State v. O'Daniel

Decision Date25 September 1980
Docket NumberNo. 6953,6953
Citation62 Haw. 518,616 P.2d 1383
PartiesSTATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Blaine O'DANIEL, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtHawaii Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. The grand jury is responsible for the determination of whether probable cause exists to believe a crime has been committed and to charge the person responsible and protect citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions.

2. The prosecutor has wide discretion in selecting and presenting evidence before the grand jury and such evidence should fairly apprise the grand jurors of facts necessary to carry out their responsibility. The prosecutor is required to present to the grand jury evidence favorable to the defense only where such testimony is clearly exculpatory.

3. Ordinarily, the prosecutor is not required to instruct the grand jury as to the nature and significance of evidence relating to a lesser included offense unless the evidence clearly establishes the lesser offense.

4. Hearsay is admissible before the grand jury if not deliberately used in place of better evidence to improve a case for indictment.

5. The evidence presented to the grand jury must be sufficient to find probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the defendant did it.

6. Length of delay, reason for delay, defendant's assertion of the right and prejudice to defendant are considered in determining whether right to speedy trial was violated.

7. The length of delay must be shown to be presumptively prejudicial before the other factors are considered. A mere three month period of delay in a murder prosecution is not presumptively prejudicial.

8. Evidence under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule is admissible if relevant to a material issue, reflecting the declarant's present intent at the time the statement was made and that the statement is reliable and trustworthy.

9. The right of confrontation is not violated by evidence admissible under an exception to hearsay if found to be reliable.

10. The trial court is vested with discretion in admitting evidence at trial and such a decision will not be reversed absent an abuse.

11. A defendant is entitled to an instruction on every defense or theory of defense having any support in the evidence, provided such evidence would support the consideration of that issue by the jury, no matter how weak, inconclusive or unsatisfactory the evidence may be.

12. Reasonable inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence may be used to prove a criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt.

13. In deciding a motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial judge must determine whether upon the evidence, giving full play to the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence and draw justifiable inferences of fact, a reasonable mind could fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Eric A. Seitz, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.

William K. Meheula, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu (Timothy A. Liu, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu, on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., OGATA and MENOR, JJ., and MARUMOTO and KOBAYASHI, Retired Justices, assigned by reason of vacancy.

OGATA, Justice.

The defendant-appellant, James O'Daniel (hereinafter called appellant) was indicted for the murder of his wife in violation of HRS § 707-701. 1 After a jury trial, appellant was found guilty of manslaughter, a lesser included offense, and was sentenced to ten years in prison. The appellant now appeals and raises numerous issues but for the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the trial court.

I.

The appellant cites three errors in the denial of appellant's motion to dismiss.

First, appellant contends that the prosecutor affirmatively misled the grand jury by failing to present evidence of the incident being an accidental shooting and by failing to inform the grand jury of additional options in the indictment process. Appellant asserts that his due process rights were violated by the failure of the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.

The grand jury proceeding "is an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person." State v. Bell, 60 Haw. 241, 244, 589 P.2d 517, 519 (1978). Additionally, the grand jury should also maintain a historical role of being a safeguard to protect citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions. Id. at 243, 589 P.2d at 519; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343, 94 S.Ct. 613, 617, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974).

Because of the accusing nature and function of grand jury proceedings, we have held that the grand jury's role should not be expanded into a minitrial. State v. Bell, supra. Such an expansion would create problems that this Court examined in Bell where we stated:

To require the prosecutor to present any and all information which may have a tendency to exculpate the accused would, in our view, confer upon (the) grand jury proceedings the adversary nature which is more properly reserved for the actual trial phase of prosecution. (Citations omitted.)

60 Haw. at 244, 589 P.2d at 519.

The prosecutor has wide discretion in selecting and presenting evidence before the grand jury. Eames v. Pitcher, 344 F.Supp. 207 (D.La.1972); State v. Bell, supra 60 Haw. at 254, 589 P.2d at 525. The Eames Court described the prosecutor's role before the grand jury as follows He is only required to produce, and he usually only produces for the Grand Jury such evidence as he, in good faith, thinks is necessary to honestly and fairly apprise the Grand Jury of the facts necessary for them to determine whether or not there exists probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, and whether or not there exists probable cause to believe a certain person or persons has committed that crime.

344 F.Supp. at 210.

To require the presentation of evidence mitigating the crime which would in turn provide additional options in the indictment process, would go against our recent holding in Bell. This requirement espoused by appellant would create dangers which we sought to avoid in Bell.

In State v. Bell, supra, the defendant Hisaw complained that the prosecutor failed to instruct the grand jury on the significance of evidence relating to self defense. We held there that only when evidence presented to a grand jury clearly establishes a defense must the prosecutor instruct the grand jury on the significance of such evidence. 60 Haw. at 252, 589 P.2d at 524. It would follow from Bell that if the evidence before the grand jury clearly establishes a lesser offense, the prosecutor must instruct the grand jury on the significance of the evidence.

The grand jury had some evidence through Detective Au's testimony that the shooting was accidental. Some testimony on the issue of accidental death does not compel a finding by the grand jury that they should have indicted on a lesser charge. It clearly appears that the grand jury did not find evidence of the accidental shooting persuasive. As we established in Bell, it would be undue judicial interference to attempt to surmise what significance a grand jury would have attached to evidence which is not clearly exculpatory. 60 Haw. at 255, 589 P.2d at 525. We would attach the same conclusion to evidence that does not clearly establish the lesser offense. The fact of accidental death arguably mitigates the seriousness of the offense, but it in no way clearly establishes the lesser offense. The issue of accidental death is one which the defense could more fully develop at trial and thus we perceive no injustice or prejudice by the prosecutor's actions before the grand jury. Following Bell, we hold that the prosecutor was not required to instruct the grand jury on the option to indict on a lesser included offense unless the evidence clearly established only the lesser offense.

We also held in State v. Bell, supra, that the prosecutor is required to present to the grand jury evidence favorable to the defendant only if it is clearly exculpatory. 60 Haw. at 245, 589 P.2d at 520.

Evidence of an accidental shooting arguably tends to negate guilt. However, we are of the opinion that such evidence before the grand jury within the context of the facts herein, was not clearly exculpatory within the standard enunciated in Bell. Although Detective Au testified as to appellant's statements concerning the accidental nature of the incident, there was contradictory circumstantial evidence which could support the charge of murder. Under these circumstances, we find that the prosecutor was not required to present evidence of the accidental shooting to the grand jury.

Appellant's second contention is that there was a denial of due process through the use of hearsay evidence before the grand jury. Appellant claims it was prejudicial for Detective Au to relate Dr. Majoska's findings on the cause of death of Angela O'Daniel. 2 Appellant relies on our holding in State v. Layton, 53 Haw. 513, 497 P.2d 559 (1972), where this Court stated that hearsay evidence before the grand jury should be used only in exceptional circumstances. We stated in Layton that exceptional circumstances would exist when direct testimony is unavailable or when it is demonstrably inconvenient to summon witnesses able to testify from personal knowledge. 53 Haw. at 515, 497 P.2d at 561. No such basis was shown to exist.

It is undisputed that Detective Au's testimony regarding Dr. Majoska's findings was hearsay. In a case decided after State v. Layton, supra, this Court allowed hearsay evidence before the grand jury, but we have placed limitations on its usage. State v. Murphy, 59 Haw. 1, 575 P.2d 448 (1978); see, Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363, 76 S.Ct. 406, 408, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956).

In State v. Murphy, supra, we examined the exact issue of the instant case and found that the decision in Layton was not a hard and...

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