Earl W. Baker & Co. v. Morris
| Decision Date | 28 May 1935 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 25781 |
| Citation | 1935 OK 591,54 P.2d 353,176 Okla. 68 |
| Parties | EARL W. BAKER & CO. et al. v. MORRIS et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 Master and Servant - Workmen's Compensation Law - Statutory Limitation on Time for Application for Reopening Cause on Ground of Change of Condition.
Under section 4, chapter 29, Session Laws of 1933, the State Industrial Commission is without jurisdiction to reopen any cause upon an application based upon change in condition, where said application is filed subsequent to the period of time for which the condition, as changed, would have been compensable if it had existed when the original award was made.
Original action by Earl W. Baker and the U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company for review of order and award of the State Industrial Commission in favor of N. Frank Morris. Award vacated.
Thos. H. Owen and Paul N. Lindsey, for petitioners.
A.P. Murrah, Luther Bohanon, J.I. Gibson, and Leonard H. Savage, for respondents.
¶1 On October 23, 1928, N. Frank Morris, an employee of the petitioners, sustained injuries to his feet while engaged in an occupation within the Workmen's Compensation Act. Thereafter he filed his claim for compensation with the State Industrial Commission. The controversy was settled and closed by an order of the Commission on July 29, 1929, awarding said claimant compensation covering a permanent partial disability of 25 per cent. to the right foot and 20 per cent. to the left foot.
¶2 The Legislature then passed an act limiting the time within which the Commission retains jurisdiction to reopen causes upon application based on change in condition. This act was approved on May 3, 1933, and is section 4, chapter 29, Session Laws of 1933, the pertinent part being:
"The jurisdiction of the Commission to reopen any cause upon an application based upon a change in condition shall extend for the maximum period of time measured by the number of weeks for which compensation could have been awarded by the Commission had the condition of claimant existed at the time original award was made thereon, and unless filed within said period of time, same shall be forever barred."
¶3 On May 25, 1934, almost five years after the above-mentioned award, and more than a year after adoption of the above statute, the claimant filed his motion to reopen the cause on account of an alleged change for the worse in the condition of his right foot. Thereupon the Commission made its order of July 10, 1934, finding that claimant had suffered said change in condition and awarding him compensation on the basis of 67 per cent. loss of use of the right foot, minus the amount previously paid him on the basis of 25 per cent. disability.
¶4 The petitioners urge two propositions in this original action to review the order and award of July 10, 1934. We consider only the proposition urging that the Commission had lost jurisdiction by reason of the above statute, and we agree with that contention.
¶5 Elsewhere in the Workmen's Compensation Act it is prescribed that for the permanent total loss of use of a foot the compensation shall be on the basis of 150 weeks pay. And by the same section (13356, O. S. 1931), a permanent partial loss of use amounting to 67 per cent. would be compensated on the basis of that number of weeks, which is 67 per cent. of 150 weeks, or 1001/2 weeks. But that basis, which was used by the Commission, is not applicable where there is a permanent partial loss of use in both feet, such as we have here. Both parties to this action have totally failed In their briefs to point out this error.
¶6 In American Tank Co. v. State Ind. Comm., 153 Okla. 117, 5 P.2d 137, we held:
"Where it appears the claimant has sustained a permanent partial disability to both hands, the percentage of loss to each hand, as determined by the Commission, should be added together, and divided by two; the quotient will be the percentage of the permanent partial disability sustained by claimant for the loss to both hands, on the basis of 500 weeks."
¶7 The method which should have been used by the Commission, in accordance with the foregoing authority, would have resulted in an award of 217 1/2 weeks compensation. Therefore, quoting from the act (sec. 4), "had the condition of claimant existed at the time original award was made" (meaning if the present...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
King Mfg. v. Meadows
...O.S.1991 § 43, see note 11, supra. For the same reasons, Arrow Tool & Gauge v. Mead, 2000 OK 86, ¶ 7, 16 P.3d 1120 and Earl Baker & Co. v. Morris, 1935 OK 591, 54 P.2d 353 are inapplicable as well. 13. Title 85 O.S.2001 § 3.6(F) provides: "Benefits for an injury shall be determined by the l......
-
Arrow Tool & Gauge v. Mead
...supra note 8 at ¶ 3, at 1212; Kluver v. Weatherford Hosp. Auth., 1993 OK 85, ¶ 14, 859 P.2d 1081, 1084. 11. Earl W. Baker & Co. v. Morris, 1935 OK 591, 54 P.2d 353, 355; Wolfenbarger v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1990 OK CIV APP 65, ¶ 6, 798 P.2d 1093, 12. Cf. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Stat......
-
Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. Satterfield
... ... S. 1931, as construed by this court in Baker v. Morris, 176 Okla. 68, 54 P.2d 353, the commission was without jurisdiction to grant an award ... ...
-
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Watkins
...case is whether or not the act shall be construed to be retroactive or prospective in its operation. In the case of Earl W. Baker v. Morris, 176 Okla. 68, 54 P.2d 353, the court was dealing with this same section of the act and held that no question of retroaction was involved therein for t......