Eames v. Pitcher, Civ. A. No. 72-43.

• Decision Date: 23 June 1972
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 72-43.
• Citation: 344 F. Supp. 207
• Parties: Ramond EAMES v. Sargent PITCHER, Jr., District Attorney, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

344 F. Supp. 207

Ramond EAMES v. Sargent PITCHER, Jr., District Attorney, et al.

Civ. A. No. 72-43.

United States District Court, M. D. Louisiana.

June 23, 1972.

Murphy W. Bell, Robert C. Williams, Robert J. Eames, Bell, Williams & Eames, Baton Rouge, La., for plaintiff.

Cheney C. Joseph, Jr., Special Counsel for the State, Baton Rouge, La., for defendants.

E. GORDON WEST, District Judge:

This suit for injunctive relief grows out of a racial disturbance which occurred in the City of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on January 10, 1972. Several people, including two Sheriff's deputies, Dewayne Wilder and Ralph Hancock, died of gunshot wounds during this incident. On February 10, 1972, a duly convened Grand Jury for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana, returned two indictments against fourteen persons, including the plaintiff, Ramond Eames charging them with murder, and one indictment against fifteen persons, including said plaintiff, charging them with inciting to riot, all in violation of the laws of the State of Louisiana. This present action was brought on behalf of Ramond Eames seeking an injunction to enjoin the State of Louisiana from prosecuting him on the murder indictments. Jurisdiction is alleged to exist under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(3), (4); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983 and 1985 and under various amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff's main contention is that the murder indictments were not returned in good faith. Plaintiff contends that the only reason for the murder indictments was to allow the District Attorney to hold petitioner in jail without bond pending his trial on the charge of inciting to riot. Plaintiff alleges that the defendant, District Attorney Sargent Pitcher, Jr., abused "the prosecutorial powers vested in his office as District Attorney and chief legal counsel to the East Baton Rouge Grand Jury by causing and procuring a Grand Jury Indictment for Murder against and (sic) certain other black men with no hope of prosecutorial success." Petitioner further alleges "that the sole reason for bringing or procuring the said Murder Indictments * * * is to harass petitioner, inflame the community against him, and to deprive him of his liberty, pending trial on another Bill of Indictment charging violation of R.S. 14:329.1 which charge is bailable."

An evidentiary hearing was held before this Court, and now, after due consideration, it is the opinion of this Court that no injunction should issue herein.

In addition to hearing the testimony of twelve witnesses, including the foreman of the Grand Jury which returned the indictment, the District Attorney, the Mayor President of Baton Rouge, the Clerk of the City Court, a Judge of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, and others, the Court also ordered the defendants to submit to the Court for an in camera inspection tape recordings of the Grand Jury proceedings.

The function of the Grand Jury is not to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Nor is the District Attorney required to present all of his evidence to the Grand Jury. The function of the Grand Jury is to determine whether or not, from the evidence before it, there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. In this case, after hearing the evidence presented to it, the Grand Jury returned three indictments against the plaintiff and others. An in camera review of the taped recording of the Grand Jury proceedings leaves no doubt in the mind of this Court that they were justified in doing so.

The United States Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669, stated that:

"Since the beginning of this country's history Congress has, subject to few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal courts. * * *

"The precise reasons for this long-standing public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings have never been specifically identified but the primary sources of the policy are plain. One is the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief."

In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Stewart...