Early v. Becerra

• Decision Date: 08 February 2021
• Docket Number: C089943
• Citation: 60 Cal.App.5th 726,274 Cal.Rptr.3d 866
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Eric P. EARLY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Xavier BECERRA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

60 Cal.App.5th 726

274 Cal.Rptr.3d 866

Eric P. EARLY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.Xavier BECERRA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

C089943

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Filed February 8, 2021

Early Sullivan Wright Gizer & McRae, Peter D. Scott, Los Angeles; Steve Cooley and Associates, Steve Cooley, Brentford Ferreira, Los Angeles; Parris Law Firm and R. Rex Parris, Lancaster, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Kaufman Legal Group, Stephen J. Kaufman, George M. Yin, Glendale, Gary S. Winuk, Sacramento; Downey Brand and Jay-Allen Eisen, Sacramento, for Defendants and Respondents Xavier Becerra and Becerra for Attorney General 2018.

Steven J. Reyes, Los Angeles, and Lisa M. Alarcon, for Defendant and Respondent Dr. Shirley N. Weber.

RAYE, P. J.

Xavier Becerra and his election committee (collectively, Becerra) successfully defended a petition for writ of mandate brought by Eric P. Early and his election committee (collectively, Early) seeking to remove Becerra as a candidate for Attorney General on the November 2018 ballot. We affirmed the decision of the trial court denying the petition. ( Early v. Becerra (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 325, 329, 261 Cal.Rptr.3d 1.) Early alleged that Becerra was ineligible for the office of Attorney General because his state bar status was "inactive" during the five years preceding the election and therefore he was not "admitted to practice" in the state as required for that period under Government Code section 12503.¹ We held that the phrase "admitted to practice" in the statute "refers to the event of admission to the bar and the status of being admitted, and does not require engagement in the ‘actual’ or ‘active’ practice of law." ( Early v. Becerra, supra , 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 329, 261 Cal.Rptr.3d 1.)²

Becerra brought a motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which the trial court granted awarding Becerra $69,718 in attorney fees.³ We now affirm the trial court's award of attorney fees under section 1021.5. Becerra's successful defense of the petition enforced an important public right and conferred a significant benefit on the general public as required by subdivision (a) of section 1021.5. This litigation resulted in a published opinion stating for the first time that Government Code section 12503 did not require active or actual practice of law, thereby expanding the pool of eligible candidates for Attorney General, for example, to include members of the state bar who had voluntarily taken inactive status while serving in other public office.

Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining under subdivision (b) of section 1021.5 that the financial burden Becerra incurred in defending Early's suit outweighed any pecuniary benefit in the form of the salary paid to the Attorney General or otherwise. A successful defense meant only that Becerra's name remained on the ballot and did not ensure that he would gain the position and its associated pecuniary benefits.⁴

Lastly, we find no abuse of discretion in the amount of fees the trial court awarded for the work of Becerra's attorneys on the fees motion. It is axiomatic that an experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of legal services rendered in the trial court.

The judgment is affirmed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In Early v. Becerra , we detailed the facts and events leading to the trial court's ruling that the language of Government Code section 12503 did not support Early's petition for writ of mandate to disqualify Becerra from the November 2018 election. We refer the reader to our prior decision on that subject. (See Early v. Becerra, supra , 47 Cal.App.5th at pp. 329-331, 261 Cal.Rptr.3d 1.)

The judgment entered in favor of Early on July 31, 2018, stated that Early's application for attorney fees under section 1021.5 would be made by separate motion.⁵

On October 1, 2018, Becerra brought a motion for attorney fees under section 1021.5 Becerra noted that Early had sought an award of attorney fees under the statute and stated in petitions to this court and the California Supreme Court that this case presented issues of great public importance. Becerra argued that his successful defense of Early's petition for writ of mandate enforced an important right affecting the public interest and conferred a significant benefit on the general public, in that he had: (1) protected the right of the electorate to choose the candidate they deemed most suitable for elected office; (2) obtained a ruling on the proper construction of Government Code section 12503 ; and (3) furthered and preserved the voters’ ability to choose candidates for Attorney General from a broad pool of the legal community.

Becerra maintained he had no alternative but to incur the legal expense of opposing Early's petition because no public entity or official could lawfully expend public resources on behalf of a political candidate. Becerra conceded that he had a personal stake in preserving his candidacy for Attorney General but contended the financial burden of the litigation exceeded his personal interest.

Finally, Becerra argued that the fees incurred were reasonable given the qualifications of his counsel, the reasonableness of their hourly rates, the interests at stake, the time and skill required in litigation involving interpretation of Government Code section 12503 as a matter of first impression, and his attorneys’ success. Becerra also sought attorney fees incurred in bringing the motion for attorney fees.

On March 22, 2019, Early filed an opposition to the motion. Early contended that Becerra did not defend the litigation to give voters greater choice in the election but to reap the pecuniary benefits of the Attorney General's office. Early argued that Becerra's motion should be denied because he failed to conduct the required cost/benefit analysis. Early maintained that such analysis would demonstrate that Becerra's financial stake greatly exceeded the attorney fees he claimed to have incurred because he stood to gain more than $2 million, consisting of the discounted value of the Attorney General's salary and benefits for a four-year term and, after leaving office, an estimated $200,000 annual salary in the private sector for 10 years due to his status as a former Attorney General. Early also suggested that Becerra's attorneys never actually billed their fees but worked pro bono, and, if the fees were charged, Becerra's campaign, not Becerra, paid them. Finally, Early contended (1) any fees awarded could not include amounts spent on writ proceedings in this court and the California Supreme Court, and (2) the fees sought for preparing the fees motion were exorbitant.

In reply, Becerra argued, inter alia, that attorney fees had routinely been awarded in election cases and the issue of eligibility under Government Code section 12503 affected more than just Becerra and had been raised in a prior suit involving then-Attorney General Brown. Becerra contended that Early's calculation of the financial gain Becerra stood to obtain were he elected to the office was no more than speculation. Becerra disputed Early's position that attorney fees for appellate work could not be awarded by the trial court.

On May 1, 2019, the trial court issued a ruling on Becerra's motion for attorney fees. The court found that Becerra's successful defense vindicated an important right in the public interest and conferred a significant benefit on the general public as required by section 1021.5 for an award of attorney fees. The court pointed out that Early referred in his petition for writ of mandate and supporting memorandum to the need to prevent a great waste of taxpayer funds and confusion of California voters occasioned by having an ineligible candidate (Becerra) on the ballot, thereby promoting the fairness and legitimacy of the election. The court reasoned that Early's failure to prevail did not make these issues any less critical, in that the decision of the court and Becerra's successful defense ensured there would be no waste of taxpayer funds or voter confusion and promote the fairness and legitimacy of the election by ensuring that Becerra was an eligible candidate. The court analyzed and distinguished Early's case authority cited for the proposition that the right of voters to the candidate of their choice is not an important right affecting the public interest and that attorney fees incurred in a candidate's pursuit of elective office do not " ‘transcend’ " the candidate's personal stake in the election.

The trial court then turned to the requirement of subdivision (b) of section 1021.5 that the necessity and financial burden of enforcement must support the appropriateness of the award. The court analyzed case authority and found there was no basis to conclude that Becerra's defense was motivated by pecuniary interests and non-pecuniary interests were irrelevant. The court found that "Becerra neither expected nor could expect any direct pecuniary benefit from this litigation," and there was no evidence before the court to support Early's assertions regarding Becerra's income over the next decade. Even if Early had submitted such evidence, the court said Becerra's future private sector income was speculative. In addition, a successful defense would result only in Becerra remaining on the ballot but not in his receiving the salary and benefits of the Attorney General position, since California voters had yet to elect him to that office. The court observed that another defect in Early's argument was the failure to offset the salary Becerra would receive from other employment if his defense had been unsuccessful. The court also found, that even if Becerra's pecuniary benefits were quantifiable and exceeded the cost of litigation, the benefits for the general public were so very high so as to make an award appropriate.

The trial court rejected Early's argument that fees incurred in appellate...