Eakman v. Brutger

• Decision Date: 15 October 1979
• Docket Number: No. 49729.,49729.
• Citation: 285 NW 2d 95
• Parties: Marvin EAKMAN and Thomas McDonald, Appellants, v. Dan BRUTGER, Chairman of the Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission, Respondent, John Boland, Chairman of the Metropolitan Council (and the full Commission and Council), Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

285 N.W.2d 95 (1979)

Marvin EAKMAN and Thomas McDonald, Appellants, v. Dan BRUTGER, Chairman of the Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission, Respondent John Boland, Chairman of the Metropolitan Council (and the full Commission and Council), Respondent.

No. 49729.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

October 15, 1979.

Marvin Eakman, pro se.

Thomas McDonald, pro se.

Mastor & Bale, Wayne H. Olson, and David R. Knodell, Minneapolis, for Brutger et al.

Forrest D. Nowlin, Jr., and John Hoeft, St. Paul, for Boland et al.

Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.

SHERAN, Chief Justice.

Plaintiffs Marvin Eakman and Thomas McDonald, pro se, appeal from an order of the district court denying their motion for a temporary restraining order enjoining any action taken by defendants Dan Brutger, Chairman of the Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission and John Boland, Chairman of the Metropolitan Council toward the building of a domed stadium in downtown Minneapolis, and granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. We consider both rulings. Affirmed.

A trial court's ruling on a motion for a temporary injunction is largely an exercise of judicial discretion. The sole issue on appeal is whether there was a clear abuse of such discretion. In Dahlberg Brothers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 272 Minn. 264, 274, 137 N.W.2d 314, 321 (1965), we specified the considerations relevant in making that determination:

(1) The nature and background of the relationship between the parties preexisting the dispute giving rise to the request for relief.

(2) The harm to be suffered by plaintiff if the temporary restraint is denied as compared to that inflicted on defendant if the injunction issues pending trial.

(3) The likelihood that one party or the other will prevail on the merits when the fact situation is viewed in light of established precedents fixing the limits of equitable relief.

(4) The aspects of the fact situation, if any, which permit or require consideration of public policy expressed in the statutes, State and Federal.

(5) The administrative burdens involved in judicial supervision and enforcement of the temporary decree. (footnotes omitted).

The district court applied these criteria and concluded that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate irreparable harm while defendants showed significant economic hardship, that plaintiffs were not likely to prevail on the merits and that public policy as expressed in the "stadium law," Minn. Stat. §§ 473.551-595 (1978), requires that the issues be dealt with legislatively. A review of the record, comprised of the pleadings of both parties and the affidavits and documentary exhibits of defendants, reveals that the trial court did not err in denying the motion.

Rule 56, R. Civ. P., permits a trial court to order summary judgment upon a showing by the moving party that there...