Eaglin v. State
| Decision Date | 16 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-92-203,09-92-203 |
| Citation | 872 S.W.2d 332 |
| Parties | Sam Edward EAGLIN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. CR. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
James R. Makin, Beaumont, for appellant.
Tom Maness, Dist. Atty., John R. Dewitt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Beaumont, for state.
Before WALKER, C.J., and BROOKSHIRE and BURGESS, JJ.
This is an appeal from a conviction for the felony offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance. Appellant's indictment included enhancement paragraphs raising appellant's punishment exposure to that of a habitual offender. TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon Supp.1994). The jury found appellant guilty of unlawfully possessing cocaine as alleged in the indictment. Appellant pleaded "true" to the enhancement allegations and the trial court assessed punishment at confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a term of fifty (50) years. Appellant presents two points of error for our review, viz:
Point of Error One: The trial court erred in holding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, because the evidence was insufficient to prove "possession" as alleged in the indictment.
Point of Error Two: The trial court erred in failing to grant appellant's timely motion for mistrial because of prejudicial conduct of the prosecuting attorney in persistently disregarding the court's rulings.
As appellant raises the issue of insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, an examination of the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict is in order. The State's first witness was Detective Patrick Powell of the Jefferson County Narcotics Task Force. Detective Powell was one of several members of the narcotics unit that executed a search warrant at the Gant Apartments in Port Arthur on January 30, 1992. The specific apartment involved was apartment 13. Cocaine was listed in the search warrant as the contraband to be sought. Through Detective Powell's search of the premises, three items containing cocaine were discovered. State's Exhibit 8 was a matchbox that was found atop some wooden beams above a water heater located inside a closet. The matchbox contained a number of off-white "rocks" later tested and found to be cocaine. State's Exhibit 9 was white powder residue and a razor blade located on a plate that Detective Powell discovered on top of cabinets in the rear of the kitchen. State's Exhibit 10 was a plastic bag containing a large number of off-white rocks. Both State's Exhibit 9 and State's Exhibit 10 also tested positive for cocaine. The combined weight of State's Exhibits 8, 9, and 10 totaled 11.87 grams. From Detective Powell's testimony, it is apparent that none of the items of contraband were either in plain view or easily accessible.
When the search warrant was executed, appellant and his wife, Judy, were seated in the "living and dining area" of the apartment. They were the only individuals present in the apartment when the search was conducted. Subsequent to the finding of the contraband, appellant was searched incident to his arrest. Appellant was found to have $1000 in currency on his person. The State also introduced into evidence a current utility bill from Gulf States Utilities. 1 The bill was addressed to appellant at "4800 Seventh Street, No. 13." This was the address of the apartment in question. Along with the utility bill, the State introduced a utility receipt for a bill paid on "NOV 26 '91." The receipt is also in appellant's name, however the address is written as "4800 7th # 15." 2
Further testimony from Detective Powell included the fact that Apartment 13 contained two separate bedrooms. In one of the bedrooms, which was apparently occupied on a regular basis, both men's and women's clothing were found. The second bedroom contained items apparently consistent with belonging to a "young teenager." Judy did not attempt to communicate with the officers at the scene of their arrest.
The appellant called his wife, Judy, to testify in his behalf. Judy testified that appellant knew nothing of the contraband found by the narcotics unit. She admitted that she had already pleaded guilty to possessing said contraband and that it all belonged to her as she was selling it out of her apartment. Judy further testified that appellant did not live at the Gant Apartments and was only at her apartment when the raid occurred because she was having problems with her son, Earl, and appellant "could always help me with Earl." Through Judy's testimony, it was also learned that appellant had been to the penitentiary, and on cross-examination she admitted that said incarceration of appellant was for possession of a controlled substance.
On cross-examination, Judy also testified to the fact of her heroin addiction, and to the fact that she would occasionally combine both heroin and cocaine powder into an injectable mixture which she used. She further admitted that she failed to proclaim appellant's innocence to the authorities on the night of the raid, or to her presentence investigation officer. At one point during Judy's cross-examination, the State introduced into evidence State's Exhibit 16, a letter addressed to Robert Cartwright who Judy recognized as a narcotics detective with the Port Arthur Police Department. The letter was in appellant's handwriting. The letter contains the following:
Sam Eaglin
383
(sic et passim) (emphasis in original)
Further cross-examination of Judy elicited the fact that while she and appellant were sitting in a patrol unit following their arrest, their conversation was being recorded. Judy admitted that she asked appellant "to try to take the case" for her.
In rebuttal, the State called Earl Fontenot, Judy's son. The entirety of Earl's testimony, including cross-examination, is as follows:
Q. (the State) Would you please state your full name for the record.
A. Earl Damian Fontenot.
Q. Mr. Fontenot, how old are you?
A. 16.
Q. Are you the son of Judy Gail Fontenot Eaglin?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And on January the 30th of this year, 1992, your mother was arrested together with her common-law husband, Sam Eaglin; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Your mother has pled guilty to possession arising from that arrest and has testified today that all the cocaine in the house--or in the apartment was hers and that she was selling it. Is that true?
A. She was selling cocaine, but all the cocaine probably wasn't hers.
Q. Who did the cocaine in the apartment belong to?
A. Sam Eaglin.
Q. Mr. Fontenot, where are you currently at?
A. Juvenile Detention.
Q. What are you up there for?
A. Three counts of attempted murder and criminal mischief.
Q. Have you and Sam Eaglin ever got along?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You-all have?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You haven't had any problems with him?
A. No. He was being a father to me.
Q. Did you ever threaten to kill him?
A. No.
Q. You haven't done that.
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you been made any promises for your testimony?
A. No, sir.
A challenge to the trial court's "holding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction" is actually a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. See Madden v. State, 799 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 954, 111 S.Ct. 1432, 113 L.Ed.2d 483 (1991). The standard for reviewing questions of evidentiary sufficiency is for the reviewing court to view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the "guilty" verdict and then determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found each of the essential elements of the offense to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). In the instant case, almost all of the evidence of appellant's criminal culpability is circumstantial. Since the trial began on September 9, 1992, our appellate review of the evidence, specifically whether appellant unlawfully possessed the contraband, will not involve the "alternative reasonable hypothesis" construct rejected in Geesa. This translates into forgoing from our analysis of the evidence whether or not the State eliminated every reasonable hypothesis other than appellant's guilt in circumstantially proving their case. Rogers v. State, 846 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1993, no pet.)
"Circumstantial evidence" has been defined as direct proof of a secondary fact which, by logical inference, demonstrates the ultimate fact to be proven. Taylor v. State, 684 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). In order to prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove the accused 1) exercised actual care, custody, control, or management over the contraband, and that 2) the accused knew the substance he possessed was contraband. See Martin v. State, 753...
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