presented the testimony of Lance Hillegas, the vice-president of design at the Hankin Group, who provides consulting services to the Association's Architectural Control Committee (Committee). Hillegas testified that after the entry of the January 23, 2014, order, Citadel did not send him proposed plans for screening its rooftop equipment. Carl Holden, an architect engaged by the Association to consider screening options for Citadel's rooftop equipment, also testified. Working with a structural engineer and a general contractor, Holden came up with several options with varying costs depending on whether the rooftop equipment remained in its current location or would be relocated. Were the rooftop equipment to be relocated, the cost would range between $169,081 and $176,021, depending on the type of screen. Were the rooftop equipment to remain in its current location, the cost would range between $196,000 and $204,000.

Citadel presented the testimony of its architect, Lee Casaccio, who generally agreed with Holden's cost estimates. However, he was uncertain about the cost to relocate the equipment, noting that it could be significant because of the need to re-route electrical and other utility services inside the building. He doubted that "investing $200,000 would be a prudent decision" because the visual impact of the screening "could be greater than the de minimis impact of the individual units that are there now." Notes of Testimony, 1/7/2016, at 83–85 (N.T. ___); R.R. 1265a–67a.

On March 8, 2016, the trial court granted the Association's petition to compel.

The trial court was troubled that Citadel had adopted a "reversal of its trial position" by asserting that the equipment should not be screened. Trial Court op., 3/8/2016, at 5. Accordingly, the trial court entered the following order:

1. Defendant is directed to comply with the January 14, 2014 Order in that the Equipment is subject to the screening requirements of § 8.3(c) of the Declaration and must be separately screened as approved by the Architectural Control Committee consistent with Exhibits P–11, P–12 and D–1, and

2. Defendant shall pay Plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in enforcing the screening requirement set out in § 8.3(c) of the Declaration and as determined to be applicable to the Equipment in the January 24, 2014 [,] Order, with a hearing to assess fees and costs to be scheduled.

It is further ORDERED that Defendant's cross-petition to strike Plaintiff's petition and for counsel fees is DENIED.

Trial Court op., 3/8/2016, at 6. Citadel appealed to this Court.¹

On appeal,² Citadel raises four issues. First, it contends that the trial court erred because the trial court's declaratory judgment in favor of Citadel did not order it to take any action. Second, it contends that the trial court erred and abused its discretion because in the initial proceeding neither party sought an order to require screening. Third, the trial court erred in concluding that Citadel's pre-trial settlement offer for separate screening of equipment was part of the Association's request for relief in the initial proceeding. Fourth, the trial court erred in denying Citadel's request for attorney fees and awarding them to the Association. The trial court lacked authorization in statute, in contract or in the Declaration that set up the planned development.

I. Petition to Compel

In its first issue, Citadel contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the Association's petition to compel Citadel to comply with the order of January 23, 2014, because that order did not require any action by Citadel. In support, Citadel offers several arguments.

Citadel first contends that the Association's petition to compel was actually a petition to modify the trial court's order of January 23, 2014. As such, the Association's petition was untimely. The Association responds, however, that it did not seek to modify the order of January 23, 2014, but only to enforce it.

Section 5505 of the Judicial Code authorizes a trial court to modify or rescind an order, so long as it does so within 30 days of the order's issuance. 42 Pa. C.S. § 5505.³ The trial court's order of March 8, 2016, was far too late to modify its order of January 23, 2014. However, the trial court did not amend its order of January 23, 2014; rather, it issued a new order. The question, then, is whether the trial court's order of January 23, 2014, ordered Citadel to install screening, as asserted by the Association and denied by Citadel.

In its injunction action, the Association requested an order:

a. [E]njoining Defendant from all further construction, alteration or improvements of any nature at the Property until Defendant has obtained approval for same from Plaintiff consistent with the requirements set out in the Declaration; and

b. [D]irecting Defendant to remove all exterior equipment placed

...