Earle v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 3.
| Decision Date | 20 February 1942 |
| Docket Number | No. 3.,3. |
| Citation | 167 S.W.2d 15 |
| Parties | EARLE v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO. et al. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Appeal from Chancery Court, Shelby County; L. D. Bejach, Chancellor.
Action by C. T. Earle against the Illinois Central Railroad Company and others for breach of contract and for decree directing plaintiff's reinstatement with full seniority rights. Decree for complainant, and defendants appeal.
Decree reversed and bill dismissed.
Application for writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court in 63 S.Ct. 161, 87 L.Ed. ___.
Evans, Evans & Creson, of Memphis (Clinton H. McKay and Lucius E. Burch Jr., both of Memphis, of counsel), for appellant.
W. H. Fisher and Lindsay B. Phillips, both of Memphis, for appellee.
W. A. Endle, of Cleveland, Ohio, for amicus curiae, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen.
The complainant, who was formerly employed by the defendants as a yardman in what is known as the Memphis Terminal Yards, instituted this suit to recover damages for the alleged breach of what he insists was a written contract of employment, claiming that he was wrongfully discharged by the defendants. He also sought a decree directing his reinstatement with full "seniority rights" alleged to have been acquired by him under the provisions of his contract relating thereto. The Chancellor held for the complainant, awarding him a recovery in the sum of $11,728.35 as damages. He also decreed that complainant be reinstated with "all the rights he would have had if he had been retained in the defendants' employ". The defendants appealed and have assigned many errors.
As bearing upon the importance of the case, it is asserted that the trials of numerous cases of a similar nature involving in the aggregate a very large sum of money and "the seniority rights" of many employees are awaiting the outcome of the appeal. Many interesting and important questions have been elaborately and ably presented, both in the oral arguments and in the briefs filed on behalf of the parties. In addition, the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, a voluntary association of certain classes of railroad employees, of which the complainant was a member, has filed a brief as amicus curiae dealing with one phase of the controversy. We shall not undertake to specifically treat all of the questions that are raised. An exposition of those that may be appropriately decided will carry the opinion to the limit of any length that can be justified by the importance of the decision to be rendered and perhaps beyond.
On January 20, 1933, due to a slump in business occasioned by the now celebrated economic depression, the defendants reduced the forces employed in the Memphis Terminal Yards, dispensing with the services of some fifty-five to sixty yardmen, among whom was the complainant. The reduction in forces was general throughout the system and involved several thousand employees all told. The complainant worked no more until May 29, 1933. On that day and the two succeeding days he was called upon to perform and did perform the usual duties of a yardman. He did not again work until June 30, 1933, when he served one day in the same capacity. By a letter dated July 26, 1933, the complainant was notified "that effective this date your name has been removed from the seniority list, due to the fact that you have not performed service off the regular extra board for a period of six months". The letter continued, "Call at the Superintendent's office and turn in any company property that you may have in your possession". This notice was signed by the defendants' Trainmasters and it may be conceded that its effect was to inform complainant that defendants considered at an end his right to be reemployed in accordance with his "seniority standing". There were no charges of incompetency, insubordination or the like against complainant.
After receipt of the notice, the complainant was not called upon to perform any service for the defendants and it is not controverted that thereafter former yardmen who, from a standpoint of length of service, were junior to the complainant at the time the yard forces were reduced, were reemployed and given work to which the complainant would have been entitled had he been reemployed in accordance with the seniority status which he had attained when he was let out in January, 1933, in the reduction in forces.
In its last analysis, the principal question for decision is whether, at the time the above-mentioned notice was given, the defendants were under a contractual obligation to re-employ complainant "in accordance with his seniority standing" when the services of additional yardmen were needed. The defendants contend that the theretofore-existing obligation so to do terminated when complainant was not returned to the service in the manner and within the time specified in the contract of employment. This, complainant denies, insisting that it is grounded upon an erroneous interpretation of the contract and he apparently contends, moreover, that even if defendants' view be correct, he had been in fact returned to the service at a time and in a manner that operated to preserve and extend the contractual obligation to so re-employ him beyond the date on which the notice was given.
A solution of the principal question, as well as of several subordinate questions, depends upon the construction to be given the contract of employment and its application to the particular facts and circumstances arising out of the relation between the complainant and the defendants.
The agreement relied upon was the result of negotiations begun many years ago by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (hereinafter referred to as the Brotherhood) with the defendant carriers. This, complainant contends, was adopted by him as his individual contract of employment when he entered the service of the defendants. As it appears in the record, it is contained in a printed booklet and is designated as a "Schedule of Wages and Rules Governing Yardmen and Switch Tenders". The schedule contains twenty-five separately numbered articles wherein are to be found what are manifestly the basic provisions of the agreement as originally negotiated. These are of general application throughout the entire system operated by the carriers, or at least that operated by the defendant, Illinois Central Railroad. Following these fundamental rules there appear in the booklet a number of supplementary provisions covering a wide variety of subjects, some of local or individual application, and some of a general nature. Many of these are in the form of written requests made by the Brotherhood for changes in or additions to the basic provisions, and the answers to such requests made by the carrier. Among these is one made in 1914 which is known throughout the record as "Request 79 and Answer thereto", hereinafter set out in full. A major part of the controversy revolves about this document, its relation to the basic provisions and whether it is to be applied to the particular circumstances of the complainant's situation.
The pertinent provisions of the basic agreement found in the printed schedule are as follows:
There is also a rather lengthy provision which in substance provides that any yardman "taken out of the service or censured for cause" shall be notified of the reason for that action, and given a hearing, if demanded, with the right to be present in person or by a representative, and to examine the witnesses and offer evidence. The right to appeal to higher officials of the carriers is also granted. This provision concludes as follows: "In case the suspension or dismissal or censure is found to be unjust yardmen or switchtenders shall be reinstated and paid for time lost."
The alleged supplementary agreement of 1914, known as "Request 79 and Answer thereto", is as follows:
To continue reading
Request your trial